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ABSTRACT
Research on the effects of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) , 
implemented in Third World countries since the early 1980s, has 
been dominated, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by the 
analysis of quantitative, national-level data. The relationship 
between gender and SAPs at the household level has been largely 
neglected. This thesis examines the above relationship in Harare, 
Zimbabwe where the government's recent adoption of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme, ESAP (1991-95) has allowed a 
study of the processes of change at the household level following 
changes in macro-economic and social policies.
Quantitative and qualitative research methods were used to 
provide an integrated picture of changes in the lives of women 
and men in a random sample of 100 households in one typical high- 
density suburb in Harare. A base-line study was carried out in 
mid-1991 and the same households followed up in mid-1992. Gender- 
specific changes in employment and income, household expenditure, 
domestic work and involvement in social organisations were 
investigated as well as responses to the dramatic rises in the 
cost of living following measures implemented under ESAP.
The research shows that almost all households have been 
negatively affected by ESAP, with widening income differentials 
and a much greater proportion of households falling below the 
Poverty Datum Line. Household savings have been depleted and a 
greater number of households are in debt. Women's income has 
declined to a greater extent than men's and their responsibility 
to meet daily consumption needs of the household has become more 
difficult to fulfil, resulting in increased gender-based 
conflict. Although all households were forced to cut consumption, 
the poorest households have been worst affected with women taking 
greater cuts than men. Coping responses were found to be 
individual and family-based, sometimes across urban and rural 
areas, rather than community-based. Responses have been 
defensive, aimed at coping with rather than changing the
situation, and largely ineffective in compensating for declining 
real wages, rising prices and diminishing income generating 
opportunities.
The relationship between changes at household level and specific 
policy measures were assessed and the evidence indicates that 
both income and gender based inequalities have, to date, been 
exacerbated by ESAP. The Social Dimensions of Adjustment poverty 
alleviation programme is very weak in its conceptualisation and 
implementation. The study emphasizes the need for more equitable 
and gender-sensitive strategies for development.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENDER AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Sub-Saharan Africa has been particularly affected by global 
economic recession since the late 1970s. The major institutional 
response to the crisis has been the adoption of Stabilization and 
Structural Adjustment Policies, advocated by the major 
international financial institutions, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Adjustment policies describe all 
policies designed to reduce financial imbalances in the economy, 
both on external accounts and in domestic resource use. 
Stabilization policies are short term, implemented over one or 
two years. They reduce imbalances in the external accounts and 
the domestic budget by cutting down on expenditure (by 
governments, firms and households), reducing credit creation and 
the budget deficit. Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), as the 
name implies, are concerned with changing the structure of the 
economy. The policies involve expanding exports with the 
objective of improving the balance of trade. Institutional 
reforms are advocated to reduce the role of the state and make 
the economy more market oriented. A shift in productive resources 
from consumption to investment, and from non-tradeables to 
tradeables is promoted, with the objective of promoting economic 
growth (Elson, 1989; Onimode, 1989a; Woodward, 1992b).
The general effects of recession and SAPs in the Third World 
during the 1980s have been documented in terms of increasing 
poverty and a decline in various social indicators such as 
nutritional status of children under five years and school 
enrolment rates (Beneria & Roldan, 1987; Cornia et al. 1987;
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989; Elson, 1989, 1991b; Moser, 1989; 
Onimode, 1989a). In sub-Saharan Africa, only a few studies have 
gone beyond the analysis of quantitative, national-level data on 
the impact of SAPs to consider more qualitative, locally-based 
data, let alone examine possible differences according to gender.
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The overall aim of the present research is to investigate the 
gender-specific effects of SAPs on urban, low-income households 
in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, and to examine responses to 
changing economic conditions at the household and community 
level. The underlying assumption is that changes in economic 
conditions and policies have different impacts on men and women 
due to the sexual division of labour and gender inequalities 
(Elson, 1989) . The gender-specific effects of SAPs have recently 
become the subject of debate, but most research has been carried 
out in Latin America (see for example, Beneria, 1991; Chant, 
1991, 1993; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988, 1991; Moser, 1989a; Rocha 
et__al, 1987; Selby et__al, 1990, Chapter 6). Research in that 
region points to an increase in women's participation in the 
labour force, changes in household structure from nuclear to 
extended, and women's increased use of informal networks to 
combat economic crisis. Although the same kinds of gender 
inequalities appear to be common to many parts of the world, 
differences in the process of economic and political development 
and in the social and cultural factors underlying the nature and 
organisation of low-income households undoubtedly give rise to 
variations in responses to SAPs. How do responses in sub-Saharan 
Africa differ from those of Latin America? What are the 
implications for women and gender relations in the short and long 
term? Which factors influence whether responses are household or 
community based? What are the implications for policy? The World 
Bank has reacted to the evidence of the negative effects of SAPs 
by adding a "Social Dimensions of Adjustment", component to the 
main programme which purports to alleviate what are seen to be 
the transitional costs for vulnerable groups. Is this component 
likely to be effective? Is it gender-aware? These are the general 
questions which have prompted the present research.
The debate on gender and Structural Adjustment has important 
implications for equality between men and women; it also has 
consequences for women's health and welfare and, because of 
women's key role in reproduction, for household health and 
welfare. Household surveys have too often been carried out with
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the assumption that the household is a homogeneous unit, ignoring 
intra-household divisions of labour and resources. However, it 
is precisely an understanding of these relations and particularly 
changes in women's productive and reproductive work, and the 
articulation between them, that is required to understand the 
"costs" of particular policies and to inform policies designed 
to promote the health and well-being of households.
Turning to sub-Saharan Africa, most studies on the effects of 
recession and SAPs have either analysed trends in data that have 
already been collected (routinely) at national level or have 
examined the effects of expenditure cuts on specific social 
sectors. While this is important, there is a need for micro-level 
research which allows a greater understanding of the nature of 
the effects of SAPs on the poor. Some recent household-level 
studies have collected data retrospectively with consequent 
limitations in measuring changes and clearly identifying factors 
causing change in low-income households (see for example 
Tibaijuka, 1988 on Tanzania, Galli & Funk, 1991 on Guinea Bissau, 
Cliffe, 1991 on Mozambique). As Weekes-Vagliani (1992:120) 
comments in her work on the Ivory Coast, without clearly knowing 
what the base-line is for sub-groups, it is impossible to measure 
the impact of adjustment policies. Since Zimbabwe only initiated 
a full programme of Economic Structural Adjustment (ESAP) in 
January 1991 (to run until 1995), this study allows an 
investigation of processes of change at household level which can 
be chronologically, and to some extent causally, linked to the 
implementation of particular macro-level policies. This study was 
carried out in two main phases, interviewing the same households 
in 1991 and in 1992, in order to document social and economic 
changes after a period of twelve months. Although this is a 
relatively short time-span, significant changes were detected and 
such a micro-level study would seem to be an important complement 
to other ways of monitoring the effects of SAPs.
Although in most underdeveloped countries rural populations are 
the most marginalised and impoverished, the capacity of the urban
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poor to cope with rises in the cost of living is arguably less 
in some respects, due to their limited access to land for food 
production. In addition, rural households may benefit to some 
extent from increases in producer prices (as part of SAPs), while 
the urban poor bear more of the costs of policies such as the 
lifting of food subsidies and wage restraints. This is one reason 
for locating the study in an urban area. A further reason is that 
studies which focus on gender issues in Africa tend to be located 
in rural areas, and to be concerned with women's role in
agriculture. Yet, as Obbo (1990:218) points out, it is in urban 
areas that African women seem to be most actively involved in 
negotiating, restructuring and reestablishing their positions 
with respect to benefits and power. Although urban women are thus 
often at the forefront in challenging traditional gender-ascribed 
roles, the issues and problems they confront have received 
inadequate attention from researchers and policy-makers.
The objectives of this research are to identify and assess 
gender-specific changes in employment and income and household 
expenditure on basic goods and services, following the
government's adoption of ESAP. A further objective is to
identify women's coping responses as well as constraints to their 
effectiveness. An attempt is then made to link these micro-level 
findings to macro-level policy changes, drawing out future 
implications for low-income households.
The rest of this chapter aims to substantiate the rationale for 
this study by examining the nature of the economic crisis leading 
to the adoption of SAPs on the one hand, and gender and
development issues on the other. The key issues concerning gender 
and SAPs then become clearer, as do the specific questions which 
the research seeks to address.
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1.2 ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBT CRISIS
Many accounts of the economic crises facing most developing 
countries today begin by describing the OPEC "oil shock" of 1973- 
74 and the transmission of recession in the North to the South1 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, we need to go further back 
to identify the structural factors which made the development of 
the economic crisis inevitable. For Africa, it is also essential 
to consider the economics of the recent colonial past and post­
independence changes (Payer, 1989:7).
Although substantial amounts of finance capital did flow into the 
colonies from the colonising powers, resources essentially flowed 
back out, with the local colonial elite accruing wealth in the 
process. The majority of people were condemned to poverty, 
landlessness, unemployment or forced labour, marginalization, 
poor housing and inadequate health and education services 
(Rodney, 1981). With political independence, many African 
governments implemented policies that would reverse some of the 
most glaring inequalities of the colonial period. More equitable 
access to education and health care, some degree of land reform, 
improved access to water and sanitation and changes in labour 
policies were undertaken. The extent to which such policies were 
carried out, and indeed the nature of these reforms, varied from 
country to country.
Much depended on the "development model" adopted by respective 
governments as well as on the degree to which the local elite had 
consolidated its power and interests. What was quite remarkable 
about the effect of such reforms was that even in those countries 
where changes made were relatively modest, the overall outcome 
in terms of social indicators such as average life expectancy, 
infant mortality and so on was considerable. Aggregate figures 
for sub-Saharan Africa show that while between 1960 and 1980 
there was only a small increase in GNP/capita ($222 to $282) , 
life expectancy increased from about 38 years in 1960 to about 
47 years in 1978 (World Bank, 1980).
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Despite independence, the fundamental relationship between the 
economies of these countries and those of the developed world 
remained unchanged. Commodity prices, control of the 
international market, values of currencies and exchange rates 
were still largely determined by the industrialized countries and 
by finance capital in particular. African countries did not have 
access to their own capital markets, nor did they have sufficient 
heavy industry to manufacture the means of production or the 
capital goods required in either the industrial or agricultural 
sectors. These were available from industrialized countries, 
usually through loans. Loans, however, required repayment in hard 
currency generally only available through the export of primary 
commodities, thereby creating a vicious circle. The roots of the 
debt crisis lie in these structural inequalities in production 
and exchange at the international level (see amongst others 
Woodward, 1992b:29).
The responsibility for the crisis cannot, however,, be solely or 
simplistically ascribed to international factors. Even before the 
recessionary tendencies of the 1970s, a class of 11 entrepreneurs1,2 
had either developed or was further consolidating itself in most 
African countries. This class took economic advantage of 
inequalities in both urban and rural areas since it was 
guaranteed a huge pool of cheap labour whose wages could be kept 
low by the existence of surplus labour. Often these entrepreneurs 
had easy access to state bureaucracies or were themselves part 
of those structures, using their influence to facilitate their 
ventures (see for example Roxborough, 1979:159). The power of 
this class and its capacity to accumulate, was related to the 
development paradigm adopted by respective governments. Some, 
such as those of Kenya and Nigeria, sought to encourage the 
development of a capitalist class in the belief that the wealth 
generated by "modernization" and "free market" development 
(advocated by Western economists) would eventually "trickle down" 
to the majority.3 These governments also operated a relatively 
liberal policy with multinational companies, allowing them to 
repatriate a sizeable portion of their profits. The profits
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reaped by the entrepreneurial classes were often high, frequently 
stored away in foreign banks and ventures.
Other African governments such as those of Tanzania and 
Mozambique, which had evolved out of a closer relationship with 
popular movements, put the need for achieving equality high on 
the agenda and often implemented wide ranging social reforms 
aimed at reversing the inequalities inherited at independence. 
Often these governments imposed a variety of measures that 
reduced (but never completely inhibited) the capacity of 
entrepreneurs to accumulate. Ventures by local entrepreneurs were 
often carried out in collaboration with the state, the latter 
endeavouring to maintain a controlling interest to ensure that 
"excesses" did not occur. Moreover, such governments also 
exercised caution over the operations of multinational companies, 
attempting to control, for example, their repatriation of 
profits. However, even Mozambique and Tanzania failed to change 
their inherited colonial structures, and production remained 
dependent on imports and foreign technology.
For much of the 1960s and 1970s, the importation of inputs for 
"development" was also paid for through capital flows from the 
developed to the developing countries. Capital flows included 
private direct investment and loans made by government programmes 
or guaranteed by • government agencies. For industrialised 
countries, this mechanism permitted the investment of export 
surplus and for western multinationals the invasion of African 
markets. However:
"There was a fatal flaw in this policy toward the 
Third World. Corporations invested in Third World 
countries because they wanted to make profits there - 
and take the profits, out of the country. But if loans 
- even soft loans - were the major vehicle of capital 
flows, they also required reverse flows of interest 
and amortization. With either loans or investment, the 
result would at some point be the reversal of the flow 
of capital" (Payer, 1989:8)
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When in the early 1980s the point for the reversal of capital 
flows was reached, "it seemed as if the world had turned upside 
down, and water (money is suggestively called liquidity) was 
flowing uphill (from the Third World to the developed countries)" 
(ibid).
The oil shock of 1973-74, rather than being a cause of the debt 
crisis, as has been suggested, aggravated an already 
contradictory economic situation. The surplus of petrodollars 
deposited mainly in OECD financial institutions had to be 
invested and made to earn money, otherwise it would be a 
liability for the banks who would be unable to pay interest to 
savers. At the same time, many African countries were seeking to 
accelerate their economic growth and required capital to invest. 
Foreign banks were more than willing to provide loans with their 
glut of petrodollars. Whether loans were negotiated between 
governments and the banks, or between private companies and the 
banks, they were guaranteed and underwritten by the state (see 
Woodward, 1991b:25). Thus repayment was guaranteed and within 
countries, large sums of private debt became public debt.
The early 1980s saw the rise of the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations and the adoption, on a world scale, of monetarist 
policies. Economic recession had set in and inflation was on the 
upswing in the industrialized world. Low raw material prices 
constituted one of the main anti-inflationary tools used by the 
US and other industrial nations, and consequently primary 
commodity prices, the main source of foreign exchange earnings 
for African countries, began to plummet.4 In addition, the US 
raised its interest rates to dramatic levels in an attempt to 
attract foreign capital to finance its trade and budget deficits 
with the result that international interest rates soared. The 
debtors had not anticipated such interest rate rises and their 
capacity to service the debts declined drastically. Debts 
incurred in an earlier period were now taking longer to repay. 
Consequently, access to new loans became even more difficult 
(Woodward, 1992b:25)
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One of the major consequences of this scenario in Africa was that 
a considerable shift occurred in capital investment away from the 
productive and into non-productive sectors of the economy. Money 
would be borrowed on the international market (guaranteed by the 
state) on a short-term basis, converted into local currency and 
in turn, lent at higher rates of interest, thereby providing 
massive profits. The "entrepreneurs" made a quick killing while 
the poor were lumbered with paying the interest and capital sum 
of their loans. All this was condoned by governments as well as 
creditors. Growth rates in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors stagnated and often became negative. Capital moved into 
speculation, real estate and money lending. The result was a 
decline of domestic production and fewer exports to generate 
foreign exchange to pay off debts.
This combination of unstable and declining export earnings, poor 
terms of trade, declining development aid and high debt 
repayments has led to persistent and deteriorating balance of 
payments deficits and crises. The response of international 
banking institutions has been to advocate and support economic 
adjustment policies.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
The towering amounts of debt servicing could not be sustained by 
underdeveloped countries and in 1982, Mexico and Brazil 
threatened to default on their debt, declaring moratoria on 
payments. The US, IMF, World Bank and OECD countries stepped in 
to bail out the private banks and avert, as the Managing Director 
of the IMF put it, "a real threat to the integrity of the 
international financial and trading system" (Lever & Huhne, 
1985:64). The IMF and the World Bank, acting in favour of OECD 
countries which effectively control these institutions (Harris, 
1989), attempted to ensure debt servicing as a means of 
maintaining the security and profits of Western financial 
institutions.
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These interests were and continue to be maintained through the 
implementation of adjustment policies (SAPs). An essential 
assumption of these policies is that economies can only grow by 
being adjusted to the "free market", guided by supply and demand. 
Growth has to be export-led (to earn foreign exchange to service 
debts) and new loans, not only from the IMF, but also from the 
World Bank and Western governments are conditional on the 
acceptance and implementation of SAPs. It is this conditionality 
for donor aid and loans that makes the IMF and World Bank 
influence on economic policy so great. Between 1980 and 1986, 
more than three-quarters (30) of sub-Saharan African countries 
implemented IMF and World Bank-sponsored adjustment programmes 
(Campbell, 1989:23).
Stabilization policies, which tend to be short-term, consist of 
demand restraint measures which, combined with devaluation of the 
currency, have a deflationary effect and tend to have a rapid 
positive impact on the balance of trade through a reduction in 
imports. Structural adjustment policies are concerned with 
changing the structure of the economy over the medium term. The 
policies involve expanding the supply of tradeables, that is 
mainly exports, with the objective of improving the balance of 
trade. Institutional reforms are advocated to reduce the role of 
the state and make the economy more market oriented. A shift in 
productive resources from consumption to investment, and from 
non-tradeables to tradeables is promoted, with the proclaimed 
objective of promoting economic growth. As Standing (1991a:5) 
summarises, the essence of this approach is that resource 
allocation and economic outcomes should be left to the market, 
macro-economic policy should be geared primarily to monetary 
stability and government should concentrate on the preservation 
of a legal framework in which "business" can be done.
The IMF and the World Bank argue that underdeveloped countries 
have a comparative advantage in the production of primary exports 
and see this as the main growth area, particularly for African 
economies. The private sector, they argue, is able to promote
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production in a more competitive and efficient manner than the 
state sector. Within this perspective, African governments have 
over-subsidised state enterprises and overspent in social sectors 
such as health, housing, education, basic services and social 
welfare. A typical adjustment package (see for example Woodward, 
1992b:31) therefore includes:-
* cumulative devaluations to discourage imports and 
encourage exports
* reduction of government expenditure in the social 
sectors through privatization, introduction of user 
charges and the withdrawal of subsidies
* trade liberalization through the abolition of price and 
import controls and freer entry for multinational 
corporations, greater incentives for exports
* privatization of government enterprises and/or reform 
including retrenchment of workers, wage freezes and 
increases in prices.
There is another point of view concerning these policy measures, 
best articulated by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN 
ECA, 1989) . While the IMF and World Bank argue that currency 
devaluation, for example, will encourage exports since other 
countries will be able to buy more with their currency and will 
discourage imports as they become more expensive, thereby 
improving the balance of trade, the UN ECA argues that since 
commodity prices are already low, devaluation will further reduce 
the value of the country's goods and will increase prices of 
critical goods and services, trigger inflation, divert foreign 
exchange to speculative activities and worsen income 
distribution. In addition, concurrent devaluations in many 
countries is ineffective because world markets are flooded with 
cheaper goods at the same time (George, 1992:340). On the issue 
of price and import liberalisation, while the IMF and World Bank 
view is that this will encourage competition and efficiency, and 
that higher agricultural producer prices will promote the 
production of cash crops and boost exports, the ECA argues that
11
these measures intensify foreign exchange constraints, erode the 
capacity of indigenous infant industries and worsen inflation. 
Food-self sufficiency may also be jeopardised if producers switch 
to cash crops.
In the light of the above, it can be argued that Structural 
Adjustment needs "depackaging" (see for example, Stoneman, 
1990:1). While some policy reforms, such as the provision of 
incentives to farmers, may be necessary, it does not follow that 
all subsidies should be removed, that the state's role should be 
minimised or that trade controls should be abandoned. However, 
to date, the policies have been prescribed as a package with 
little consideration of inter-country differences in economic 
structures and circumstances.
The conceptual framework of adjustment policies is similar to 
that of "modernization" advocated by western economists in the 
immediate post-independence period. The preoccupation is with 
economic growth per se and represents a retraction from any 
marginal moves in the 1970s towards a Basic Needs approach to 
development.5 In the context of adjustment, education, health and 
other social services, hitherto considered basic needs and basic 
rights, are increasingly seen as commodities for private 
purchase. Non-governmental organizations are encouraged to play 
a greater role in providing services for "vulnerable groups", 
just as they were in the residual model of social welfare 
associated with the modernization theories of development. Once 
again, "trickle down" from economic growth is being relied on to 
improve the standards of living of the majority in spite of 
decades of experience demonstrating the contrary (See amongst 
others Hardiman & Midgely, 1982; Sandbrook, 1982; Wisner, 1988). 
Percy Mistry, a former senior manager at the World Bank describes 
the role of the IMF and World Bank in Africa as follows:
"I think that under the adjustment label what the 
Bank and the Fund have really been doing in Africa is 
to attempt fundamental change in the development 
paradigm; essentially to convince African governments
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through the guise of adjustment that their particular 
form of collectivism, of a type of socialist mixed 
economy is unworkable” (Mistry, 1989:18).
Adjustment policies have been argued to embody a fresh attempt 
to ensure the full integration of African economies into the 
existing world economic order. As Togba-Nah Tipoteh (1991;30), 
member of the UN International Advisory Board on Structural 
Adjustment in Africa, contends:
"Foremost, in terms of the objectives, the World Bank 
and IMF seek to promote private, foreign (relative to 
Africa) profit making opportunities. This is not 
surprising because both institutions are controlled by 
the group of five member-states: USA, Japan, West
Germany, France and Britain, but principally by the 
first three countries), whose governments are 
accountable to their multinational corporations which 
continue to dominate investment, trade and aid in 
African economies".
There is however, an important class dimension to consider. Many 
national-decision makers willingly collaborate with international 
banks and have a vested interest in the implementation of 
adjustment policies, since it allows the most economically (and 
politically) powerful groups in society to continue making and 
exporting their profits. For example, the entrepreneurial class 
is able to take advantage of import liberalization and access to 
foreign exchange to import manufactured (often luxury) goods 
which can be sold at high profits, as well as increasing their 
asset holdings abroad as illustrated by trends in capital flight 
(Tipoteh, 1989:30). In addition, cuts in the social sectors least 
affect high income groups since they are able to buy services in 
the private sector and in any case, are inclined to use tertiary 
level services, such as hospitals, which have tended to suffer 
less in the way of cuts.
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Because of these class interests, spontaneous and organised 
protests to the implementation of adjustment policies have, in 
general, been severely suppressed. Food riots in countries such 
as Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Zambia, directed at the increases 
in the cost of basic commodities under SAPs, have all been put 
down severely, often with high casualties (Loewenson,1991:7).6 
Strikes by public sector workers and student demonstrations in 
countries such as Mozambique and Sudan, have been suppressed and 
information about these actions is hard to come by since it is 
also suppressed (ibid).
In terms of macro-economic performance, the implementation of 
adjustment policies has not, for the most part, been successful 
in promoting growth. As Woodward (1992b:96) concludes from his 
study of debt and adjustment in developing countries, ten years 
into the adjustment process few countries show any signs of a 
return to sustainable growth. This is particularly true for most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where there was negligible to 
negative growth in GDP, exports and imports for the 1982-87 
period. During this period, the average annual real growth rate 
for GDP, exports and imports was 0.1%, -0.8% and -10.3%
respectively (Tipoteh, 1989:31). Debt service obligation as a 
percentage of exports more than doubled from 14% in 1979 to 31% 
in 1987 (United Nations, 1988). Sub-Saharan African debt more 
than doubled from US$ 77 billion in 1982 to US$ 164 billion in 
1990 although its share of total Third World debt was only 11% 
(George, 1992:336). Forty per cent of this debt is to the World 
Bank and IMF and in the 1986-90 period, Africa paid $4.7 billion 
to these institutions (Adedeji, 1990). Again, quoting Mistry 
(1989:24) the former World Bank senior manager on Ghana, the 
"model" programme in Africa:
"Seven , years into adjustment, Ghana has continually 
been held up by the Bank and the Fund as the success 
story of adjustment in Africa. But I believe it's 
pretty unsustainable because what people tend to 
forget is that something like $1.2 billion a year of 
external financing has had to be provided annually for
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a country of 15 million people. That's $75 per capita 
and it can't go on indefinitely. Ghanaian savings or 
investment just have not increased. Ghana's capacity 
for self-sustaining adjustment is still a long way 
off."
EFFECTS OF SAPs ON LOW-INCOME GROUPS
By the mid 1980s, there was mounting evidence of the negative 
effects of adjustment policies on the living conditions of the 
poor. One of the first large-scale studies in ten underdeveloped 
countries showed that lower real incomes, higher costs of living 
and restricted government expenditure in the social sectors were 
producing an alarming deterioration in living conditions, 
reflected in such indicators as infant mortality rates and 
children's nutritional status (Cornia et al. 1987). In sub-
Saharan Africa, per capita incomes fell by over one quarter in 
the 1980s and open unemployment increased (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1989:27, 55). Real wages declined by 30% to 90%
(George, 1992:337). Various studies using national-level data 
have shown the negative effects on low-income groups and on the 
social sectors in sub-Saharan Africa (for example, Loxley, 1990 
on Ghana and Zambia and Onimode, 1989a on a range of countries).
One of the major, stated objectives of adjustment programmes in 
Africa is to stimulate the production of export crops by raising 
producer prices and/or dismantling price controls. This, it is 
argued, will also raise the living standards of the majority of 
the rural population. There is, however, nc clear evidence of the 
effectiveness of this measure. Firstly, it is unclear whether 
these rises are able to offset the price increases in 
agricultural inputs and in consumer goods. One study found that 
maize producer price increases of 142% in Zambia dropped to a 
real increase of 6% after taking into account increased cost of 
purchases (Elson, 1989:66). Another study in Zambia found that 
a minority of small-scale producers directly benefitted from 
changes in producer prices while many more were negatively 
affected by price increases for essential food and non-food items
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(Evans, 1989). In addition, those who are able to take advantage 
of increased grants and loans are farmers with larger scale 
production, rather than small peasant producers. Secondly, the 
ideology is to promote private farming. In Mozambique, for 
example, USAID grants were given only to private farmers around 
the capital to increase the supply of food to the city. It 
therefore became more difficult for women farmers in cooperatives 
to offer competitive prices, particularly as some profits were 
channelled into collective childcare. Thirdly, there are no 
incentives for food as opposed to cash crop production which has 
implications for household health and nutrition and ultimately, 
national food production. As Loxley points out, the massive 
increases in the price of cocoa in Ghana, during the 1983-87 
period, resulted in a severe erosion of incentives to produce 
food. Between 1984 and 1986, per capita output of each of the 
major food staples fell by between 10% and 30% (Loxley, 1990:14) . 
The World Food Programme estimates that malnutrition affected 40% 
of African children in 1990 as compared with 25% in 1985 (George, 
1992:337) .
Export-led growth, an important objective of SAPs, depends on 
international competitiveness in the relevant productive 
sector(s). To ensure a flexible, low-cost workforce, wages have 
been held down and measures used to limit workers' rights and 
their bargaining power over working conditions (Standing 
1991a:19). In addition, a large surplus labour force acts as a 
disciplinary threat to those in employment (ibid). The argument 
is that minimum wages distort the market, deterring employment 
by favouring capital-labour substitution and increasing the 
inequalities between the formal and informal sectors.7 The 
counter argument is that measures should be introduced to raise 
incomes in the informal economy, not reduce the wages for those 
who have some measure of protection. In any case, retrenchments 
under SAPs has increased the labour supply to the informal 
economy, decreasing the price of labour in this sector (Standing, 
1991a;24) .
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The view that SAPs only create unemployment in the short term is 
not borne out by the experience of most sub-Saharan countries 
which underwent adjustment in the 1980s. Since reductions in 
public expenditure have been a major target of SAPs, wage erosion 
and compression have been more pronounced in the public sector 
than in private enterprises (Vandemoortele, 1991:88). This is 
obviously of enormous consequence in countries where the public 
sector is the most important wage employer. Declines in public 
sector wages and terms of employment in many parts of Africa have 
led to widespread "daylighting" (absence from work to engage in 
other income generating activities) and other responses by civil 
servants that seriously affect public sector productivity. A 
growing proportion of wage earners are engaged in secondary jobs 
and there is evidence that low-income households increase their 
economic activity during periods of recession and adjustment, and 
spread their income sources over a multitude of economic sectors 
that extend sometimes across international borders 
(Vandemoortele, 1991:90). Standing (1991a:45), in his 
comprehensive analysis of labour market issues and SAPs, 
concludes:
". . at the end of a decade of supply side 
"experiments" in many labour markets in industrialised 
and low-income economies, poverty is more widespread, 
inequality and labour fragmentation greater, labour- 
related insecurity worse and unemployment chronically 
high."
During Structural Adjustment, the informal sector is ascribed an 
important role in absorbing labour and mitigating what are seen 
as transitional negative effects (World Bank, 1988a). Although 
there is little doubt that this sector does operate as a refuge 
for the unemployed, it generally creates low productivity jobs 
and precarious forms of employment (Moser, 1984; Vandemoortele, 
1991). One problem is that this sector is reaching saturation in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Vandemoortele, 1991;19; see also Brydon, 1993 
on Ghana), with lower real incomes implying falling demand and 
increasing competition. Within informal sector production, grants
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and loans are more easily obtained by larger-scale enterprises. 
As Stewart (1992:32) points out, credit reform under SAPs do not 
help low-income borrowers significantly because of their lack of 
collateral. It is therefore probable that adjustment policies 
tend to further divide and stratify low income groups in both 
urban and rural areas, increase competition for scarce 
employment, resources and markets, and exacerbate income 
differentials.
Cuts in public expenditure on social services form an important 
element of SAPs. There were significant falls in real per capita 
expenditure in the health and education sectors in about two- 
thirds of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
in the early 1980s (Stewart, 1992:27). The World Bank recommends 
"cost recovery" in these sectors, an expression for the 
introduction and/or raising of user charges. Although further 
research is required, there is increasing evidence that these 
measures decrease accessibility, particularly for low-income 
groups (Cliffe, 1991; Kanji, 1989; Waddington & Enyimayew, 1989; 
Stewart, 1992:30) . Although many countries have fee exemption for 
the poorest, in practice, the poor.have found it difficult to 
claim (Loewenson, 1991:4). In a number of countries (Stewart, 
1992:29 cites examples), the incidence of recorded diseases rose 
significantly in the SAP implementation period and diseases which 
had been eliminated reappeared, for example, yaws and yellow 
fever in Ghana (Loewenson, 1992:6).
As in the health sector, public budgets for education have also 
been cut, fees introduced and access to schooling diminished as 
a result of SAPs. Drop-out rates rose and school completion rates 
fell in a number of countries in the 1980s (Stewart, 1992:29-30). 
The introduction of fees in primary schools in one state in 
Nigeria led to a reduction of one-third in enrolment rates 
(ibid). In sub-Saharan Africa, the gross enrolment ratio at the 
primary school level decreased from 80 to 75 during the period 
1980-1987 (Vandemoortele, 1991:83) and there were indications of
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falling educational attainments (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
1989:5).
Another aspect of social expenditure cuts, the removal of food 
subsidies, also particularly affects low-income groups who tend 
to spend a higher proportion of their income on food. The removal 
of food subsidies in Mozambique caused a real increase in food 
prices of between 400% and 600% (Cliffe, 1991:8). In general, 
households cope with declining purchasing power by shifting food 
consumption towards less balanced diets and less food in total, 
leading to nutritional deprivation, particularly in young 
children (Cornia et_al, 1987:100; Stewart, 1992:30). In Mexico, 
Gonz&lez de la Rocha (1988; 1991) found in her study on the
effects of economic crisis, that food consumption declined in 
quantity and nutritional quality. Moser (1989) reported similar 
findings from her research in Ecuador.
The deterioration in health and living conditions of the majority 
of the population in underdeveloped countries, advocacy from 
various international organisations, Third World organisations 
and intellectuals, together with the social unrest caused by the 
implementation of SAPs has led the World Bank to include an 
additional component to Structural Adjustment, the earlier 
mentioned Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) programmes. These 
poverty alleviation programmes to protect the "human resource 
base" are designed independently of the main programme and in no 
way constitute an alternative. A much cited "model" initiative 
is the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in Ghana. This US$ 90 million programme was 
adopted in 1987, five years after the main programme began. It 
seeks to redeploy laid-off workers and to improve health care 
(mainly through an essential drugs project) , nutrition, literacy, 
educational facilities and water supplies. While the programme 
is more comprehensive than most SDAs, Loxley (1990:21) points out 
that PAMSCAD was tacked on to the end of the adjustment package 
as an afterthought, under pressure from UNICEF and concerned 
bilateral donors. The impact of PAMSCAD has not yet been
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adequately evaluated, although Gayi (1991) describes a range of 
problems including a delayed start to the programme due to late 
and/or non-release of funds, lack of logistic support and staff 
shortages. The projects being implemented more quickly are those 
he terms "high visibility" projects targeting the "new poor", 
particularly the redeployed in urban areas rather than projects 
which are supposed to meet the basic needs of poor and vulnerable 
groups (Gayi, 1991:562). Recent research (Brydon, 1993) also 
questions the targeting of the programme and shows that those to 
whom it is directed are not necessarily benefitting. In any case, 
serious questions arise as to the sustainability and 
replicability of the Ghana programme given the level of external 
funding required.
In summary, given the dismal record, it is difficult to see how 
the IMF and World Bank can continue the rhetoric concerning 
"economic growth", particularly when countries are shipping out 
what wealth they do have in debt service repayments. A recent 
study by the Transnational Institute concludes that Africa cannot 
emerge from crisis if it relies on exports of traditional 
products (George, 1992:339) and the special session of the UN 
General Assembly on International Economic Cooperation on 23-28 
April 1990 concluded that Structural Adjustment Policies have in 
many instances exacerbated social inequality without restoring 
growth and development, and have also threatened political 
stability. The lack of concern of policy-makers about the 
distributional effects of adjustment policies is certainly not 
warranted by the evidence reviewed above.
Alternative policies have been formulated (Cornia et al. 1987; 
Elson, 1989; UN Economic Commission for Africa, 1989; Onimode, 
1990; Onimode et al. 1990) which include a range of measures: 
priority to food self-sufficiency and realignment' of consumption 
and production patterns (at a national and regional level), 
lessened import dependence and diversification of the productive 
base, management of debt and debt-servicing, and greater 
selectivity in public expenditure cuts. Although there have been
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recent hints of policy reform in the World Bank (discussed in 
Chapter 6), there is little evidence that such alternatives are 
being considered by governments or by the international financial 
institutions which currently carry such weight in the formulation 
of policy. It can be argued that the undemocratic imposition of 
Structural Adjustment has only been possible because of the lack 
of accountability of governments, and the weakness of civic 
organisations, autonomous from the state and able to exert 
pressure on it. This is, however, a separate point which will 
be taken up in Chapter 6, when examining the implications of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe.
Having examined the nature and implications of the economic 
crisis and SAPs with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, 
the remainder of this chapter seeks to justify the need for 
gender-disaggregation in studies of the effects of SAPs on low- 
income households. In order to do this, selected key issues 
concerning gender and development will be discussed, followed by 
a review of recent research on gender and SAPs.
1.3 GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT
It is difficult to generalise about gender relations in pre­
capitalist societies in the Third World; although patriarchal 
systems inevitably subordinated women to men, there were arguably 
fewer distinctions between productive and reproductive work due 
to the domestic base of subsistence activities (Batezat et al. 
1988; Rogers, 1980; Sacks, 1982; Stamp, 1989). Changes in the 
sexual division of labour and gender roles in the colonial period 
(in the recent past in Africa) were a result of a complex 
interaction between capitalism and patriarchy. The penetration 
of capitalism, by separating out production for consumption and 
production for exchange, and assigning greater value to the 
latter, resulted in much of women's work in the family becoming 
"uncounted" and undervalued. All the work which is necessary for 
the reproduction of the labour force: food processing and 
cooking, organising fuel and water, caring for children, caring 
for sick people and managing the household became seen as 'a
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"private” matter taking place in a "private" arena: the
household. This work became increasingly separated from wage 
labour which takes place in a public arena. Only wage labour, or 
work which directly produces surplus value for capital is seen 
as productive work. Colonial rulers tended to discriminate 
against women in access to employment, technology and land, 
directly transferring Western, capitalist gender relations to the 
colonies (Boserup, 1970).
Much Marxist analysis of capitalism has concentrated on the mode 
of production in relation to socialised labour, and has therefore 
"been unable to come to grips with the core material condition 
of women's oppression under capitalism" (Seccombe, 1980:27), 
since this is individual labour within the household.8 Over the 
last two decades, however, Marxist-feminists analysing both 
industrialised and Third World societies have struggled to 
emphasise the relationship between domestic production, the 
household and sexual relations on the one hand and the mode of 
production and systems of appropriation and exploitation on the 
other (see for example Beneria & Roldan, 1987; Beneria & Sen, 
1982; Grown & Sen, 1987 on the Third World and Barrett, 1980, 
Eisenstein, 1979; Fox, 1980; Mackintosh, 1981 and Scott, 1988 on 
theoretical issues/ industrialised societies). Forms of 
organisation and struggle in the area of subsistence and 
reproduction also become important when this framework is 
adopted. Although many of the fundamental issues concerning 
women's oppression are similar globally, the following discussion 
concentrates on women in the Third World.
/ . . .( Women do most of the work necessary to maintain the family:
looking after children, caring for sick and old people, shopping, 
cleaning, processing and cooking food, collecting or buying fuel 
and water. These tasks necessary for social reproduction are 
generally not classified as economic activity, and if a man takes 
responsibility for this work, he is in danger of losing his 
dignity in many parts of the world (Elson, 1991b:172). Elson 
(1989, 1991a) describes this as a male bias in economic policy-
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making with economies defined and measured in terms of marketed 
goods and services with no explicit consideration of the work and 
resources required for the maintenance and reproduction of the 
labour force. Notions of efficiency and productivity which do not 
take into account this largely unpaid labour are clearly biased 
against women.
In the "productive" sectors, peasant production systems, 
organised industrial production and the "informal sector", in the 
Third World, women represent cheap or uncounted labour. In 
peasant production, particularly in Africa, women contribute to 
the production of cash crops for export but their contribution 
is rarely enumerated and usually merely classified as unpaid 
family labour. Many agricultural development projects initiated 
after independence, in both "socialist" and capitalist countries 
have taken away land and resources which women worked and 
controlled for the production of food crops and the sale of 
surplus. Land titles and new technology have been allocated to 
men for the production of cash crops. There are now numerous case 
studies which document the negative consequences for food 
production which affects the entire community and it is on the 
basis of such work that Stamp (1989), for example, argues that 
women have increasingly lost power and autonomy at the local 
level while their workload has increased.
Women's work in the formal sector tends to be confined to certain 
occupations which are usually lower paid and less skilled. As 
Heyzer (1981:5) points out, the nature of women's tasks and the 
value of their labour are affected by a number of factors 
including ideological assumptions about women and work, women's 
workload within the household as well as the changing structure 
of employment in certain sectors of production, and the selective 
nature of labour utilization. The marginalisation of women 
sometimes occurs through exclusion from employment (in Africa, 
the unemployment rate for women is usually twice that for men) 
(Vandemoortele, 1991:96), but also occurs within employment as 
patriarchal and capitalist forces combine to limit women's
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responsibility and autonomy in the workplace (Faulkner & Lawson, 
1991:16). Women earn less on average than men (Anker & Hein, 
198 6:102) and are sometimes paid less than men for doing the same 
job (Stewart, 1992:22; Munachonga, 1988 on urban Zambia). The 
process of the internationalisation of capital and the 
development of multinational export industries have also had a 
disproportionate impact on poor women since they represent one 
of the cheapest sources of labour. Incorporation into such work 
transforms rather than eliminates gender subordination (Elson & 
Pearson, 1981:104). In industrial export zones, set up in many 
countries pursuing export-led industrialisation, women often 
account for three-quarters of the total employed (Standing, 
1991a:20). The work which women do in these industries, while it 
is sometimes better-paid than other alternatives, is semi-skilled 
with poor working conditions and no long term security, 
vulnerable both to fluctuations in the world market and to the 
power of these corporations to relocate their activities. Women 
undoubtedly derive benefits from earning an income and may even 
gain what Dwyer and Bruce (1988:8) term "psychological and 
practical leverage" in gender relations within the household. 
However, Elson (1991b:172) makes the important point that 
entering the labour market does not automatically provide new, 
liberating opportunities if women sell their labour on very 
disadvantageous terms in an overcrowded market.
Women are heavily involved in informal sector activities in order 
to generate a cash income. They are often forced to choose these 
activities because they can be carried out at home or close to 
home and therefore facilitate carrying out childcare and domestic 
tasks (see for example, Moser, 1989b; Rakodi, 1991). Within the 
informal sector, there are also gender differentials with women 
concentrated in areas of lower returns (see amongst others 
Heyzer, 1981, Weekes-Vagliani, 1992). For example, women often 
work in the service sector: petty marketing of food and related 
items, domestic service while men are generally involved in the 
more lucrative businesses such as electrical and mechanical 
repairs, transport, carpentry, which require some capital and/or
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"modern" skills (see for example, Nelson, 1988 on Nairobi, 
Kenya).
The under-valuing of women's work (paid and unpaid) increases 
profits for capital since it is under-renumerated compared to 
men's. However, capitalist and patriarchal relations do not 
reinforce each other in all aspects - there are contradictions. 
The transformation of women into commodity producers or wage 
labourers has the potential to undermine the patriarchal 
organisation of reproductive work. In practice, however, wage- 
earning women, even if they remain the principal managers of the 
household, often pay poorer women to carry out childcare and 
domestic work (sometimes intensifying their oppression by paying 
very low wages).9 Similarly, women peasants may have different 
interests depending on ownership of land, the scale of production 
and differing dependence on hired labour. The problem therefore 
becomes not one of men and women per se. nor of capitalists 
versus workers, but the social relations of production and 
reproduction, the interaction between class and gender 
inequalities (Beneria & Sen, 1982; Grown & Sen, 1985), with race 
being an important factor in some contexts (see for example 
Radcliffe & Westwood, 1993, Chapter 1, for examples from Latin 
America).
Post-modernist aspects of social theory question the coherence 
of analytic concepts such as women, class and race, arguing that 
in the contemporary, complex social world there are too many 
divisions and differences within these groups (Walby, 1992). As 
Radcliffe and Westwood (1993:27) argue, there has been a 
fractionalisation of class via the formal/informal economy, 
complexities of ethnicities, the urban/rural divide and gender 
divisions (see also Standing 1991a). Social divisions have 
increased and there is an understandable reaction to the somewhat 
simplistic and deterministic models of Marxism and Modernisation 
theory. The politics of civil society and cultural leadership 
have therefore become more prominent as opposed to organised 
class politics. However, as Walby (ibid) convincingly argues, an
25
analysis of differences, and not inequalities, can obscure the 
significant structuring of power along class, race and gender 
lines, and that fragmentation has gone too far, leading towards 
mere empiricism. She also makes the important point that race, 
class and gender cannot be understood within one country alone 
and that an international perspective is essential, a view shared 
by Grown and Sen (1987) writing for DAWN (Development 
Alternatives with Women for a New Era), a network of activists 
and researchers, largely in the Third World.
It is the extent and pervasiveness of discrimination against 
women as a group which makes it essential to consider gender as 
an important variable in development planning. Women face 
discrimination in the labour market, patriarchal family systems 
and discriminatory customs and laws and norms which confine their 
roles. As Sen (1990:12 3) puts it, the systematically inferior 
position of women inside and outside the household in many 
societies points to the need for treating gender as a force of 
its own in development analysis. It is not that women are 
powerless victims, or that there are no women in positions of 
power over men, but rather that, relatively speaking, women are 
less powerful than men of similar economic and social position 
(Elson, 1991a:2). Taking into account the roles and needs of the 
most disadvantaged women would lead to comprehensive policy 
changes which, in turn, would mean that development efforts could 
be more effectively, efficiently and equitably planned.
1.4 GENDER AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Among low income groups, households will be differently affected 
by economic crisis depending on the nature of their members' 
employment and income. However, not all members of particular 
households will be affected in the same way since the intra­
household divisions of labour, resources and decision-making are 
highly variable. Aside from the unequal sexual division of labour 
discussed above, there are now many studies which show that equal 
sharing of resources and joint decision making within households 
cannot be taken for granted (Beneria & Roldan, 1987; Chant, 1991:
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Chapter 7; Mascarenhas & Mbilinyi, 1983; Raikes, 1989;). As 
Tibaijuka (1988:15) describes the situation in Tanzania, 
". .although women do most of the work, men make all the important 
decisions because they control the resources and in some cases, 
they even control female labour". The notion of altruistic 
distribution within the household can be seen as a disguise for 
male power and female subordination (Kabeer & Joekes, 1991:2). 
Certainly, the outcomes of development efforts are better 
predicted and explained if intra-household roles and allocation 
processes are understood (Dwyer and Bruce,1988:3).
Both neo-classical and Marxist economic approaches to the 
household have been criticised for treating the household as an 
undifferentiated unit, allowing economic self interest to operate 
for households as a whole, but not within them (Folbre, 1986, 
1988b). Sen's model of the household (cited in Wilson, 1991:31) 
as a scene of "cooperative-conflict" is much closer to reality: 
"First there has to be a clear analysis of the 
existence of both cooperative and conflicting elements 
in family relations.. . the essence of the problem is 
that there are many cooperative outcomes (beneficial 
to all parties concerned, compared with non­
cooperation) but the different parties have strictly 
conflicting interests in the choice among the set of
efficient cooperative arrangements, so the problem is
one of 'cooperative-conflict'".
There should therefore be no assumption that all members of the 
household will be affected equally or similarly by economic or
other changes. Sen's model would seem to be an essential guide
to investigating the real effects of SAPs on low-income 
households. An important point is that the respective bargaining 
power of different members will depend on their position outside 
as well as inside the household (Wilson, 1991:31). Thus, the 
socially powerless are likely to remain in a household even when 
the outcomes of cooperative- conflict are personally quite 
unsatisfactory. As Beneria and Roldan (1987:151-2) point out,
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there is often conflict between long-run gender interests and 
women's recognition that these interests endanger current life- 
rewarding experiences, and perhaps even economic and social 
survival. If the household disintegrates, women are generally in 
a worse economic and social position than men (Elson, 1991:182). 
On the other hand, Chant (1985) shows, using data from home- 
owning households in Queretaro, Mexico, that a significant number 
of women-headed households result from choice, since the 
situation with men was so conflict-ridden, if not actually 
violent. Once separated from their men, women were better able 
to ensure that resources were more equitably and efficiently 
pooled (see also Bruce, 1989:986; Buvinic and Gupta, 1993:7) and 
family life became more secure and stable. Much would seem to 
depend on the assets and resources to which women have access as 
well as the specific cultural context. These are undoubtedly 
important issues to be considered in studying women's responses 
to the effects of SAPs.
RESEARCH FINDINGS ON GENDER AND SAPS
Current research does indicate that women are worse affected by 
adjustment policies, particularly expenditure switching measures 
(non-tradeables to tradeables), price liberalisation on basic 
commodities and public expenditure cuts in the social sectors. 
However, much of the detailed research has been carried out in 
Latin America (Beneria, 1991; Chant, 1991:Chapter 6; 1993;
Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988, 1991; Moser, 1989a; Rocha et al.
1987;). The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is more fragmentary 
and studies from other parts of the world, particularly Latin 
America, will be referred to wherever relevant. The main findings 
are discussed below while more detailed aspects will be drawn on 
when discussing the results of the present research. Research 
results are presented sequentially according to their effect on 
women's productive, reproductive or community management work 
(Moser, 1989b); however, as discussed in the introduction to this 
chapter, it is often the articulation between these different 
roles that influences the impact of various policy measures.
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Gender, SAPs and productive work
In Ghana and the Ivory Coast, as in most countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa implementing adjustment policies, incentives have been 
given to export crop production such as cocoa and cotton, with 
no support for subsistence crop production in which women are 
most heavily involved (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989). The study 
in Zambia cited above (Evans, 1989) found that rural producers 
reliant on selling traditional food crops, predominantly women, 
found their incomes being squeezed by stagnating producer prices, 
rising transport costs and rising prices for consumer goods. In 
male-headed households producing maize for sale, women were 
allocating a greater proportion of labour time to maize 
production, often at the expense of other food crops such as 
millet, beans and groundnuts. The men then retained control of 
the income from the maize, with some indications that their 
priorities were not for food items for the family. Women 
therefore continue to bear the primary responsibility for 
satisfying household food needs, while their access to and 
control of resources are further reduced (see Weekes-Vagliani 
(1992:121) for similar findings in the Ivory Coast). The fresh 
onslaught on increasing cash crop production, and the inherent 
expenditure switching, increase women's labour and decreases 
their income with negative implications for their own health and 
well-being as well as that of their households.
Studies from various countries also show that men and women have 
different spending priorities. Women tend to buy goods and food 
for household consumption, while men buy items for their personal 
use or as investments, usually for production and trade, rather 
than the maintenance of the household (Bruce, 1989:985; Dwyer & 
Bruce, 1988; Feldman, 1989; Grown & Sebstad, 1989:938; Jiggins, 
1989:957) . Dominant gender ideologies support the notion that men 
have a right to personal spending money, while women's income 
should be used for collective purposes (Beneria & Roldan, 
1987:118). Declines in women's income would therefore have a much 
more direct negative impact on household health and welfare. 
Indeed, an increasing number of studies provide evidence that the
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resources (cash and food produce) under the mothers' (rather than 
the fathers') control are the most important factor accounting 
for the level of child nutrition in low-income households 
(Blumberg, 1991:105 provides examples from Cameroon, Kerala in 
India, Ghana and Belize).
In waged work, the gender-specific effects of SAPs are less 
consistent. In many parts of Latin America, women's participation 
in waged employment increased during the 1980s (see Chant, 
forthcoming b; Selby et al. 1990:176). Stewart (1992:27), too, 
states that there is evidence of rising female employment rates 
in underdeveloped countries in the 1980s, with stable or falling 
rates among men. The examples cited, however, are drawn from 
Latin America and the Philippines. The situation is much less 
clear in sub-Saharan Africa where the recorded participation rate 
of women in the paid labour force, as a proportion of the total 
female population, fell from 28% in 1950 to 23% in 1985 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989). During this period, women 
remained at 32% of the labour force (ibid; see also Stewart, 
1992:22). On the other hand, retrenchment in the public sector 
in Africa has severely affected (middle-income) women because, 
in general, there are relatively more women employed on better 
terms in the public rather than private sector (Stewart, 
1992:26). Falling real wages affect both men and women, but 
again, there is some evidence to indicate a further deterioration 
in relative wages (Stewart, 1992:26).
Within the informal sector, women may also be disproportionately 
affected since incentives, if any, are directed to "tradeables" 
as opposed to "non-tradeables"; in other words production-related 
rather than services and consumption-related activities (such as 
the sale of cooked food for low paid workers in urban areas) in 
which women are more involved. The credit reforms under SAPs do 
not assist low-income borrowers in general (as discussed earlier 
in this chapter) and women are further disadvantaged because they 
have fewer starting assets and greater difficulties than men in 
approaching formal institutions (Stewart, 1992:32). Recession and
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adjustment in Nigeria in the 1980s have intensified women's need 
for income in the informal sector, but have made it harder for 
most women to enter the profitable segments of this sector 
(Dennis, 1991). Recent research in Ghana shows that although 
access to capital has become more difficult for men and women, 
and that profit margins have dwindled over the period of economic 
adjustment, profits in the female-dominated petty trading sector 
have been most severely affected (Brydon, 1993) . Another 
interesting finding of this study is that the relatively buoyant 
sector of trading in second hand clothing was in the hands of 
men, or middle class women (ibid).
There is also evidence that women are having to engage in a 
greater number of activities which generate an income in order 
to contain falls in household income. This is a consistent 
finding of studies in Latin America (Chant, 1991: Chapter 6;
1993; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988; Moser, 1989a). A study in low- 
income areas in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania found that 81% of a 
sample of 134 women were employed; 37% in the formal sector and 
44% in the informal sector (Tibaijuka, 1988). However, 70% of the 
formally-employed women were engaged in other income generating 
activities such as farming and vegetable gardening, petty trade, 
brewing and selling beer and poultry keeping, in order to make 
ends meet (ibid). This study also refers to cases in which 
children have had to participate in these activities and also 
mentions an increase in women's working hours.
Another consistent finding from Latin America is an increase in 
the proportion of extended in relation to nuclear households 
(Chant, 1991: Chapters 6 & 7, 1993; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988; 
Moser, 1989a). Chant (forthcoming b) found that households in 
Mexico and Costa Rica which either deployed women into the labour 
force and/or extended their membership, were able to cope with 
recession more adequately than nuclear families. However, whereas 
in Latin America this has often meant an increase in formal wage 
employment for women, the situation, as discussed above, is less 
clear in sub-Saharan Africa.
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A study in an urban neighbourhood in Bissau, the capital of 
Guinea Bissau, interviewed 2,090 women, most of whose husbands 
worked as lower paid government employees. It showed that women 
were active in three areas: domestic work, agricultural
production and the marketing of their produce. In order to 
supplement the family income and diet at a time of economic 
crisis, women had increased their agricultural production, mainly 
market gardening, and become market women. Moreover, during 
harvest time, they went back to their villages to help, and in 
this way, gained access to essential food items (Galli & Funk, 
1991:8). Women's seasonal migration and the flow of resources 
between city and countryside also occurs in Harare (Potts, 1990). 
In the past, remittances from urban members of the family have 
been crucial in determining the quality of life of rural 
households, but there has been no research on possible changes 
or even reversals of these resource flows under SAPs.
Gender, SAPs and reproductive work
Cuts in government expenditure in the health sector also have a 
disproportionate effect on women because of their primary 
responsibility for child rearing and family health and nutrition. 
This is seen as an extension of women's role in reproduction.10 
The cuts in health services and/or the introduction or raising 
of user charges mean that women spend more time caring for sick 
members of the household at home and more time queuing for health 
services if they are utilised.11 In a study in North Zambia, 
women said that they themselves could not afford to be ill both 
because of direct costs of treatment and because of time spent 
away from productive work. They also pointed out that they were 
spending more time caring for sick members of the household, 
particularly children, at home (Evans & Young, 1988). This 
represents a direct shift of responsibility for health care from 
the state to women, and illustrates Elson's (1991a:178) point 
that so-called increases in efficiency may instead be a shifting 
of costs from the paid to the unpaid economy, with women footing 
the oil! (see also Kanji, 1991) .
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Cuts in food subsidies and price rises put more direct pressure 
on women who are responsible for shopping as well as processing 
and cooking food. Moser's study (1989a) in Ecuador also found 
that a reduction in the quality and quantity of women and 
children's diets was directly linked to the lifting of food 
subsidies on basic staples. Cuts, or a deterioration, in water 
services put more direct pressure on women because they, and 
their children, are primarily responsible for fetching water for 
household consumption. These policies have a direct bearing on 
unpaid labour inputs by women and there is a danger of assuming 
that women's capacity to undertake extra work is infinitely 
elastic (Elson, 1989; 1991b; Moser, 1989a).
Rising costs of education combined with the need for substitute 
childcare in the home also indicate that school enrolment for 
girls may be suffering more than for boys (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1989). A recent study in the Ivory Coast reveals 
that the reduction in government expenditure on secondary and 
university level education is having a negative impact on young 
women (Weekes-Vagliani, 1992:126). Moser's (1989a) study in
Ecuador found that 20% of women in the sample started working 
because household income was not enough to cover family needs 
forcing elder daughters to take on childcare and domestic work. 
The women identified the rising costs of schooling as the second 
most important factor (after food) causing them to seek work. 
These increased schooling costs were directly related to changes 
in social expenditure within the 1987 economic adjustment 
programme. Research carried out by Chant (1991) and Gonzalez de 
la Rocha (1988) in Mexico also indicates that older daughters may 
have to give up school, or neglect their education, in order to 
cope with increased domestic work. As a consequence, these young 
women may be seriously disadvantaged in the labour market in 
future.
Women's role in feeding, caring for and maintaining the household 
gives them a critical role in negotiating the effects of SAPs at 
household level, but this responsibility, poorly recognised by
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policy-makers, is not accompanied by commensurate power and 
resources.
Gender, SAPs and community managing work
In addition to productive and reproductive work, women in low 
income communities are being asked by government and non­
governmental organisations to perform a greater role in the 
organisation of items of collective consumption, such as water 
and health services. This community level work is usually 
carried out on an unpaid basis, often in the ,name of
"participation" in projects. If women are paid, for example as 
community health workers, they do not receive salaries but 
"allowances" or "incentives" which almost always amount to less 
than the minimum wage. Tibaijuka (1988) points out that women in 
Tanzania have recently been targets for mobilisation to undertake 
unpaid activities like road building, building and maintaining 
schools for the community. With economic recession and
adjustment, "efficiency" as a policy approach towards women 
(Moser, 1989b:30-32) is gaining popularity amongst international 
aid agencies and governments, with women's participation in
development projects being associated with equity. In reality, 
this once more implies shifting costs from the paid to the unpaid 
economy through the use of women's unpaid time. Women are assumed 
to have free time and yet time-use data have shown that women 
consistently work longer days than men and that low-income women 
face severe time constraints in getting through what is often a 
continuum of productive and reproductive tasks (Bruce, 1989;
Dwyer & Bruce, 1988). In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
a 16 hour workday beginning at 5 a.m. and ending at 9 p.m. is not 
uncommon. • Mothers often balance the conflict between working for 
an income on the one hand, and domestic work and childcare on 
the other, by reducing their sleep and leisure time (ibid; see 
also Leslie, 1989). Therefore, the "efficiency" approach 
misconceptualises women as an under-utilised resource when they 
are in fact "over-utilised".
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The situation may be particularly acute in women-headed 
households. A recent review of 60 studies carried out in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean found that female-headed 
households were poorer than male-headed units in 44 cases, and 
that women-headed households with children to support tend to be 
disproportionately represented among the poor (Buvinic & Gupta, 
1993). On the other hand, as discussed earlier, some studies (see 
Bruce, 1989:986 for a summary) have found that resources may be 
better pooled in these households and more directed towards 
meeting the household's basic needs. The evidence does, however, 
suggest that the protective effects from gender-related 
preferences, such as prioritising food and children's education, 
are likely to break down with increasing impoverishment (Buvinic 
& Gupta, 1993:8). Survey classifications of family types greatly 
under-enumerate de facto women-headed households. The prevalence 
of female headship in developing countries varies substantially 
across countries and contexts, comprising anywhere between 10% 
and 40% of all households (Buvinic & Gupta, 1993:11). In 
Zimbabwe, as in other countries in the region, the rates in rural 
areas are high due to male out-migration, with women-headed 
households making up 25% to 50% of the total (Batezat & Mwalo, 
1989; Schlyter, 1989). According to the 1982 census, 15% of 
households in Harare and its satellite town of Chitinguiza are 
headed by women (Schylter, 1989:27). Little research has been 
done, however, on the particular problems and needs of these 
households.
The macro-policy instruments and structural reforms of SAPs of 
the IMF and World Bank do not incorporate explicit concerns with 
the distributional effects of the programmes, and yet the 
evidence reviewed strongly indicates an extremely negative impact 
on low-income groups and women in particular. This is, however, 
an under-researched area and neglected in policy terms, 
especially the relationship between gender and SAPs at the 
household level and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
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1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
This section provides a very brief summary of the objectives and 
methods of the present study to complement the discussion at the 
beginning of this chapter. A detailed description of the research 
methods is given in Appendix One and the questionnaire and 
interview guidelines are provided in Appendix Two.
The research seeks to identify and assess gender-differentiated 
effects of ESAP in one high-density suburb12 of Harare: 
Kambuzuma. This is a well-established and stable settlement, with 
varying income levels and tenure status. It is not the poorest 
of locations, since there are at least two poorer settlements 
with squatters and recent migrants, but it is fairly typical of 
most high-density suburbs. The results of the research do not 
therefore reflect the experience of the poorest settlements under 
ESAP, which is likely to be much worse.
The areas of investigation include employment and income- 
generating activities; household expenditure, debt and savings; 
domestic work; use of social services; leisure activities and 
involvement in social organisations. The aim is to provide a 
holistic picture of the changes in the lives of women and men 
following macro-level policy change. Questions concerning leisure 
(as well as work) were seen to be vital in assessing changes in 
the quality of life and questions concerning debt and savings 
important in assessing not only the present situation but future 
prospects for low-income households. The changes detected are 
related to variables such as income level, household structure 
and tenure status to identify those factors which may be 
important in buffering households from the rises in the cost of 
living associated with -economic adjustment programmes.
Changes in total household income and consumption were of 
interest as well as gender-specific changes in employment, 
income, expenditure and time-use. In other words, the aim was to 
collect gender-disaggregated data rather than information only 
about women, even if it was found that women were actually doing
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more "adjusting" than men. Coping responses were an important 
aspect of the study, as were constraints to their effectiveness 
and consequences on gender relations within the household.
A questionnaire was used to investigate the above-mentioned areas 
in one hundred randomly selected households. Women were the 
respondents in the first instance, but shorter interviews were 
carried out with men to obtain or confirm information that the 
women were uncertain about as well as to glean male perspectives 
on the situation. Interviews were carried out in mid-1991 and 
again in mid-1992 using the same questionnaire.
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in 40 households, to 
discuss how respondents attempted to cope with increased costs 
of living. Two focus group discussions were held with women with 
a similar purpose. The use of these qualitative methods was 
extremely useful in clarifying why certain changes had occurred 
and specific decisions made, in terms of both the subjects' 
perceptions and intra-household inequalities in the control of 
resources.
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE
The first chapter has discussed the main concepts and issues 
relating to gender and Structural Adjustment, reviewed recent 
research in this field and briefly summarised the objectives and 
methods of the present research. Chapter 2 provides an historical 
overview of socio-economic change in Zimbabwe thereby setting the 
wider context in which the research took place. Once again, 
development policies and outcomes are dealt with alongside gender 
issues to elucidate their interaction. Key elements in ESAP are 
discussed with particular reference to measures affecting low- 
income urban households. Chapter 3 moves to Kambuzuma, the 
specific setting of the study, providing a gender-disaggregated 
socio-economic profile of the population based on the initial 
survey carried out in mid-1991. Chapters 4 and 5 describe and 
assess the changes detected between 1991 and 1992. More 
specifically, Chapter 4 deals with the effects of ESAP at the
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household level and examines inter-household differences, while 
Chapter 5 takes up intra-household issues, discussing gender as 
a key variable, and examining women's responses to rises in the 
cost of living under ESAP and the constraints they face. Chapter 
6 attempts to link micro and macro levels, assessing the results 
of measures implemented under ESAP and drawing out future 
implications for low-income urban households, and women in 
particular. The final chapter summarises critical research 
findings and conclusions of the study and raises some questions 
for future research.
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Notes to Chapter 1
1. The terms "South", "Third World", "developing countries" and 
"underdeveloped countries" are used interchangeably in this 
thesis.
2. The terms "ruling class", "elite", "capitalist class" and 
"entrepreneurial class" are used interchangeably to denote groups 
who own the means of production within a country or those who, 
usually by virtue of their political power, control these means 
and derive benefits from them, without owning them, including the 
government/bureaucratic elite.
3. Modernization theory held that all countries in the south must 
pass through specific stages in order to achieve self-sustaining 
growth (Rostow, 1960). Underdeveloped countries would follow the 
same process of industrial and social change experienced in the 
West, following injections of capital and technology from abroad 
combined with domestic savings. Thus, "primitive" societies 
typified by rudimentary technology and low productivity, 
autocratic systems and fatalistic attitudes, would develop into 
modern societies, characterised by high technology and 
production, democratic systems and entrepreneurial attitudes 
(Hardiman and Midgley, 1982). The wealth generated by 
modernization would "trickle down" to the majority. This theory 
has been criticised by the Dependency school (see for example, 
Frank, 1978 on Latin America and Amin, 1974 on Africa), for 
ignoring the inequalities in economic relations between 
metropolis and periphery. It has also been criticised for the 
failure of "trickle down" and more recently, the technology 
associated with the modernization model has been criticised for 
its effects on the environment.
4. The average price for the exports of non-oil producing 
developing countries fell by more than a fifth in dollar terms, 
between 1980 and 1986 (Woodward, 1992b:24)
5. Proponents of this approach (eg Ghai, 1977; Streeten, 1981) 
argued that patterns of production and consumption were being 
determined by the elite to the detriment of the poor. They argued 
that the state should intervene to ensure a more equitable 
pattern of economic growth directed to meet the basic needs of 
the majority. The UN agencies, and for a short time, the World 
Bank, advocated and supported this approach.
6. In Zambia, for example, demonstrations broke out in the Copper 
Belt in December 1986 and early 1987, when maize meal price 
increases were announced. Ten workers were killed. In July 1990, 
food riots took place, leading to an abortive coup and 2 6 people 
killed. (Loewenson, 1991:7)
7. For present purposes, the informal sector can be defined as 
sma]1-scale units engaged in the production and distribution of 
goods and services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to their participants, notwithstanding the
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constraints on capital, both physical and human, and know-how 
(Sethuraman, 1981) . Early discussions of the informal sector were 
criticised for excessive stress on the duality of the formal- 
informal sectors, the neglect of linkages between sectors and the 
problem of heterogeneity within them (Bromley & Gerry, 1979; 
Moser, 1984). However, as Scott (1991:104) points out, these 
criticisms have been taken on board and most contemporary 
accounts assume polarisation rather than dualism* that there is 
a continuum of activities rather than abrupt discontinuity 
between sectors and that diversity within sectors is important, 
as are linkages between them.
8. Barrett (1980) and Seccombe (1980) provide excellent overviews 
of the limitations of the analysis employed by Marx and Engels 
to understand women's oppression. Seccombe extends their 
analysis, relating the changing forms of both capitalism and 
patriarchy, describing the consumption of labour power in 
capitalist production and its replacement in the private, working 
class household. Kusterer (1990), amongst others (for example 
Barrett, 1980 and Buechler, 1986) argues that the distinction 
between production and reproduction is essentially false, since 
both processes involve labour power which adds use value to their 
products: productive work by creating new things and reproductive 
work by maintaining the use value of existing things. Kusterer 
argues that there is a domestic mode of production which is 
articulated with the capitalist mode of production in much the 
same way as Seccombe describes. The domestic mode involves 
exploitative relations between men and women while the capitalist 
mode between capitalists and workers. Although the terms 
productive and reproductive work will continue to be used in this 
thesis, these arguments would seem theoretically sound, and the 
terms are therefore used in a descriptive rather than analytic 
sense.
9. In her study of wage-earning women in Nigeria, Parpart 
(1990:177-8) notes that their domestic labour is more managerial 
than manual, but that it still requires time and effort. She 
argues that although the inadequate daycare and unreliable 
domestic help that these women face may appear trivial in 
comparison with the problems facing poorer women, wage-earning 
women in Africa are a potentially influential section of the 
female population and may have opportunities to influence 
policies which could benefit all women, thus the problems which 
inhibit their progress reduces their "visibility" and ability to 
affect change.
10. Raikes (1989) and Browner (1989), for example, describe a 
whole range of health care activities carried out by women in 
East Africa and Latin America respectively, both within the home 
and at community level.
11. See Leslie et al (1989) and Leslie (1987) for a discussion 
of the pressure on women's time and the implications for the use 
and delivery of health services.
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12. The term "high-density suburb" refers to townships built in 
the pre-independence period to house the black population. After 
independence, better-off black families moved to lower-density 
suburbs, previously exclusively white. Some better-off black 
families did remain in high-density suburbs due to the housing 
shortage in Harare so that there is a considerable income range 
within these settlements. High-density suburbs remain, however, 
exclusively black.
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CHAPTER TWO
ZIMBABWE: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to contextualise the research in Harare, by 
outlining the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe, prior to the 
implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP). In addition, it describes key elements in the programme 
thus far. Since the colonial period in Zimbabwe only ended in 
1980, the effects of colonial policies on the economic and social 
structure are still much in evidence. Inequalities in social 
relations, and gender relations in particular, are very 
influenced by labour policies of that period as well as by the 
patriarchal gender relations of the two main indigenous groups 
in Zimbabwe, the Shona and Ndebele. As such, a brief historical 
overview is essential in understanding the current socio-economic 
situation in the country.
The chapter begins with an examination of development policies 
and outcomes in the post-independence period. It then moves on 
to discuss and assess gender roles and relations, and finally 
outlines ESAP with particular reference to measures affecting 
low-income urban households. Issues concerning gender roles and 
relations are purposely treated alongside socio-economic 
development to facilitate an analysis of gender issues in 
developmental processes and outcomes.
2.2 POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
Zimbabwe became independent in early 1980, after a long period 
of political, social and military struggle for black majority 
rule. ZANU.PF (Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic 
Front), had a landslide victory in the first elections in 1980 
and proclaimed itself as a party committed to building socialism. 
The government was confronted not only with a situation of severe 
inequalities in income, land, capital and access to basic social 
services, but also an economy ravaged by war. Average white 
earnings were more than ten times those for blacks in formal
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employment and 60% of income was earned by the 4% (white) 
minority (Stoneman, 1988:51).
The industrial sector was more sophisticated and diversified than 
in other countries in the region, having been developed as a 
response to sanctions imposed on the Rhodesian government after 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. There 
was also a diversified set of primary exports including metals 
and agricultural products (Stoneman, 1987:44) It is widely 
accepted that this diversification (and limitations on imports 
due to sanctions) constitute positive aspects in the colonial 
economic legacy but it is also important to note that industry 
was largely directed at providing luxury consumer goods for the 
white minority (Drakakis-Smith, 1984:1278).
A "growth with redistribution" strategy for development was 
adopted and a range of policy measures introduced by the ZANU.PF 
government immediately after independence. These included the 
introduction of minimum wages, reduction of indirect taxes, 
introduction of free primary education, free health care for 
those earning below Z$ 150 per month (equivalent to US$ 233 at 
the time), increased outlays in the social sectors, price and 
rent controls and land redistribution (Nyawata, 1988:97).
In the 1980s, there was a substantial expansion of health 
services, with qualitative changes made in the orientation 
towards Primary Health Care1 and a greater focus on preventive 
and rural health care (Loewenson et al. 1991). In the education 
sector, free tuition at primary level and substantial increases 
in both capital and recurrent public expenditure resulted in a 
phenomenal expansion in school enrolments. Primary enrolments 
increased from 0.819 million in 1979 to 2.229 million in 1985; 
secondary enrolments increased even more dramatically from a mere
79,000 in 1979 to almost half a million in 1985, a sixfold 
increase (Chung, 1988:121). As Davies (1987:23) points out, 
however, there has also been an expansion of private schools, 
changes to the curriculum have been minimal (the British ”0”
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level system has been retained) and experiments with new forms 
of education (such as education with production) tended to remain 
marginal. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that improved 
social services was one of the major visible gains of 
independence.
In terms of economic policy, the picture is somewhat different. 
An analysis of state intervention in industry, wage and 
industrial policies, agriculture and land distribution, points 
to the fact that the government adopted a programme of capitalist 
development (Stoneman, 1988).2 One of the central provisions of 
the Lancaster House agreement3 related to property rights: no 
matter how land or mining concessions had originally been 
obtained, they could only change hands on a "willing-seller, 
willing-buyer" basis. This basically meant that whites and 
foreign investors could continue to own half or more of economic 
assets including most of the productive land, nearly all the 
mines, manufacturing industry and other businesses. Despite 
demonstrations of legal ways in which, for example, land 
redistribution could have been brought about without violating 
the letter of the agreement, it can be taken that a political 
decision was made not to violate the spirit of the agreement. The 
land and property issue is tied to the whole complex of aid, 
trade and investment (Stoneman, 1988:50). By the end of 1987, 
only some 52,000 households had been resettled, constituting just 
32% of the official programme target, 14% of households needing 
land and 7% of the 1980 farming population (Loewenson et al. 
1989:14).
Wage policy centred on the minimum wage, with differentiated 
wages applying to particular sectors, agricultural and domestic 
workers being on the lowest minimum wage. Davies (1987;24) argues 
that the minimum wage became an instrument for controlling wage 
increases rather than raising the incomes of the low paid, with 
increases to the minima being taken as maximum increases. The 
government took over various functions of the trade unions, 
arguing that they were too weak to defend the workers,
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particularly in the face of transnational capital. The right of 
workers to strike in both pre- and post-independence periods has 
been limited.
Although the government stressed the importance of developing the 
cooperative sector and collective relations of production in the 
1980s, most ventures survived because of inputs of external aid. 
The government's establishment of the Small Enterprises 
Development Corporation and the preferences given to emergent 
businesses in foreign exchange allocation probably outweighed its 
support to cooperatives. Despite the socialist rhetoric, then, 
the Zimbabwean government followed a capitalist path, albeit with 
more extensive provision of social services than countries which 
have openly embraced capitalism.
Table 1 shows selected economic and demographic indicators. 
Zimbabwe is categorised by the World Bank as a lower-middle- 
income country, although GNP per capita as an average figure does 
not allow a consideration of income inequalities and data on this 
is not available.
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Table 2.1: Zimbabwe: selected economic and demographic indicators 
(1990)
Area (sq km) 391,000
Population 9.8 million
Urban population as 
% of total 28%
Population - Harare 882,000
Average annual growth 
of population 1980-90 3.4%
Infant Mortality Rate 
(per 1000 live births) 49
Life expectancy at birth 61 years
GNP per capita US$ 640
Distribution of GDP (%)
agriculture
industry
services
13%
40%
47%
Structure of exports (%) * 1988 
minerals and metals 
other primary commodities 
manufactured goods
figures
13%
47%
40%
Debt service as % of exports 22.6%
Source: Compiled from figures in World Bank (1992)
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
In Zimbabwe, the chronology and depth of the economic crisis has 
been different from other countries in the region but the 
fundamental issues are essentially similar. In the first two 
years after independence there was enormous economic growth. The 
causes of this, apart from the arrival of peace and international 
legitimacy, were exceptionally good rains in 1980 and 1981, the 
stimulation of internal demand by large wage increases, and 
renewed access to aid and loans from foreign sources. Removal of 
restrictions, high guaranteed crop prices and the end of the war 
led to record crops and the manufacturing sector was able to
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respond to the consumer boom by increasing capital utilisation. 
The lifting of sanctions in 1980 also produced substantial 
improvements in the country's terms of trade, with a 27% increase 
in exports in 1980 followed by a further 7% increase in 1981. In 
the first two years after independence, real GDP grew by a total 
of 26% (Stoneman, 1988:47).
The recovery was, however, shortlived, with 1982 showing zero 
growth and 1983 a contraction in GDP of over 3%. Drought meant 
that sales of maize dropped by nearly 70% between 1981/82 and 
1983/84. Mining suffered from falling world prices and the 
relative strength of the Zimbabwean dollar, while manufacturing 
was hit by the consequent foreign exchange shortages and 
contracting domestic demand, as inflation eroded the wage rises 
of 1980 and 1981. Total employment levels stagnated. Zimbabwe, 
as other countries did in this period, resorted to borrowing from 
the IMF. However, although there was a cut in subsidies and a 20% 
devaluation, the government resisted the entire package of 
conditions which the IMF wanted to impose. In particular, the 
government withstood IMF pressure to liberalise foreign exchange 
and import controls, thus protecting its own industries 
(Stoneman, 1990) . External debt rose from 2.6% of export earnings 
at independence to over 30% in 1983 (Stoneman, 1988:48).
In 1984, GDP rose by almost 3%, followed by 9% in 1985. Zimbabwe 
therefore weathered this period better than most countries in the 
region and from 1984 to 1987, was successful enough to do so 
without an IMF programme. In 1986, however, growth fell back 
sharply to under 1% and did not recover in the 1980s 
(Stoneman,1988:48).
Since independence, only 10,000 to 30,000 jobs have been created 
annually, with secondary school leavers numbering approximately
200,000 per year in the latter half of the 1980s (Kadenge et al. 
1991:8). Twenty-five percent of the workforce is unemployed 
(ibid). Youthfulness and the high level of education are two 
important characteristics of the unemployed, shared by many
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countries in the region (Vandemoortele, 1991). Women are 
particularly vulnerable to unemployment as discussed in the next 
section. As Stoneman (1988:51-52) argues, there is no prospect 
of meeting job expectations of any substantial proportion of the 
unemployed using orthodox policies reliant on western technology, 
institutions and markets. As he points out: first the unequal 
income distribution pre-empts a large slice of investment funds 
for luxury consumption and indeed investment (eg aircraft and 
luxury conference centres) . Second, the capitalist market context 
exerts pressure for profit maximisation which usually points away 
from labour intensive technology since it is more efficient 
(using purely economic criteria) to employ fewer people and more 
capital, leaving the unemployed to scrape a living in the 
communal (rural) areas. Thirdly, the vicious circle of a small 
internal market leading to the need for outward orientation which 
in turn further impoverishes the internal market is not easily 
broken within capitalist structures.
By the late 1980s then, the inherited structures from the 
colonial era and the failure of the government to change these 
in any fundamental manner resulted in an interrelated set of 
economic problems: foreign exchange shortages, low levels of
investment, large budget deficits, escalating debt and inflation, 
high unemployment, an inefficient industrial base and 
infrastructural decay (Kadenge et al. 1991:2).
As Stoneman (1988:59) concludes:
"Zimbabwe is caught in the same structural trap as 
most developing countries: it is not earning enough 
foreign exchange both to service its debts and to 
invest for expanded exports, but it can only escape 
through a massive expansion of exports (which in any 
case might be aborted by world market trends over
which Zimbabwe has no control)."
This is not to say that the government has not mismanaged the
economy but rather to emphasize the weight of historical and
international factors. For its part, the government allowed a
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huge bureaucracy to develop in the civil service and chose to 
reduce expenditure on infrastructure rather than trim down 
personnel, arguably in large part to maintain support for 
themselves. It has also allowed capital to move from investment 
in the productive sector to financial speculation. In real 
estate, for example, the returns on providing housing and office 
development for the rich are far greater than investment in 
production, and require less effort (Bond, 1990:8). The 
government financed its balance of payments deficits of the late 
1980s by further borrowing on the international market. As 
Kadenge et al (1991:14) point out, the economy remains firmly in 
private hands and the level of foreign ownership is regarded as 
strikingly high. In essence, the government has failed to redress 
the vast inequalities in income, with 10% of the population 
owning 90% of national wealth (ibid:7). A third of the land and 
nearly all industry remains in white hands, whilst the number of 
people in the overcrowded communal lands is greater than at 
independence.
THE DEVELOPMENT 07 THE CAPITAL CITY: HARARE
The economic, political, social and spatial characteristics of 
Harare are firmly rooted in the recent colonial past. As with 
most other cities in the Third World, Harare was established to 
serve the economic interests of the colonial powers to facilitate 
the export of primary commodities and the import of consumer 
goods. From the time of colonial occupation in the 1890s until 
independence, urban areas were considered the preserve of the 
white population (Patel, 1988:20). The fertile highveld was 
reserved for white settlement, and a network of roads and 
railways were constructed to facilitate development of mining and 
agricultural industries. The two main axes of urban development 
were established between Harare and Bulawayo, and between Harare 
and Mutare (see Fig. 2.1).
As with most capitals, there is a concentration of public 
investment in the city and foreign investment also tends to 
concentrate in the largest towns. Until the 1940s the majority
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Fig 2.1 Zimbabwe
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of black people in urban areas were either housed on their 
employers' property or in black housing areas, known as 
"locations" and clearly separated from white residential areas. 
During and after the Second World War there was a reduction in 
the external supply of consumer goods and an increasing demand 
for semi-processed raw materials, which resulted in the growth 
of the manufacturing sector and an increased demand for labour. 
Government and local authorities then began to provide urban 
housing for the black population, in townships (now known as high 
density suburbs) on the periphery of cities. Supposed fears for 
health and security helped codify strict segregation between the 
races (Bond, 1992b:5).
Legal restrictions, lack of adequate accommodation, especially 
for families, low wages and the lack of financial and social 
security in times of unemployment and old age compelled workers 
to retain links with their rural homes through circulatory rural- 
urban migration (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986:378). An example of 
legislative control was the Vagrancy Act of 1960 which regulated 
the flow of male migrants into town according to the availability 
of employment (Patel, 1988:22-3). The growth of "shanty towns", 
characteristic of cities in other underdeveloped countries, was 
thus prevented until the late 1970s, when the Smith regime was 
unable to enforce influx control measures in the latter years of 
the liberation war.
In the 1970s, migration to Harare on which industrial growth was 
dependent, was channelled to the satellite town of Chitinguiza, 
about 20km to the south-west of the capital, which grew from
15,000 in 1969 to 173,000 in 1982 (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986:379). 
Since independence, movement into Harare and Chitinguiza has 
accelerated for the same reasons as in almost all underdeveloped 
countries in the last 30 years: the removal of restrictive
regulations, the lack of opportunities in rural areas and the 
hope of employment in the cities (Drakakis-Smith, 1984:1284). In 
Zimbabwe, the migration of families of male workers was an 
additional factor in the immediate post-independence period.
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The pace of urban population growth in Zimbabwe, as in other 
Third World countries, has far exceeded the supply of jobs, 
housing and basic services. Although the proportion of the 
population which is urbanised (28%) is relatively low, the growth 
rate of 5.4% (Patel, 1988:24) gives a doubling time of 14 years. 
The government, as early as 1982, adopted an urbanisation policy 
based on decentralisation of economic activities and employment 
opportunities to the smaller towns, "growth points" and rural 
service centres in the Communal Lands. However, in 1986, Harare 
and Bulawayo, the two major cities, accounted for nearly three- 
quarters of the industrial output and employment in the country 
(Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986:383), and the situation is unlikely to 
have changed. Private investors are unwilling to decentralise and 
without massive financial input from government to improve 
infrastructure (increasingly less likely), decentralisation is 
unlikely to take place (ibid).
Having outlined the general socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe 
prior to the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP), the following sections will discuss gender 
issues and how women, in particular, have been affected by 
development policies and outcomes.
2.3 GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE GENDER ROLES AND RELATIONS
In Zimbabwe, pre-capitalist social relations of production were 
patriarchal and lineage-based among both the Shona and Ndebele 
tribes. Elder males controlled the means of production (land and 
cattle) and also the means of reproduction since traditional law 
and marriage rules gave them considerable control over women and 
their reproductive capacities (Folbre, 1988) . Women were involved 
in a wide range of activities: in agriculture and the rearing of 
small livestock, in food processing and production of essential 
household items and in child bearing and rearing. The bulk of 
these tasks were menial and labour intensive. Men were the main 
decision makers, traders, controllers of accumulated wealth and 
directors of family labour. Despite this, women's degree of
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powerlessness has been questioned. Women did have some rights 
to property, especially the "gifts of motherhood”4, products such 
as kitchen ware (which they made themselves) and surplus food 
from the plots allocated by husbands. More importantly, perhaps, 
it has been suggested that women wielded more informal power than 
was later acknowledged in Customary Law and that despite gender 
subordination, women had their own sets of skills and 
responsibilities which commanded respect and protection (Batezat 
et al. 1988; Sacks, 1982).
In areas of southern and eastern Africa, including Zimbabwe, the 
best land was taken over by white settlers while indigenous 
people were forced onto small tracts of poor quality land.5 In 
order to run the large commercial farms and the mines that were 
being established, the settlers required a large labour force. 
Additional labour was also required to service white households 
as domestic servants, in the growing number of administrative 
posts and market towns. Demand for labour was almost exclusively 
male (Batezat & Mwalo, 1988:24; Seidman, 1984:422).
The mechanisms for drawing African men into the cash economy were 
several: by driving Africans onto impoverished land, which became 
overcrowded and progressively less productive, men were forced 
to look for paid work. The establishment of taxes, which 
presupposed the possession of cash, created a further need for 
wages. Moreover, in those cases where it was difficult to attract 
labour, for example in the mines, forced labour was introduced. 
A system of passes and permits kept women and children on land 
designated as "tribal trust lands", extending their work to tasks 
that had previously been performed by men. Women remained 
responsible for feeding and caring for the family, with ever 
fewer resources to meet these responsibilities. Employers were 
able to pay wages below the level necessary for the reproduction 
of labour power; rather than paying a "family wage”, employers 
could rely on women's subsistence agriculture to keep the family 
thereby subsidising their profits. The system also spatially 
divided black women and men.
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The codification of European-identified "traditional” law reduced 
women to minority status under the guardianship of either fathers 
or husbands. Property rights were extremely limited, as were 
rights to their own children. As family separation became a 
feature of life, the rules of sexual relationships outside 
marriage also changed. Husbands formed other liaisons in towns. 
These relationships might supersede the rural wife, leading to 
divorce or a reduction in remittances. The impact on rural 
families was and still is severe (MCDWA, 1982:142; Govt of 
Zimbabwe/UNICEF, 1985:5-7).* Although urban female migration was 
initially restricted both legally and by the lack of employment 
prospects, women did migrate if rural conditions became 
untenable. Some women obtained employment as domestic workers and 
a small minority as factory operatives. The only training 
opportunities available for the small numbers of better-off women 
who managed to receive some education were in the fields of 
nursing and teaching, areas traditionally reserved for women in 
the West (Seidman, 1984:423).
In 1980, women comprised only 6.8% of the non-agricultural, wage 
labour force. Those who were in waged employment were 
concentrated in domestic service, with 16.7% of all domestic 
workers being women (ibid). Thus, most women resorted to illegal 
activities such as petty trading, beer brewing and prostitution 
in order to survive (Batezat & Mwalo, 1989:24). Beer brewing was 
traditionally a female task and the colonial administration's ban 
on the sale of liquor to blacks meant that women could use their 
skills to meet a steady demand (Seidman, 1984:425). Prostitution 
met the demands for sexual services by men separated from their 
families, and urban women, particularly if divorced or unmarried, 
became almost synonymous with "prostitutes” (Seidman, 1984:425; 
Bassett & Mhloyi, 1991:150; Jacobs & Howard, 1987:38; Schylter, 
1989:29).
To supplement meagre incomes, many women became seasonal 
migrants, returning regularly to work their fields and to bring 
back crops to consume or sell in town.7 Women also found seasonal
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employment on white-owned commercial farms, where they made up 
about a quarter of the temporary labour force (Seidman, 
1984:425).
Batezat et al (1988:155) sum up the interaction between economic 
development and gender relations in the colonial period as 
follows:
Men were forced to work as cheap labour on commercial farms 
and mines, and later in the emerging manufacturing sector 
while women were largely confined to the "native 
reserves"...where their now additional workload in 
subsistence production provided for a vast reserve army of 
cheap labour and its reproduction ....men's status vis-a- 
vis women was enhanced as they became controllers of cash 
income with access to new goods and services, while still 
retaining control (at least formally) over the agricultural 
surplus and cattle. These new social/gender relations 
slowly permeated the whole of society, exposing men and not 
women to new skills (however limited) and new forms of 
production; encouraging parents to educate sons rather than 
daughters and subtly changing notions of responsibility and 
power away from the collective towards individual men 
exercising authority over individual women."
GENDER ISSUES IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
Women in Zimbabwe, as in other countries in the region, 
contributed in diverse ways to the liberation struggle. Some were 
involved in military combat, although the majority provided food 
and shelter for the combatants, smuggled and hid weapons and 
equipment, acted as look-outs and messengers, and became 
teachers, paramedics and organisers (Weiss, 1986). The mass 
support and involvement of women in liberation struggles forced 
many African leaders to recognise women's oppression and take a 
stand against this. Thus, at independence, the President of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, asserted:
"The principle of equality between men and women is 
basic to the political philosophy of our government.
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It is the objective of our government to create such 
an environment to make these objectives possible."
(cited in Lapchick & Urdang, 1982:108)
In 1981, the Ministry for Community Development and Women's 
Affairs (MCDWA) was set up although with relatively few staff and 
meagre resources (Batezat et al. 1988). In 1982, it carried out 
a nation wide survey on the situation of women in Zimbabwe and 
produced a report in which women themselves identified areas most 
in need of change: land alienation, agricultural production, lack 
of skills and formal employment opportunities, as well as a 
massive labour burden (MCDWA, 1982).
Just as a government's proclaimed commitment to socialism does 
not make a country socialist, such commitment to women's 
emancipation is not sufficient to achieve equality in gender 
relations. This point is clearly illustrated by studies in other 
(self-proclaimed) socialist states. For example, Molyneux's
(1985) analysis of changes in gender relations in Nicaragua under 
the socialist Sandinista government, aptly entitled "Mobilization 
without Emancipation" shows how women are drawn into liberation 
struggles only to be denied promised benefits after the struggle 
is won. Similarly, women participated in national liberation 
struggles in, for example, Mozambique and Algeria only to be 
refused fundamental change in their situations post-independence 
(Baylies & Bujra, 1993:7).
Legislative Changes
Nevertheless, some important legislation was enacted in Zimbabwe, 
such as the Legal Age of Majority Act (1982) and the Matrimonial 
Clauses Act (1985), to redress some of the most glaring gender 
inequalities at the level of civil rights. The Legal Age of 
Majority Act conferred adult status on every Zimbabwean citizen 
aged 18 and above, regardless of sex or race, freeing women from 
being "minors" throughout their lives. The Act allows women to 
contract and marry without parental consent, to sue and be sued 
in one's own name and right, and to administer property.
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"Seduction damages" which could previously be claimed by a father 
on behalf of his daughter can now be claimed by the woman 
herself.
The Matrimonial Clauses Act enabled women, upon divorce, to be 
beneficiaries of the property that was accumulated during 
marriage, and to change the procedure whereby fathers had 
automatic rights to children. However, there was and still is 
substantial opposition to these change of customary law with 
claims that family life will break down, daughters will no longer 
heed their fathers and women will be free to engage in 
promiscuous behaviour. Opposition is voiced through various 
channels including letters to the press, complaints to Members 
of Parliament and also in women's groups. As recently as 1989, 
a report of the 6th national conference of the Zimbabwe Women's 
Bureau states that the majority of women there expressed 
dissatisfaction with aspects of the Legal Age of Majority Act, 
claiming that it encourages juvenile delinquency, is unfair to 
parents and goes against valued traditional customs (Zimbabwe 
Women's Bureau, 1990:14). This view is not representative of all 
women but it nevertheless highlights the extent to which women 
internalise patriarchal values in social relations. It is also 
interesting to note the decline in militancy in the tone of this 
document as compared to earlier documents written shortly after 
the liberation struggle. Indeed, the backlash can be seen to have 
begun as early as 1983, with "Operation Clean-up", a programme 
designed to rid urban areas of prostitutes, beggars and 
squatters. Several thousand women (and almost as many men) were 
arrested. Women had to depend upon husbands and employers to 
present marriage certificates or proof of employment and women 
failing this screening were sent to a rural settlement (Zimbabwe 
Women's Action Group, 1987:225-6). Interestingly■, prostitutes 
working in expensive hotels and with higher-status clients were 
not disturbed (Jacob & Howard, 1987:42), showing the influence 
of class on repression used by the state. This rounding-up of 
women continues with the last occasion taking place in 1991 
before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.8 Such urban,
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clean-up campaigns have been enforced throughout colonial Africa 
and by post-independence governments in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Mozambique. It would seem that within the existing economic and 
social structure, controlling the movement of people to town is 
necessary as is preserving the role of women, especially rural 
women, as unpaid domestic and agricultural labour (Jacobs & 
Howard, 1987:40).
Another complicated factor influencing gender relations is the 
widespread practice of MloboloM or Mbride-priceM which requires 
that the man's family pay that of the bride's. This practice has 
become more commercialised and has altered from being a family 
obligation to more of an individual contract between a son-in-law 
and father-in-law. One argument used to oppose women's rights to 
property accumulated during marriage was based on the point that 
payment for her had already been made. As May (1987:40)
persuasively argues, when lobolo has been paid, it is not
difficult to see why, to a greater or lesser extent, a man may
regard a woman as his property and a woman may regard herself
as his possession. Although early statements by the MCDWA 
included plans to challenge the lobolo system (MCDWA, 1982:98), 
opposition has led to the shelving of this issue.
In conclusion, although the ZANU government has facilitated 
incremental gains in basic civil rights for women, it has been 
unwilling to challenge the fundamental structures of gender 
relations and the family. The MCDWA seems to have been 
marginalised in government policy making and has proved unable 
to confront many fundamental issues oppressing women.
Gender, health and education
Although the State has been reluctant to take a stand on 
family/gender relations, government investment and improvements 
in the social sectors (in the 1980s) undoubtedly benefitted 
women. Largely as a result of the activities of the Zimbabwe 
National Family Planning council (a parastatal established in 
1981) Zimbabwe, in 1988, had the highest contraceptive prevalence
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in sub-Saharan Africa. 43% of married women practised family 
planning (UNICEF, 1990:53; Central Statistical Office, 1990:4). 
Fertility rates dropped from 6.7 births per woman (1982-4) to 5.3 
births (1985-88). Education and residence are key factors 
influencing these rates. Women who attended secondary school had 
3.8 children compared with 7.0 children for women with no 
education. Urban women had an average of less than four children 
while rural women had slightly more than six births each. More 
than half of all Zimbabwean women had married for the first time 
before age 20, although there is some evidence that younger women 
are delaying marriage slightly, particularly educated, urban 
women (UNICEF, 1990:5).’ A decline in fertility is often 
associated with increases in the average age of first marriage. 
The maternal mortality rate dropped from 145 per 100,000 in 1980 
to 87 per 100,000 in 1987 (UNICEF, 1990). There is still a need, 
nevertheless, for improved access of delivery services and 
greater sensitivity in screening problem cases at antenatal care 
clinics (UNICEF, 1990:vii). Finally, it should be noted that in 
common with many other countries, a preoccupation with maternal 
health does ignore a wide range of health problems which women 
suffer arising out of poor living and working conditions, poor 
diet and reproductive problems.
The enormous expansion of primary and secondary education 
unquestionably increased girls' access to schooling. However, 
although the male:female enrolment ratio for primary schools was 
equal by 1989 (UNICEF, 1990:66-70), drop-out rates and secondary 
school enrolment rates tell a different story. From the fifth 
year of primary school onwards, the male:female ratio declines 
continuously. For example, while girls accounted for 49% of 
primary school pupils in 1986, they comprised 24% of total 
university enrolment in that year. Fees were payable at secondary 
school level and the male: female ratio for secondary school 
enrolment in 1989 was 1.3:1, indicating the continuing barriers 
for girls (ibid). Greater numbers of girls than boys drop out of 
secondary school every year. For example, in 1987 14% of girls 
dropped out compared with 9% of boys (Cotton, 1992). When women
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do succeed in making their way through the education system, the 
facilities still only prepare women for employment roles 
traditionally ascribed to females. This is reflected in their 
position in the workforce, described in the next section.
Gender and Employment
Legislation provides for equal pay for women, maternity leave and 
redress for discrimination on issues such as recruitment, 
promotion, training and retrenchment. However, this only affects 
the small proportion of women in paid employment and demands 
considerable commitment and organisation to enforce. In a 
workshop organised by MCDWA, trade unions and the Women's Action 
Group (WAG) in 1985, women still identified their problems at work 
as lack of security, lack of promotional opportunities, sexual 
harassment, lack of creche facilities and health hazards at work 
(WAG, 1985) .
According to the 1986-7 Labour Force Survey, only 22% of women 
are self-employed or working for wages, compared with 52% of men 
(Central Statistical Office, 1989:20). (When farming in communal 
lands are taken into account, employment rates rise to 65% for 
women and 78% for men) . In Harare, paid or self employment 
figures are 29% for women and 69% for men (ibid) . High 
unemployment rates for men, the colonial legacy of male migrant 
labour and dominant gender ideology (man as breadwinner, woman 
as housewife),10 combine to diminish opportunities for women in 
the formal sector.
About 69% of the total employed labour force (communal farmers, 
paid and self-employed workers) are in the agricultural sector 
and this is the only sector where women are in the majority 
(56%). Ninety-three percent of these women are communal land 
farmers. The labour survey does not take into account many 
"informal sector" activities in which women are heavily involved. 
In rural areas in Zimbabwe, these activities include pottery, the 
making of mats, gardening and the raising of small livestock, 
while in urban areas, they include crocheting, knitting, dress­
59
making, vegetable and fruit selling and illegal activities such 
as beer brewing and prostitution.
A study of 47 informal sector activities (in Zimbabwe) in 1984 
found that women were mainly represented in food kiosks (50%), 
knitting (40%), vegetable growing (12%), firewood selling 
(16.7%), hairdressing (16.7%), the sale of clothes (20%) and 
tailoring (14.3%). No women were represented in electrical 
repair, building, tin-smithing and such activities which were 
more in the line of small enterprises with greater investment in 
capital stock and employment of labour, thus confirming the 
gender-based inequalities in this sector described in Chapter 1. 
The study also showed that male informal sector operators had the 
advantage over women operators in that they were able to call on 
their wives' labour while women could not do likewise with their 
husbands' labour (Batezat & Mwalo, 1989:35).
In an in-depth study of informal sector activities in Magaba, 
Harare (Brand, 1986), 184 people were interviewed about their 
activities which fell into 3 areas: small-scale production,
repairs and maintenance, and petty trading. Seventy-two per cent 
of respondents were men and 28% women. Most women were in trading 
and none in productive or repair work which were found to be more 
lucrative. Widows represented 51% of the female respondents and 
only one-third of women were currently unmarried (ibid:56). Brand 
concludes from this that the informal sector provides a 
livelihood for those who tend to be marginalised by the 
mainstream economy. Most people interviewed (56%) indicated that 
they had informal jobs because they could not find employment in 
the formal sector. (The second most common reason was to 
supplement low household incomes.) In a much earlier (1976) 
survey also in Harare (May, 1979:11) , women also said they wanted 
but could not find "jobs" and had therefore turned to the 
informal sector.
MCDWA has encouraged the establishment of income generating 
projects, particularly cooperatives, as the main solution to
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women's lack of access to cash. Shopo and Hoyo (n.d.) , in a study 
of vulnerability in the segmented labour market in Zimbabwe, 
conclude that although cooperatives have provided employment, 
they are generally subject to labour undervaluation and increased 
exploitation of youth and women. Moreover, the popularity of 
activities such as sewing and knitting are a reflection of 
women's clubs emphasis on these as appropriate activities for 
women, dating back to colonial times (MCDWA, 1982:56).
Studies of income-generating projects in various countries have 
shown their limitations (see Buvinic, 1986 for a summary of the 
problems), and it is highly questionable whether most of these 
projects can offer a regular and reasonable income on a sustained 
basis.
Having examined gender inequalities in the post-independence 
decade, the rest of this chapter discusses key elements of ESAP 
and specific measures which raise the cost of living for low- 
income households.
2.3 THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 1991-1995
In early 1991, Zimbabwe embarked on a major Structural 
Adjustment programme (ESAP), scheduled to run until 1995, with 
the objectives of sustaining higher medium and long-term economic 
growth and reducing poverty (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991a:1). 
Although some adjustment measures had already been introduced, 
the adoption by the Zimbabwean government of this programme 
marked the beginning of a new, more intensified phase in the 
implementation of SAPs. Although the government claims that ESAP 
is home-grown, it shares the main characteristics of programmes 
implemented in more than 40 countries in Africa, Latin America 
and parts of Asia in the 1980s. The programme includes further 
cuts in consumer subsidies, severe cutbacks in government 
spending (including the social sectors) , extensive liberalisation 
of price and import controls and promotion of exports, 
particularly the expansion of non-traditional exports, that is, 
manufactured goods (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991a). Since the
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manufacturing sector is stronger than in other countries in the 
region the World Bank view is that Zimbabwe is in a better 
position than others to compete in the international market. In 
March 1991, the World Bank representative in Zimbabwe claimed 
that "Zimbabwe could be the first African country to succeed with 
such reforms" (cited in Economic Intelligence Unit, 1989:13); an 
interesting statement given that the World Bank claims many 
successes.
Local economists were involved in drawing up the preliminary ESAP 
proposal, but the proposal was then radically altered. To cite 
just a few examples of their differences with the final proposal, 
they had suggested lower rates of currency devaluation, lower 
interest rates, less restriction on credit to farmers and had 
cautioned against the use of free collective bargaining 
procedures for wage-setting since it was felt that the trade 
unions were not strong enough to obtain the necessary conditions 
and benefits for their workers (Davies, 1993; Kadenge, 1991).
Economic growth during 1991, the first year of ESAP fell far 
short of government expectations. It has been put at between 0% 
and 0.5%, far below the 4.3% predicted by government.11 Trade 
liberalisation and currency devaluations played a part in this. 
By November 1991, 15% of all imports (raw materials only at this 
stage) had been placed under an open importation license (OGIL), 
deregulating government controls on imports and foreign exchange 
allocations. As Mumbemgezi (1991) points out, the private sector 
responded by bulk purchasing inputs beyond immediate requirements 
resulting in a drain of foreign currency reserves and leaving the 
government even more dependent on foreign loans. Debt servicing 
rose to 27.2% of export earnings (World Bank, 1993), rather than 
declining to 2 0% as predicted by the government. The dollar 
depreciated by 97% during 1991 with 50% of this change taking 
place between August and November 1991 (Mumbengegwi, 1991). The 
actual devaluation of 42% in 1991 moved Zimbabwe from a middle 
to a low income country in the terms of the International 
Monetary Fund (ibid). Even within the economic criteria defined
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by the government, the programme did not begin successfully.
For manufacturers, input costs rose by 37% in the first three 
months of 1991.12 Quite apart from competition and unfavourable 
trends in the world market, the high import dependence of the 
manufacturing sector is a major constraint on the successful 
promotion of exports. More to the point, perhaps, the only group 
within Zimbabwe which can gain from this export-led strategy for 
growth is a small minority who own large, internationally 
competitive industries dealing in exports. The degree of foreign 
ownership of this sector is high with estimates ranging from 50% 
to 80% (Kadenge et al. 1991:16), although the government has set 
up the "Indigenous Business Development Centre” to promote local 
participation in (and benefits from) ESAP.
ESAP AMD EMPLOYMENT
With ESAP, a system of collective bargaining for wages and 
conditions has replaced government intervention in wage setting 
except for farm workers and domestic workers. However, the 18% 
wage rise negotiated by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) in 1991 has been completely eroded by inflation. 
Amendments to the Labour Relations Act are designed to allow more 
”flexible hiring and firing of labour to improve firms' 
efficiency and competitiveness” (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991:7), 
in other words, to keep production costs low by reducing costs 
of labour. The amendments also strengthens employers' ability to 
undermine the already-weak capacity of organised labour to resist 
exploitation and fight for better working conditions. In January 
1992, 4000 employees of a parastatal organization, the National 
Railways of Zimbabwe, went on strike after management refused to 
grant equal (financial) recognition to the two trade unions 
operating within the organization, preferring to support the 
newer and smaller union that was more sympathetic to government 
officials rather than the larger and longer-established union. 
The management's response to the strike was swift: all 4000
employees were fired. They were subsequently invited to reapply
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for their jobs with the same pay but loss of accumulated 
benefits, along with queues of other unemployed people; all but 
a small percentage of "troublemakers" (active trade unionists) 
were re-employed on these unfavourable terms.
ESAP also includes a reduction of 25% in civil service staff by 
1995, although initiating these retrenchments was postponed from 
1991 to 1992, arguably out of reluctance to lose the support of 
this section of the population.
ESAP AND THE COST OF LIVING
Since the introduction of ESAP, prices of food and basic 
commodities have spiralled upwards. The removal of subsidies and 
the decontrol of prices have resulted in a huge increase in the 
cost of living. This has been exacerbated by escalating costs of 
imported inputs for manufactured products due to the devaluation 
of the Zimbabwean dollar. The cost of living for lower-income 
urban families rose by 45% between mid-1991 and mid-1992 (the 
interval between the two surveys) while that for higher-income 
groups rose by 36% (Central Statistical Office, 1992). Table 2 
shows the increase on selected food items, during the period July 
1991 and January 1992, when a sub-sample of households was 
followed up.
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Table 2.2: Prices of selected basic commodities (in Zimbabwean 
dollars)
July 1991 Jan 1992 % rise
Bread per loaf 75cts 99cts 32%
Milk per pkt 59cts 65cts 10%
Sugar 2kg $2.20 $3.19 45%
Maize meal-less refined
5kg
50kg
$3.23
$30.26
$3.88
$36.31
20%
20%
Maize meal-more refined
5kg
50kg
$5.68
$40.52
$8.54
$74.20
50%
83%
Meat (economy cut) 1kg $5.50 $7.00 21%
Source: Author's survey of shops in Kambuzuma.
The overall price rise on food items consumed by low-income 
groups was calculated at 49% (Central Statistical Office, 1992), 
between mid-1991 and mid-1992.
ESAP AMD SOCIAL SERVICES
In January 1992, primary school fees were introduced and 
secondary school fees in urban areas were raised. This is in 
addition to levies already set by individual schools and approved 
by government. Primary school fees were set at Z$20 per term in 
high density areas and Z$70 in low density areas, with rural 
schools remaining free (see note 1 for US$ equivalence) . 
Secondary school fees were raised by 40% to Z$70 a term in high 
density areas and by 200% to Z$150 in low density areas. Schools 
in rural areas continue to charge Z$50. In addition, examination 
fees were raised. Although the fee structure reflected a concern 
to alleviate the burden for low income groups, the absolute 
amounts were still high, particularly at a time when everything 
was going up.
Parents earning under Z$400 per month should theoretically be 
considered for exemption. The Department for Social Welfare has
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been given the responsibility for vetting families who claim they 
cannot afford to pay, using forms obtained at the school, The 
problems that ensued are fully discussed in Chapter 6. For the 
moment, it is worth noting that Z$400 corresponds to the 
threshold for the payment of personal tax, but the figure is way 
below the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) of Z$525 for a family of five 
in July 1991 (updated from Loewenson et al. 1989)•
Health charges for curative services were not raised during the 
period of this study but the income threshold for exemption from 
payment for health care services was extremely low at Z$150 per 
month, the same figure as in 1980 but about a third in real terms 
(Economic Intelligence Unit, 1991:13) . Maternity fees were raised 
in January 1992. The deposit for the fees at the major hospital 
in Harare rose from Z$140 to Z$500, to cover delivery charges, 
ward fees, anaesthetic and so on. Maternity fees in city council 
clinics rose from Z$40 to Z$63.95.u An earlier increase in ante­
natal and maternity fees in Harare had already depressed use of 
these services (Loewenson et al. 1991) . Women most at risk of 
having complicated births and who most require good ante-natal 
care are those who are overworked and undernourished. These are 
obviously women from poorer households and are precisely those 
who cannot afford these higher charges. Maternal morbidity and 
mortality is therefore likely to increase for poor women.
The price of other basic services also rose in this period. In 
November 1991, electricity charges rose by 15.5% having already 
been increased by 20% in July 1991. This was justified in terms 
of the higher costs of imported inputs due to devaluation.14 
Urban bus fares were increased in November 1991, a basic 55 cts 
bus fare rose by 45% to 80 cts. Payment for health services and 
education therefore becomes one more competing demand on low 
incomes.
The government clearly recognised that ESAP would have negative 
implications for the poor; however, these are seen as short to 
medium term consequences and by 1994 and 1995, the positive
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effects of the programme are expected to predominate on the lower 
income groups (Government of Zimbabwe,1991a). "Transitional” 
negative consequences of ESAP are to be alleviated by a Social 
Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) programme. The two components are 
social welfare programmes: food, health and education subsidies 
and training and employment programmes. The effectiveness of the 
programmes are discussed in Chapter 6, in the light of the 
research findings.
Having discussed the broader socio-economic context in which the 
research was carried out, and the policies likely to affect urban 
low-income households, the next chapter turns to the specific 
setting in Harare of the micro-level study: Kambuzuma.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. In 1978, at a joint World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNICEF 
Conference in Alma Ata, the governments of 134 countries and many 
voluntary agencies adopted a Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy 
to achieve better health for all. PHC was defined as "essential 
health care made universally accessible to individuals and 
families in the community by means acceptable to them, through 
their full participation and at a cost that the community and the 
country can afford.” (WHO, 1978:34) The state is seen to have an 
important role in correcting resource inequalities in the health 
sector, from urban to rural, tertiary to primary level and 
curative to preventive services.
2. Stoneman (1988; 1990) provides an excellent overview of the 
economy in the post-independence and pre-adjustment period, and 
his data is used extensively in this and the next section. Other 
comprehensive accounts are given by Davies (1988), Kadhani
(1986), Nyawata (1988) and Sibanda (1989).
3. The Lancaster House agreement refers to the constitution and 
conditions for independent rule, negotiated between Ian Smith's 
colonial white government and ZANU.PF. These negotiations were 
mediated by the British government and the agreement was signed 
in London in Lancaster House.
4. Women were able to acquire property such as the ”cow of 
motherhood” on the marriage of their daughters. They could also 
accumulate some wealth, for example, through the provision of 
midwife services, pottery and weaving (Batezat & Mwalo, 1989:48; 
Kazembe, 1987:381)
5. Zimbabwe, then Southern Rhodesia, was named after Cecil Rhodes 
of the British South Africa Company who entered the territory in 
the 1890s in search of gold. The final uprising in opposition to 
the European incursion was defeated in 1897 and company rule 
established, when gold failed to materialise in significant 
quantities, the settlers turned to agriculture.
6. See also Nelson (1991) who describes the increased stress and 
poverty in rural families in Kenya, caused by male migration to 
towns.
7. Seasonal migration continues to be necessary for the survival 
of low^income urban households and will be discussed in Chapter 
3. Chant & Radcliffe (1992) and Potts & Mutambirwa (1990) 
provide an analysis of this phenomenon, the former referring to 
various countries and the latter to the specific case of 
Zimbabwe.
8. See "Prostitution” in Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11 (6):16.
9. See also "The new urban woman and the tradition trap” in 
Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1991, 10(26):11.
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10. This issue was discussed in the first chapter but see also 
MCDWA (1982:46) for a discussion of how women in Zimbabwe are 
seen to supplement men's wages, irrespective of the fact that 
they might be the main providers for the household.
11. See "Remodel the Economy” in Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1991, 
10(20):4.
12. See "Projections" in Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1991, 10(24):7.
13. See "Maternity Fees Go Up" in The Herald. 6-01-92.
14. See "ZESA raises electricity charges" in The Herald. 30-11- 
91.
15. However, the effects of the 1990-91 drought on macro-economic 
growth rates are difficult to disentangle from the effects of 
ESAP. The much more severe drought of 1991-92 also had an 
extremely negative impact on the economy. This point regarding 
the various factors influencing economic growth is taken up in 
Chapter 6, in the discussion of the performance of the economy 
during the first two years of ESAP.
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CHAPTER 3
KAMBUZUMA; A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe socio-economic 
conditions in Kambuzuma, with particular attention to the ways 
in which gender influences the experience of living in a high- 
density suburb. The data used in this chapter is drawn from a 
household survey carried out in 1991 (July-August), complemented 
by two focus group discussions with women. The results of this 
survey serve as "base-line" information with which data collected 
12 months later (and one and a half years into the Structural 
Adjustment Programme) will be compared in Chapters 4 and 5.
The chapter begins by briefly outlining the housing situation of 
low-income groups in Harare before addressing the specific 
characteristics of Kambuzuma. It then moves on to introduce the 
study sample presenting a profile of income levels, employment, 
household expenditure, domestic work, leisure and participation 
in social organisations. The information is gender-disaggregated 
wherever appropriate and the objective is to describe the lives 
of women and men in Kambuzuma prior to the full implementation 
of ESAP. It should also be noted that since the settlement is 
heterogenous in terms of income level, there is some 
disaggregation by income groups where relevant.
3.2 HIGH-DENSITY HOUSING IN HARARE
As early as the 1960s, the Rhodesian government was searching for 
low cost solutions to house the black population, involving the 
transfer of part of the costs of construction to occupants. A 
"core housing" project in Kambuzuma marked the initiation of this 
strategy. The core usually consisted of one partitioned room, a 
kitchen and a toilet and occupants could then extend the building 
(Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991:6). The government's policy after 
independence (1980) concentrated on home ownership on an owner- 
occupier basis. Ownership of rental accommodation was transferred 
to sitting tenants. Squatters were to be removed and accommodated
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in properly planned residential areas. The idea of core housing 
was rejected as inferior accommodation and a policy of site-and- 
service provision was adopted with higher building standards 
(Bond, 1992a:l; Potts, 1991 & Mutambirwa:7). Ambitious plans 
were drawn up but by the end of 1983, it became clear that the 
reality of housing construction and investment fell far short of 
the plan,1 with the situation exacerbated by economic recession 
and the drought. In 1984, following a World Bank Urban Sector 
review which recommended full cost recovery for housing and urban 
infrastructure, the government passed responsibility for middle 
and low income housing to building societies. The World Bank and 
USAID assisted in the expansion of site-and-services projects by 
providing resources for incentives to expand building society 
loans. Building standards remained high and monthly repayments 
(including service charges) could not exceed 30% of income (Potts 
& Mutambirwa, 1991:12).
This -housing strategy has been fraught with difficulties. The 
complicated conveyancing procedures of building societies 
combined with their refusal to grant loans of less than Z$6000 
(approx. US$ 1200 in July 1992), on the grounds that it was 
unprofitable given administration costs, has hindered low income 
groups from using this system of credit. In addition, it is 
questionable whether very low income households can afford to pay 
30% of their income for housing repayments, without trading off 
vital expenditures such as food, and whether . they can meet 
requirements to complete building work within a fairly restricted 
time period (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991:15). In practice, poorer 
people face huge barriers, while better-off households who gain 
ownership are forced to supplement their income by renting out 
rooms. Thus most low-income people in Harare are lodgers, renting 
one or more rooms from house owners or principal council tenants, 
mostly in high density areas.2 The forces of supply and demand 
mean that rents are high and rising. This has created a huge 
problem of absentee landlordism with richer people obtaining 
housing meant for the poor in order to make large profits (Bond, 
1992:7; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991:15). Finally, rising costs of
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urban land and the profits to be made, from its commercial use and 
from high-income housing mean that new low-income housing schemes 
are pushed even further out of the city.
In 1989 and again in 1991, the World Bank and USAID provided 
unprecedented resources for expanding the small loans capacity 
of building societies and there are plans to lower shelter 
quality requirements and further limit government involvement in 
low-cost mortgages (Bond, 1992:9). Ironically, the rise in 
interest rates in Feb 1991, as part of ESAP, meant that building 
societies restricted mortgage lending, at a time when they were 
meant to have an expanded role. The contradictions between the 
housing strategy and market determined finance flows means that 
the housing situation of the urban poor is unlikely to improve 
in the near future.3
3.3 KAMBUZUMA: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
AND STUDY SAMPLE
Kambuzuma is one of the longest established high density suburbs 
in Harare, located 10km from the city centre (see Fig. 3.1). 
Council.allocations of core houses to black workers (no specific 
sector was targeted) began in 1965, with buyers putting down a 
deposit and then meeting monthly repayments to pay off the lump 
sum in instalments (at 7.25% interest). At the time of the first 
survey in 1991, the settlement consisted of 2,600 units, laid out 
in a grid pattern, over half of which had been purchased 
outright. Leaseholders who had not completed purchase paid a sum 
of Z$12.00 (US$ 4.30), in addition to local rates and for some 
houses, a fixed electricity charge was also applied. The 
population of Kambuzuma was estimated by the local council at 
approximately 40,000 although since lodgers were not registered, 
this figure might well be inaccurate.
Kambuzuma has two primary schools, one secondary school, a pre­
school creche located in a community centre and a polyclinic 
offering a range of preventive and curative services. In 
addition, there are a number of churches of various
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Fig 3.1 Harare: location of Kambuzuma and other high density suburbs
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denominations. All houses have piped water although in the vast 
majority it is located outside in the yard. All houses have 
electricity although many householders only have access to a 
fixed amount, paid at a set rate and inadequate for lighting and 
cooking by electric stove at the same time, even if the main 
streets are lit. There are two main sets of shops although 
vegetable vending and ,,tuckshopsM selling bread and other common 
items proliferate. Finally, there is a large council owned beer 
hall, built in colonial times and used to raise revenue for the 
council.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE STUDY SAMPLE
One hundred and twenty households constituted the random sample 
with a mean household size of . 5.3 and a range of two to fourteen 
people (see Appendix 1 for details of the sampling frame and 
method). The household was defined as people living and eating 
together and who at least partially pool resources (income and 
unpaid work) to meet the physical needs of the group as a unit4. 
Lodgers therefore constituted separate households, although 
single lodgers were excluded since the intra-household division 
of labour and resources was a major focus of the study and since 
they are the most highly mobile section of the population and 
would have been most difficult to follow up twelve months later. 
Women were the main respondents in the survey, although when they 
were unsure of facts pertaining to their menfolk, the men were 
interviewed as well.
Fifty-six per cent of the sample were main householders and the 
remaining 44% were lodgers (including two families who rented 
entire houses from absent landlords). A far larger proportion of 
main households (59.7%) consisted of more than 5 members than 
lodger families (13.7%). The average number of offspring in the 
whole sample was 3.9, with 2.7 being the mean number of resident 
offspring. The mean number of resident offspring was 1.6 for 
lodgers and 3.6 for main householders. Lodgers had fewer 
offspring even when non-resident offspring were included; 2.7 
children as compared to 4.8 children for main householders. This
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could be due to the younger age composition of lodgers rather 
than different choices of family size (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Mean age of respondents and spouses in study sample 
(July 1991)
Women Men 
N=116 N=104
Main householders
Lodgers
Entire sample
41.1 yrs 46.6 yrs 
29.9 yrs 34.2 yrs 
36 yrs 40.7 yrs
Only 15% of women and 12% of men (heads and spouses) were born 
in Harare. There was little difference between lodgers and main 
householders in this respect, but as expected, a much greater 
proportion of lodgers (43% of women and 30% of men) had migrated 
to Harare after independence, as compared to main householders 
(13% of women and 13% of men). Only 14% of households were sole 
occupants of the housing unit, the rest shared. The average 
number of people per unit was 10, with a range of 3 to 19. Of the 
main householders, 62% of ownership or lease agreements were held 
by male heads of household, 12% were jointly held by spouses and 
10% were held by female heads. In part, this reflects pre­
independence housing eligibility criteria but it also reflects 
gender inequalities in that full ownership obtained after 
independence was still granted to men, with no active policy of 
promoting joint ownership (Schlyter, 1989:194). De jure (but not 
de_facto) women headed households have the same rights to housing 
as men (ibid).
Table 3.2 shows the levels of schooling of the respondents and 
their spouses (where applicable) . In general, it can be seen that 
men had higher levels of schooling than women and a higher 
proportion of women had little or no formal education.
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Table 3.2: Gender-disaggregated levels of education (July 1991)
Women
N=116
Men
N=105
No schooling 5.2% none
Incomplete primary 24.1% 15.2%
Complete primary 27.6% 35.2%
Form II (Junior
Certificate) 16.4% 12.4%
Completed secondary 23.3% 30.5%
"A” level 0.9% 2.9%
University/ higher
education 2.6% 3.8%
Variations in household structure are shown in Table 3.3.5 The 
head of the household, as defined by the woman, was always the 
man, except in the women-headed households and in one household 
where the woman said they were both heads (both were formally 
employed).
Table 3.3: Variations in household structure (July 1991)
Male head Female head Total
Nuclear 60.8% (73) 6.7% (8) 67.5% (81)
Extended 25.8% (31) 5.0% (6) 30.8% (37)
Siblings 0.8% (1) 0.8% (1) 1.7% (2)
Total 87.5% (105) 12.5% (15) 100% (120)
Although male-headed, nuclear families are in the majority, there 
is a substantial minority of women headed and extended 
households. As expected, only a few women headed households were 
single women (3 out of 15), the rest were widowed or divorced 
women. Due to the history of male migration, women-headed 
households are under-represented in urban areas (Schlyter, 
1989:28). The proportion of women headed households in rural 
areas is much higher, 25% to 50% depending on the area (Batezat 
and Mwalo, 1989), with many being de facto women-headed, since 
husbands are away working in urban areas.
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3.4 INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Table 3.4 shows the income levels of the sample and the 
percentage of households living below the Poverty Datum Line 
(PDL) in each income category. Monthly income was based on the 
spouses' income from employment and .other regular sources. 
Regular sources most commonly included rent from lodgers (for 
main householders), women's income generating activities and 
adult offsprings' contribution to the household budget.6
Table 3.4: Monthly income levels (July 1991)
Income in Z$
US$ 1 = Z$ 2.79
% households 
N= 120
% households 
below PDL*
< $400 15.8% 78.9%
$401 - $900 36.7% 18.2%
$901 - $1200 22.3% 3.7%
$1201 - $1800 15.8% none
>$1800 9.2% none
* Poverty Datum Line for Harare, according to family size, 
updated from Loewenson et al. 1989.
Twenty per cent of households in the sample lived below the 
Poverty Datum Line (PDL) and this percentage rose to 32% if only 
income from formal employment was considered. Women-headed 
households (50%) were significantly more likely (p <0.05) to live 
under the poverty datum line than male headed households (19.5%) . 
Extended households were more likely to live below the PDL than 
nuclear households (38.5% as compared to 17.9%), and larger 
households (more than 5 members) were more likely to live below 
the PDL (33% as compared to 18%) . This is because households were 
generally extended by dependent members or by earners who did not 
pool their income nor make large enough contributions to the 
household budget to substantially raise living standards. The 
mean number of earners per household was only 1.4 while the mean 
number of resident dependents was 3.8, rising to 4.3 when non­
resident dependents were included.
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FORMAL AND SELF EMPLOYMENT
Eighty-nine per cent of household heads were formally or self 
employed. Two-thirds of households had only one earner, 33% had 
two earners and 9% had three. As expected, the main earner was 
a male in 93% of households, the remaining 7% being women in 
female-headed households. A much higher proportion of second and 
third earners were women: 43% and 50% respectively. Thirty-eight 
per cent of household heads who were formally or self employed 
were union members, but the proportion fell to 21% of second 
earners and 10% of third earners. Twenty-nine per cent of 
households had at least one member actively seeking work, and the 
mean length of time people had been seeking employment for was 
18 months.
Over four times as many men than women were formally or self 
employed. Women were concentrated in sales and clerical work, 
health and teaching while men were concentrated in skilled and 
unskilled manual work in industry and construction (see Tables
3.5 and 3.6). Amongst the self-employed, gender differentials 
were also evident, with men involved in more lucrative areas such 
as running their own taxi services, while women were seamstresses 
and knitters with their own machines.
Table 3.5: Categories of employment (July 1991)
Women
N=30
Men
N=127
Self-employed 13% 2%
Unskilled manual 3% 8%
Skilled manual 6% 43%
White collar 37% 29%
(sales & clerical) 
Teachers 13% none
Health workers 17% none
Other professionals 10% 2%
Soldiers, police none 5%
Managerial none 11%
77
Table 3.6 : Branches of employment (July 1991)
Men
N=125
Women 
N=3 0
Industry 36.8% 10.0%
Construction 4.8% none
Commerce 13.6% 26.7%
Transport, storage 
and communication 16.0% 3.3%
Electricity, gas, water 
services 2.4% none
Banks, finance, insurance 
companies 5.6% 6.7%
Health and social welfare 0.8% 30.0%
Education 1.0% 16.7%
Other public services 7.2% 3.3%
Army, police 5.6% 3.3%
Catering 4.0% none
Others 2.4% none
Men's income averaged Z$ 760 a month while women's averaged 
Z$ 749, and there was little difference in the proportions of men 
and women in various income bands (see Table 3.7). Gender 
differences therefore lie in the numbers of men and women 
formally employed and the sectors they worked in, rather than 
income levels.
Table 3.7: Men and women's monthly income from formal/ self 
employment (July 1991)
Monthly Income in Z$ 
(US$ 1 = Z$ 2.79)
% of women 
N=3 0
% of men 
N=124
$ 400 and below 20% 18%
$ 401 - 900 50% 56%
$ 901 - 1200 20% 15%
Over $1200 10% 11%
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME
About 80% of households had at least one other source of income 
excluding formal or self employment, although a substantial 
proportion of these were irregular (Table 3.8).
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Table 3.8: Percentage of households with other regular and
irregular sources of income (July 1991)
Regular sources Irregular sources 
N=120 N=120
None
One source 
Two sources 
Three sources
35.8% 65.8% 
35% 30.0% 
19.2% 4.2% 
10% none
For main householders, the most important and regular source of 
income, other than formal employment, was lodgers' rent. For the 
sample as a whole, however, women's income generating work was 
the most common other source of income (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Nature of sources, by regularity of income (July 1991)
% of activities providing: 
Regular income Irregular income 
N=125 N=46
Lodgers' rent
Women's income-generating
work
Transfers eg pensions 
Adult male offspring 
Adult female offspring 
Ex-husband
Co-resident relatives 
Men's odd jobs 
"Boyfriends"
40.0% -
32.8% 78.3%
8.0% —
5.6% 6.5%
6.4% 2.2%
2.4% -
2.4% 2.2%
2.4% 6.5%
- 4.3%
WOMEN'S INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES
Although 78% of respondents defined themselves as housewives, 91% 
of these women earned some income of their own. However, almost 
half the income generating activities they engaged in could not 
be relied upon on a regular basis (36 of 77 activities) . The 
activities tended to be individually undertaken and in 
traditional areas of work (Table 3.10), with low and unreliable 
returns. The irregularity was linked to factors such as lack of 
time and/or lack of capital and markets. For example, women could 
not engage in petty trade all year round because they went to 
help with agricultural work often on their in-laws' farms.
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Table 3.10: Women's income generating activities, by regularity 
of income (July 1991).
Type of activity No. of activities providing: 
regular irregular 
income income
Sewing, knitting, crocheting
Sale of agricultural produce*
Sale of small livestock
Petty trading
Hairdressing
Baking and cooking
Other
20 24 
11 5 
3 2 
3 3 
1 1 
1
2 1
Total 41 36
* in rural areas on a periodic/seasonal basis, usually to a 
marketing board.
The average income which women received from their regular 
activities was Z$ 203 per month, but ranged from Z$ 10 to Z$973 
with 63% earning under the average. The mean monthly income for 
the irregular sources was only Z$39 per month. Women's income was 
undoubtedly important; it was directed towards basic household 
needs such as food, kitchen utensils, children's clothing, 
savings for emergencies, even if it was low in relation to income 
from waged employment, corroborating the findings of studies from 
various countries discussed in Chapter 1.
Links with rural areas are strong and women play a major role in 
maintaining them. As Chant and Radcliffe (1992:20) point out, in 
most countries, women migrants tend to be more committed to 
sustaining ties with home areas than men, since women attach more 
importance to the family and/or are expected to do so within the 
framework of kinship obligations. In over one-third of 
households, women seasonally migrated to work on farms in rural 
areas. These usually belonged to the husband's family although 
the couple sometimes had their own land and even hired help to 
maintain it in their absence.
Urban households maximise their current and future economic 
security by maintaining land, rights to land and links with
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extended family in the communal areas. Within the colonial, 
migrant labour system, male workers retired to their rural homes 
and many respondents in this study said they expected to return 
to the rural areas at some time in the future (see Potts and 
Mutambirwa, 1990, for similar findings in a larger survey 
focusing on urban-rural linkages) . Women therefore compensate for 
an uncertain job market and an inadequate social security system 
by keeping up contact with rural homes, contributing labour on 
the farm and sometimes even working to build a house there for 
the future.
Women also visited and cared for elderly and sick relatives in 
rural areas. Sixty-three per cent of households sent money 
regularly to family, an average of Z$ 62 per month, almost always 
to family in rural areas. The flow of resources was not all one 
way: women also gained access to food items which were sometimes 
brought back to urban areas. Some women were also able to sell 
excess produce for cash (see Table 10). Case studies in various 
Third World countries have described the importance of these 
urban-rural linkages involving productive and reproductive 
activities, which enable urban households to survive (Chant & 
Radcliffe, 1992:27; Galli & Funk, 1991).
3.5 HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE. SAVINGS AND DEBT
Table 3.11 shows the average amount spent on various essential 
items on a regular monthly basis. The number of households 
varies for each item of expenditure because the mean was 
calculated for households which actually incur that item of 
expenditure; for example, the sum for rent is calculated for 
lodgers only, since main householders pay rates.
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Table 3.11: Mean monthly expenditure on regular, essential items
(July 1991).
Item Mean sum
US$ 1
Range 
= Z$2.79
Food (N=120) $279 $50 — $750
Food at work (N=76) $45 $5 - $147
Rent (N=53) $96 $35 - $400
Rates (N—67) $40 $16 - $60
Education* (N=88) $53 $1 - $383
Electricity (N=lll) $39 $10 - $86
Water (N=102) $6 $1 - $34
Fuel (N=41) $12 $2 - $31
Transport to work (N=79) $67 $16 - $441
Money to family (N=75) $64 $7 - $300
Other regular expenses $95 $5 — $510
TOTAL REGULAR EXPENSES $556 $121 - $1848
* this includes fees, levies, school milk and lunches, transport 
and excludes school uniforms which are bought irregularly (see 
Table 3.12).
Food was the largest item of expenditure and on average, 
constituted 50% of total monthly expenditure. However, the range 
is enormous with 80% of the poorest households' expenditure 
devoted to food as compared to 25% for the most well off. Sixty- 
three per cent of the sample sent money regularly to family 
members, usually in rural areas. Other regular expenses, incurred 
by one-third of the sample, included items such as pay for 
domestic workers, hire purchase payments for furniture, insurance 
policies and medicines for chronic illness.
Respondents were also asked to estimate what they had spent on 
clothes and school uniforms (where relevant) in the previous 
twelve months. A monthly average for the two items was then 
derived and added to the regular monthly expenses to provide an 
assessment of total essential monthly expenses (Table 3.12).
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Table 3.12: Mean monthly expenditure on essentials including
clothes and school uniforms (July 1991).
Item Mean sum Range
Clothing (N=107)
School uniforms (N= 82 )
Total
$63 $8 - $200 
$17 $2 - $86
$625 $120 - $2348
Table 3.13 provides a breakdown of household members and 
combination of members who make financial contributions towards 
the household budget.
Table 3.13: Sources of financial contributions to household
expenses (July 1991).
Member/s of household % of sample (N=120)
Male head 45.0%
Both spouses 25.8%
Female head 5.0%
Male head + male offspring 5.0%
Female head + male offspring 1.7%
Male head + female offspring 4.2%
Male head + offspring 2.5%
Female head + offspring 2.5%
Male offspring 1.7%
Male head + relatives 2.5%
Spouses + son 0.8%
Female spouse + daughter 0.8%
Other 2.5%
Although the "male breadwinner” ideology dominates, over half the 
households are dependent on income from other members, mainly 
women and offspring (male and female). In households where men 
were the sole earners, women were usually given a housekeeping 
allowance from which they purchased food and basic household 
necessities. In some households, men alone or with their spouses 
did a monthly shop for basics and women were then given a smaller 
amount for food which had to be bought on a daily or weekly 
basis. Women sometimes also paid the rent and school fees but had 
to ask their husbands for the specific sums required. In most of 
these households, husbands did not tell their wives how much they
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earned although wives' estimates were almost always found to be 
accurate (on seeking this information from husbands).
This pattern of allocation has been categorised as the 
housekeeping allowance system by Munachonga (1988:187) in her 
research in urban Zambia and by Beneria and Roldan (1987:158) in 
their work in Mexico. As they point out, women are relatively 
powerless (in decision-making) in these households; however, 
whereas in Zambia and similarly in Harare, they faced 
considerable stress in making ends meet, in Mexico these women 
were the most "well provided for" in the sample concerned (see 
Beneria & Roldan, 1987:159).
In households where women were involved in income-generating 
activities with low returns, the housekeeping allowance pattern 
was also observed but the women tended to use their income to 
make up the shortfall buying food, kitchen utensils and sometimes 
clothes for herself and the children. Women used their income to 
reduce the frequency with which they had to ask for money or 
argue over expenditure and to at least slightly increase the 
control they had over their own lives. In the words of one 
respondent, "Having my own money means that he can't completely 
rule me". This comment was made in a focus group discussion and 
evoked agreement from all members of the group.
In households where both spouses were employed, there was shared 
responsibility for basic household expenses with women having a 
greater say in decision-making. However, this entailed a process 
of negotiation which sometimes generated conflict since women 
usually felt they contributed more towards household expenses 
than their husbands and that the men retained more for personal 
spending (see Beneria & Roldan, 1987:122 and Munachonga, 1988:185 
for similar findings).
SAVINGS AND DEBT
Sixty-eight per cent of households did manage to save cn a 
regular basis. The average amount saved was $114 per month
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although the variation was enormous with 74% of households saving 
well under the average. One household only managed to save $5.00 
a month and at the other end of the scale, one household saved 
$500 a month and another $1300. Interestingly, although money was 
more commonly saved by the male head or separately by each 
spouse, respondents stated that decisions on how to spend savings 
were made jointly in the majority of these households (see Table 
3.14). This may be because savings were spent on "emergencies" 
in 45% of households; unforeseen expenses usually involving 
illness or death in the family which would be a matter of 
consensus. Twenty-seven and a half per cent of households used 
their savings for house related expenses: saving to buy or
improve a house, buying furniture or other household items. Seven 
and a half per cent specifically mentioned health related 
expenses and a further 5% education expenses.
Table 3.14: Who saves and who decides how to spend savings (July 
1991)
Savers Deciders 
N=82 N=79
Male head 
Female head/spouse 
Spouses jointly 
Spouses separately 
Other
46.3% 17.7% 
41.5% 22.8% 
20.7% 58.2% 
4.9% 1.3% 
2.4%
Seven and a half per cent of the sample were in debt, in the 
sense that they had borrowed money from employers, relatives or 
friends in order to meet regular "consumption" costs such as 
food, school fees and rent. The sums owed varied from $70 to $300 
with an average of $155. A further 20% of the sample had monthly 
payments to meet in furniture and clothing stores which allowed 
customers to purchase goods "on account" and pay in monthly 
instalments. These instalments varied from $17 to $517 with an 
average of $130 a month. Finally, 11.8% of the sample borrowed 
regularly from employers and then had repayment docked off their 
next pay cheque. The amount borrowed varied from $10 to $200 with 
an average of $71 per month.
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3.6 DOMESTIC WORK AND CHILDCARE
Women were almost exclusively responsible for domestic work, 
particularly cleaning, cooking and washing clothes. In response 
to a question on who carried out most domestic tasks, men were 
cited in only two households; one where sons did the work because 
their mother lived in a rural area and they had no sisters and 
the other where a male relative was responsible (both spouses 
were formally employed and had a seven year old daughter) . In the 
households where women went to rural areas for periods in the 
year, older children, overwhelmingly daughters, took on these 
tasks.
The average number of hours spent on domestic work per week was
47.2 hours: 27.6 hours on cooking, 8.7 hours on cleaning, 7.4 
hours on washing and 3.5 hours on shopping. In only 3 households 
were men involved in cooking; in two cases sons cooked and in the 
third it was the male relative referred to above. The majority 
of households (70%) used electricity for cooking although a 
substantial proportion used paraffin (28.3%). Only 2 households 
(1.7%) used gas.
In eight households men were involved in cleaning; in six cases 
sons, in one the male head did some cleaning and in one it was 
again the male relative. In four households men did wash clothes, 
in one case this was the son and in the others the male spouse 
shared this work. Only 16.7% of the sample had access to piped 
domestic water, the others had taps in the yard outside, and 
washing was always done outside. Interestingly, men were involved 
in food shopping in 38% of households, the only task which 
involves money and perhaps, a greater degree of choice and 
decision making!
Childcare was an exclusively female task although women in 84% 
of households containing children said that men did spend time 
with their children, most commonly playing and going out with 
them, but also engaging in school-related and educational 
activities. Time spent on childcare was not a specific point of
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enquiry because looking after children is so often carried out 
simultaneously with other tasks.
Sixty-eight percent of households in the sample grew food for 
consumption, usually vegetables for the relish which is eaten 
with maize meal, and less commonly maize. The proportion of 
people growing food would probably be higher, but most lodgers 
do not have access to even a small patch of land although maize 
is sometimes grown illegally on vacant council plots. In half the 
households growing food, women were exclusively responsible for 
this work but in others children helped and in 7% of households, 
this was a collective task.
3.7 PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS
Forty-two per cent of the women interviewed belonged to at least 
one social organisation with a further 10.3% belonging to a 
second organisation. Of the women who did belong to 
organisations, 57% belonged to religious groups, 39% to burial 
societies7 and 29% to professional or political groups or 
cooperatives. As a percentage of the entire sample, 24% belonged 
to religious organisations, 16% to burial societies and 12% to 
other organisations.
Thirty-two per cent of men (as compared to 42% of women) belonged 
to social organisations. Of these, 26.5% belonged to religious 
groups, 44.1% to burial societies and 29.4% to other 
organisations such as trade unions, political and sportive 
groups. Religious groups and burial societies are therefore the 
most common form of social organisations for both men and women.
Only 29% of men attended church regularly compared to 63% of 
women. Church is extremely important; it seems to provide women, 
and to a lesser extent men, with an escape from harsh, daily 
realities; as one respondent put it: "it is a way to relax." One 
interpretation, based on a study in South Africa, is that 
religion raises the individual above his or her dependence on the 
material and social. When social structures fail to provide the
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necessary support, faith intervenes (Meer, 1990:21). As Meer 
points out (ibid), it is above all the underprivileged who live 
by religious faith and as a generality, women fall into this 
category more so than men. The church is a major advocate of 
women as "home makers”, supporting dominant gender ideology. 
However, since women do fulfil this role (among others), they 
feel supported, particularly when the church calls for men to be 
more responsible to their families. In a focus group discussion, 
one respondent reported that since she and her husband had joined 
an Apostolic church, he handed over his monthly salary to her to 
manage and then asked for personal spending money.
3.8 GENDER INEQUALITIES IN KAMBUZUMA
The picture that emerged from the initial study in 1991 was one 
of women working hard, to generate income (a minority through 
waged work, the majority "informally”), to produce food for the 
household, to maintain relations with family in rural areas and 
to carry out the myriad of domestic tasks which are essential for 
the maintenance and reproduction of the household. This is not 
to say that men did not work hard: a high proportion of men in 
Kambuzuma are employed in industry where working conditions are 
poor and where journeys to and from work entail long waits for 
buses or the scramble for taxi services. However, gender 
inequalities were evident and the findings arising directly from 
the research can be summarised as follows:
Firstly, women's work is, in general, undervalued and underpaid. 
This refers to both paid and unpaid work since domestic tasks are 
not even considered real work, by men and many women themselves, 
let alone by official bodies. As discussed in Chapter 1, this 
undervaluation of women's work renders them invisible and under­
represented in national economic accounting.
Secondly, women have to balance productive and reproductive work. 
This leads to time pressures, which are particularly severe for 
women who have large families and/or who are also formally or 
self employed. Many women who are in waged work employed domestic
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workers (female) although they remain responsible (as in most 
parts of the world) for overall household management.
Women's community managing role, based on the provision of items 
of collective consumption (Moser, 1989b), is less evident, partly 
because basic services such as water, electricity, local schools 
and clinics are provided by the state. However, some linkages 
which women maintain with rural kin share some of the 
characteristics of this role, compensating for an inadequate 
social welfare system, assisting elderly relatives in 
agricultural work and caring for the sick with little or no 
renumeration. Having said that, in the urban setting, networks 
of friends and neighbours with whom goods and services are shared 
are not highly developed, as they are in many Latin American 
cities (Daines & Seddon, 1991) • Although she does not discuss the 
reasons why, Rakodi (1991) points out that such networks do not 
seem to have developed to the same extent in cities in Africa. 
This issue is taken up in Chapter 5 which discusses responses to 
ESAP.
Thirdly, the concept of Mleisure” is more alien to women than 
men. In response to the question "What do you do to relax and 
enjoy yourself?", 52% of the sample cited knitting and 
crocheting, usually for the children. For one-third of the 
sample, this essentially productive activity was the only 
activity cited. Men engaged in a wider variety of activities 
with sport and drinking being the most popular (45% and 35% of 
men respectively, as reported by women) . Many more of their 
activities entailed spending money, with only 3% of men engaging 
in hobbies which might benefit the household, such as fixing cars 
and electrical appliances.
Finally, women's heavy workload does not give them a commensurate 
say in decision making, for example, in how money is used. There 
was a difference, however, in the level of negotiation in 
households where women had a reasonable, independent income, 
although it sometimes generated conflict. In households where
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women had little income of their own, and were given housekeeping 
allowances, they were, and felt they were, relatively powerless.
In focus group discussions women felt that some of men's 
attitudes had changed slowly over the years since independence. 
More men accepted that their wives should live with them in urban 
areas and particularly with rises in the cost of living, that 
women should be permitted to work (to bring in income for the 
family). However, as they pointed out, formal employment 
opportunities were limited and they lacked sources of credit and 
skills to try and diversify their informal income generating 
activities.
Having described the study population in 1991, Chapters 4 and 5 
turn to the changes which have occurred in the lives of women and 
men in Kambuzuma following 12 months of economic and social 
policy change implemented under the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. By 1984, only 13,500 houses of a planned national total of 
115,000 had been completed and by 1985, there was an estimated 
backlog of 240,000 units (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1991:2).
2. As early as 1982, 95% of houses in Kambuzuma accommodated 
lodgers (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991:18).
3. Bond (1992:8) calculates the housing need in the early 1990s 
to be Z$950 million annually as against a supply of Z$196 million 
worth 14,000 homes or 22% of requirements.
4. This definition was derived from Schmink (1984:89) : a resident 
group of persons who share most aspects of consumption, drawing 
on and allocating a common pool of resources (including labour) 
to ensure their material production.
5. Household structure was classified in the following way:
male headed nuclear: spouses and offspring
male headed extended: spouses and offspring and/or
relatives
female headed nuclear: woman and offspring
female headed extended: woman and offspring and/or
relatives
male headed sibling; headship assumed by eldest brother 
female headed sibling: headship assumed by eldest sister
6. Offsprings' income was not included in entirety since they 
usually only made a contribution to food. In the 4 cases where 
offspring share responsibility for all household expenses, their 
income has been included.
7. Burial societies consist of individuals, usually members of 
the same church, who make small, monthly contributions (usually 
Z$5 to Z$10) to a common fund which is used for burial costs in 
the event of the death of a member of the group. However, if 
funds build up and there are no deaths, gatherings with drink and 
food are held and various ceremonies performed.
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8. This Poverty Datum Line was developed by V.S.Cubitt and R. 
Riddell and updated by Lowenson et al using rises in the Consumer 
Price Index for Lower Income Households in Harare. For the 
present study, an identical method was used to update the PDL to 
yield figures for mid-1991 and mid-1992 (see notes 3 and 9 in 
Chapter 4).
Cubitt and Riddell's original work (The Urban Poverty Datum Line 
in Rhodesia) was carried out in 1974 and updated in 1978. It 
represents the only serious attempt at the construction of a PDL 
in Zimbabwe to date. The PDL is defined as
"The income required to satisfy the minimum necessary 
consumption needs of a family of given size and composition 
within a defined environment in a condition of basic 
physical health and social decency".
There are nine components included in consumption needs: food, 
clothing, accomodation, fuel and lighting, personal care and 
health, household goods, transport, education and provision for 
post-employment consumption. As such, it covers a wider range of 
needs than is usually covered by a PDL and is more generous than 
the PDLs used in other countries in the region. Cubitt and 
Riddell argue that it is not enough to include food, housing and 
clothing as minimum necessities for physical efficiency but 
incorporate socially defined necessities within the given urban 
context.
The main component of the PDL was food, with calculations based 
on minimum nutritional requirements by age and sex. Families with 
parents and children of varying age and sex, rather than 
households, were used for all the calculations. A minimum 
clothing list was constructed and priced. Paraffin was the item 
for fuel and candles for lighting. Personal care and health 
included items for personal hygiene (soap and toothpaste) and a 
minimum number of clinic visits for family members. Household 
goods included replacement costs of a minimum of furniture (one 
bed and sleeping mats), bedding and kitchen ware. School fees 
were costed for families of given size and composition. Transport 
was calculated for one adult member working in industrial sites, 
using buses to get to and from work. Housing costs were based on 
rental accomodation. The provision of post-employment consumption 
was calculated for man and wife, who would continue to live in 
town with a reduced list of needs. The cost of this last item was 
viewed by the authors as a severe underestimate of the real costs 
involved in saving for retirement. Cubitt and Riddell stress that 
this PDL is need oriented and does not reflect actual 
expenditure, since individuals and families do not necessarily 
choose to direct their income to the needs here identified. 
Nevertheless, it provides a useful yardstick against which the 
adequacy of incomes can be judged.
It is important to note that for the purposes of the present 
study, the changes in the number of households living below the 
PDL between 1991 and 1992 (see Chapter 4) are perhaps more 
important than the absolute numbers, which are dependent on the 
construction of this particular PDL.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EFFECTS OF ESAP AND RESPONSES AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
"I am the only provider for the family. Hy son has been
retrenched. Where can he find work? Where? We now live from
hand to mouth. We can't save a cent. We used to eat eggs
and fruit. We used to have soft drinks. We now eat meat
only once a week but even vegetables are expensive.
Hale respondent, Kambuzuma, 1992.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to examine the changes that took place 
at the household level in Kambuzuma in a twelve-month period 
between two surveys carried out in mid-1991 and mid-1992.1 During 
this time the cost of living escalated dramatically as a result 
of various measures implemented under ESAP, which in turn had a 
number of consequences at the household level. The present 
chapter covers changes in expenditure and consumption, employment 
and income, savings and debt. Although gender is an important 
variable, the emphasis here will be on households as a whole and 
differences among rather than within them. Chapter 5 then 
focuses on intra-household gender differences in coping 
responses.
The terms effects, responses and strategies have all been used 
in the literature describing changes made by individuals and 
households as a result of economic stress. Although the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably, there are differences linked to 
the degree of conscious decision making, which are worth spelling 
out. "Effect" tends to imply a degree of inevitability iu the 
result and conveys passivity v/hile "response" implies an active 
element of choice and "strategy" an even more conscious set of 
choices with perhaps longer-term aims in mind. However, there is 
no sharp cut-off point between the terms but rather, they would 
seem to lie on a continuum.2
The main focus of this chapter is on the effects of ESAP on 
households as a whole and inter-household differences in
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responses relating to household income, structure, size and 
tenure status. Chapter 5 concentrates on responses and the 
gender-specificity of these within households. Since all forms 
of coping responses were found to primarily involve women, areas 
of female activity such as domestic work, informal income- 
generating activities and links with rural homes/agriculture are 
left until the following chapter. As far as the organisation of 
this chapter is concerned, the first section deals with the area 
of greatest change, namely the consumption of food and basic 
commodities and the use of services. Following on from this, 
changes in income and employment together with changes in savings 
and debt are examined. Changes in household structure and 
composition are then described and the final section assesses 
mediating factors such as pre-existing income levels, household 
structure and so on which give rise to differential effects of 
ESAP at the grassroots.
4.2 CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE
During the period between the two surveys, prices of food and 
basic commodities rose sharply mainly due to the lifting of 
subsidies and the decontrol of prices (see also Chapter 2) . 
According to the Central statistical Office (CSO), the cost of 
living for lower income urban families rose by 45% between July 
1991 and July 1992 while that for higher income families rose by 
3 6% (CSO, 1992) .3 Higher costs of food were the biggest 
contributor to the rises, and since low-income families spend a 
greater proportion of their income on food, they faced the higher 
percentage rise in their overall cost of living.
Table 4.1 shows average monthly household expenditure in 1991 and 
in 1992, excluding clothes and school uniforms which are not 
bought regularly. While food and total regular expenditure 
applies to all 100 households, the figures for the other items 
relate to the number of households which actually incurred those 
expenses.
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Table 4.1: Changes in regular household expenditure (in Z$)
Item Average monthly sum (Z$) 
1991 1992 
US$1=Z$2.8 US$1=Z$4.9
% rise
Food 284 (N=100) 382 (N=100) 35%
Food at work 42 (N=65) 58 (N=56) 38%
Transport 57 (N=66) 69 (N=54) 21%
Electricity 39 (N=62) 49 (N=64) 26%
Other fuel 12 (N=34) 14 (N=47) 17%
Water 6 (N=86) 6 (N=92) 0%
Rent 97 (N=40) 128 (N=40) 32%
Rates 40 (N=60) 48 (N=60) 20%
Education 54 (N=76) 60 (N=81) 11%
Money to family 62 (N=61) 88 (N=56) 42%
Other expenses 69 (N=32) 87 (N=39) 26%
Total Regular 
Expenditure 542 (N=100) 727 (N=100) 34%
Table 4.1 gives a picture of the magnitude of rises in absolute 
terms for various items included in the household budget. 
However, expenditure fell in real terms, when compared to the 
rise in the cost of living. The real change in total regular 
expenditure is-7'6%, since the cost of living rose by 45%. While 
Table 4.1 shows the.decline in expenditure for the sample as a 
whole, disaggregating the sample provides a clearer view of which 
groups faced the most severe problems. Per capita regular 
expenditure rose by 47% in the highest 25% income group 
representing a real increase of while it only rose by 27% in 
the lowest 25% income group representing a real decline of 
The more severe effect of price rises on the poorest households 
is clearly illustrated by the way they were forced to make the 
greatest cutbacks on basic items. Various areas of spending will 
be discussed in the following sections.
CHANGES IN FOOD CONSUMPTION
Considering food expenditure first, the percentage rise in the 
per capita figure for the highest 25% income group is 44%. In 
contrast, the percentage rise for the lowest 25% income group is 
only 26%. Taking into account the 49% increase in prices of food
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consumed by lower-income urban households (CSO, 1992), food 
expenditure declined by 3.4^in real terms in the former group and 
by 15*4? in the latter, poorer group. Nine percent of very poor 
households- actually spent less money on food in 1992 than they 
did in 1991, despite the enormous price rises. Gonzalez de la 
Rocha (1991:119) in her study in Mexico also found that per 
capita food consumption was consistently lower in the lower 50% 
income group in her sample, in 1982, 1985 and 1987.
Household size and structure also influenced changes in per 
capita food expenditure. Per capita food expenditure rose more 
in male headed households (mean=47%) than in female headed 
households (mean=29%). Taking into account the rise in food 
prices (49%) , spending in the former group declined by 1.3-% 
whereas it declined by 13.4% in the latter group. Female headed 
households, which are over-represented in lower income 
percentiles and under-represented in the higher percentiles, 
therefore made much greater cuts in consumption than male headed 
households. Another factor which may account for this difference 
is that female household heads were more reluctant to borrow 
money and fewer (as compared to male heads) had the option of 
taking loans or salary advances from employers. They were 
therefore more likely to opt to cut back consumption to make ends 
meet. Muntemba (1989:121) reports similar findings from Zambia.
In extended households the mean change in expenditure was 22% 
with no change or a negative change in 18 households (of a total 
of 42). In real terms, this was a decline of 13-1%. In comparison, 
the mean change for nuclear households was much higher at 58% 
with only six households registering no change or negative change 
(of a total of 58). This represents a real increase of 6 % in food 
expenditure. In general, extended households therefore suffered 
severe cuts in per capita consumption while nuclear households 
did not. This was due to higher dependency ratios in extended 
units, an issue which is addressed later in this chapter. 
Similarly, per capita food expenditure declined by £L% in real 
terms (mean absolute rise= 46%) in smaller households (five or
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less members) as compared to 8.7 % in larger households (mean 
absolute rise= 36%).
A greater number of men and women workers took a packed lunch 
from home in 1992, as a way of cutting expenses. Fewer , people
spent money on food at work (see Table 4.1), which is a
reflection both of higher unemployment and more workers taking 
food from home.
Households with the highest incomes cut down on "luxury” items 
such as chicken, ice-cream and sausages. Most households made 
some changes to their diet, eating meat less frequently and 
substituting this with home grown green vegetables to make the 
relish which accompanies the maize meal staple or buying cheaper 
cuts of meat. In short, households ate food of higher bulk and 
less protein (see Beneria, 1991; Chant, 1993; Gonzdlez de la
Rocha, 1988, 1991; Moser, 1989 for similar findings in Latin
America and Muntemba, 1989 for Zambia). The number of households 
which reared small livestock, usually chickens, declined from 12% 
in 1991 to 7% in 1992, mainly due to the increased price of 
chicken feed. Chicken is eaten occasionally but the number of 
households who never ate chicken went up from 9% in 1991 to 19% 
in 1992. This was obviously a means of cutting food costs. Some 
poor households cut out fruit and milk completely (see Beneria, 
1991:174 for similar findings in Mexico).
The lowest income households had to cut down on absolute amounts 
of food consumed. This is reflected in the frequency of meals 
consumed, which declined between 1991 and 1992 (see Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Changes in frequency of meals per day
Frequency of meals 1991
N=100
1992
N=100
Three times per day 71% 63%
Twice per day 28% 35%
Once per day 1% 2%
100% 100%
The meal which was cut out was the midday meal, usually consumed 
by women and children, since the man was at work and had either 
taken food from home or would purchase food at work. Lunch was 
occasionally substituted by tea and bread, but in many cases 
women would only give the children a piece of bread and have 
nothing themselves, or perhaps just a soft drink. An examination 
of responses at household level therefore immediately involves 
a consideration of gender, in this case the bearing it has on 
food allocation within the household, a point further discussed 
in the next chapter.
Rising food prices were identified as the main problem created 
by ESAP by most respondents. Studies elsewhere, for example Evans 
(1989) in Zambia and Galli and Funk (1991) in Guinea Bissau, 
found that urban households increased their food production in 
times of economic stress. Households in Harare were unable to 
grow more food because land around the house was limited and the 
city authorities were slashing maize grown on vacant council 
plots.
In March 1992, a "sentinel site surveillance”4 nationwide study 
found that 70% of groups categorised as unskilled workers, 
landless persons and low-income informal sector workers faced 
food shortages (Interministerial Committee on SDA Monitoring, 
1992). The same study found that children in food shortage 
households had a statistically significant higher rate of acute 
respiratory infections (ARI). ARI was used as a proxy for other 
acute conditions including malnutrition (ibid). This is echoed 
by studies elsewhere. For example, Moser (1989:149) found in
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Guayaquil, Ecuador that changes in dietary patterns as a result 
of reduced incomes resulted in a deterioration of the nutritional 
status of whole households, but particularly children. The major 
UNICEF study on the effects of SAPs, referred to in Chapter 1, 
found that child malnutrition had increased in eight out of the 
ten countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Cornia et al. 
1987:34). Although nutritional impact was not assessed in the 
present study, there can be little doubt that the poorest 
households were or will be negatively affected. Certainly, the 
findings show how income level and gender have an important 
bearing on food consumption, with the poorest households faring 
worst and within these, women cutting down more than men.
HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES
In addition to price rises in food and basic commodities as a 
result of ESAP, the cost of all essential services such as 
education, health, transport and electricity also rose. This was 
due to the implementation of the policy of cost recovery under 
ESAP combined with the rising cost of imported inputs due to 
currency devaluations.
Lodger households faced enormous rent rises during 1991 and 1992, 
mainly as a result of attempts by main householders to buffer 
themselves from the increased cost of living, including, local 
council rate rises for basic services. Although a few main 
householders had only raised the rent by small amounts, "out of 
compassion", as one householder put it, most had raised rents 
substantially (see Table 4.1). Many lodgers felt they no longer 
had any hope of owning their own "stand" in current sites-and- 
service projects because they could not afford the down payment 
and/or the monthly repayments. In any case, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the huge gap in supply and demand means that rents are 
rising and overcrowding is rife (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991:18). 
For households which did not maintain strong links with their 
rural areas of origin, this provoked enormous anxiety for the 
future.
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The increased cost of electricity and public transport is also 
reflected in higher expenditure on these items. A greater number 
of households used other fuel such as paraffin for cooking and 
candles for lighting in the second survey (see Table 4.1), as 
ways of cutting down on the amount of electricity consumed. 
Indeed, one household had their electricity cut off because they 
could not afford to pay the bill.
Fewer households were able to pay for transport to work and a 
number of men and women had begun walking to work or had arranged 
lifts which cost less than the bus service. A number of white 
collar workers had managed to get their workplaces to take 
responsibility for transport costs, either by arranging for 
company transport or getting the costs paid on a monthly basis, 
indicating that lower-paid workers bear the brunt of cuts in 
public transport subsidies and decontrol of these prices.
EDUCATION COSTS
Although the average rise in monthly expenditure on education 
expenses, due to fee increases under ESAP, was not as high as on 
other items, the money has to be paid in a lump sum at the 
beginning of term. All poorer households with school-age children 
expressed difficulties in finding the money for fees. Households 
with a higher income but with three or four school-going children 
also had difficulties paying fees. In one case, the school head 
had allowed a respondent a few weeks to find the money and her 
husband was trying to work overtime to raise the necessary 
amount.
All respondents were determined not to withdraw their children 
from school and were willing to cut food consumption, use savings 
and borrow money to pay the fees, underlining the fact that 
parents view education as the only way their children can better 
their lives. Although thirteen households were eligible for 
exemption from school fees, since parents earned less than the 
threshold of Z$400 a month, none had managed to claim exemption. 
This issue is further discussed in Chapter 6, which will examine
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the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme, designed to 
mitigate the negative effects of ESAP.
Paternal uncles and older siblings are expected to help with 
school fees but some respondents pointed out that this was 
becoming more difficult, and creating or exacerbating tensions 
when expectations were not met. A widow with three school-going 
children, dependent on her two working sons to pay fees, 
complained that they were refusing to pay fees rather than, as 
she saw it, "cut down on drinking, smoking and girlfriends". In 
another household, where both spouses were employed, the woman 
said she had to reduce the amount of money she sent to her mother 
(living in a rural area) so that her husband could pay the 
higher school fees for his nephews.
Since the second survey, the effects of drought have exacerbated 
the economic crisis and the cost of living has further increased 
(for example, food prices have again risen as a result of 
reliance on imports). During 1992, some primary schools in Harare 
lost 10% of their pupils (sex unspecified) and the number of 
students writing "0" level exams in 1992, was 25% lower than in 
1991 (these exam fees also went up, due mainly to devaluation 
since the government pays Britain in foreign currency). A report 
based on interviews with single mothers in Mbare in mid-1992 (one 
of the two poorest:high-density suburbs in Harare) stated that 
women could not afford fees for their children and were "ignorant 
of the Social Fund for vulnerable groups".5
As discussed in Chapter 2, the enrolment rate for secondary 
schools is already higher for boys than girls, and although data 
is not yet available, girls are likely to be the first casualties 
when families withdraw children from school. As Cotton (1992:10) 
puts it, on the basis of discussions with parents and teachers 
in Zimbabwe, "In a national and local environment that favours 
boys for paid employment, they will continue to take priority in 
decisions about schooling. The relationship between girls' 
education, their own well-being and that of their future children
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is also strong but involves a longer term view and a view which 
does not reduce the vulnerability of the girls' family to 
impoverishment." In addition, as Moser (1989a) points out, girls 
who drop out of school may well be seriously disadvantaged in the 
labour market in the future, reducing their options and 
perpetuating if not worsening gender differentials in employment.
CHANGES IN SPENDING PRIORITIES
Aside from regular items of expenditure such as food, rent, 
transport and so on, respondents in the survey were also asked 
to estimate the cost of clothing and school uniforms on a yearly 
basis. A monthly figure was then derived from this. Table 4.3 
shows the changes in monthly expenditure on clothes and school 
uniforms for households (number shown in brackets) incurring 
these expenses. The percentage changes in absolute and real terms 
(compared to the overall rise in the cost of living of 45%) are 
also shown.
Table 4.3: Changes in expenditure on clothes and school uniforms 
(in 2$)
Item Average 
1991 
US$1=Z$2.
monthly sum 
1992 
8 US$1=Z$4.9
% absolute 
change
% real 
change
Clothes $64 (94) $64 (72) 0% - 31 %
School
uniforms
$18 (73) $16 (65) - 11% -
As the figures show, most households had cut down drastically on 
new clothing and school uniforms, logically seeing this as the 
first areas in which cuts could be made with the least negative 
repercussions. The number of households which could not afford 
to buy any clothes went up from six in 1991 to twenty-eight in 
1992. The decline in the demand for clothing and textile products 
is manifest at the national level and resulted in the 
retrenchment of about three thousand workers and the closure of 
several small companies in Harare and Bulawayo, the second 
largest city. The Zimbabwe Clothing Council estimated that the
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local market was 2 0% of normal and stated that the loss could
not be made up by exporting more because of the worldwide
recession in the clothing industry.6
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Figure 4.1: Breakdown of household expenditure in 1991 and 1992
Fo o d  49%
Cl o t  hi ng 12%
H o u s i n g  10%
E d u c a t i o n  7%
H e a l t h  2% 
O t h e r  4%
E l e c t r i c i t y  4%
T r a n s p o r t  6% 
R e m i t t a n c e s  6%
Food 53%
Clothing 7%
Housing 10%
Education 6?^
Health
Other
E lectricity
Transport 5% 
Remittances 6%
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Figure 4.1 shows that for the sample as a whole, food, 
electricity and health care charges constituted a greater 
proportion of basic, monthly expenditure in 1992, because of the 
increase in the cost of these items. It does not, as discussed 
above, imply that food or fuel consumption levels remained the 
same but rather that even with cuts in consumption households 
still had to spend a larger proportion than in 1991. This is 
because expenditure on certain basic necessities cannot be easily 
reduced. On the other hand, clothing and transport are items 
which households had managed to make savings on even though they 
resulted in what was perceived as a poorer quality of life and 
more hardship. Beneria (1991) reports similar findings from 
Mexico, where most poor households were no longer buying new 
clothes, shoes or household equipment.
In her study in Guadalajara, Mexico, Gonzalez de la Rocha (1988;
1991) looked at household expenditure in 1982 and 1985 and found 
that in 1985 the proportion of spending on clothing and footwear 
had declined. She also found that food absorbed a greater 
proportion of expenditure although the quality of food consumed 
had declined. Housing took up a larger proportion while health 
and education spending had diminished. In this study, the main 
difference is that health and education spending had not yet been 
affected.
"Other" expenses which also went up as a proportion of total 
expenditure in the present study include items such as domestic 
workers' wages, monthly repayments on furniture and other 
household goods, insurance policies and water bills, all of which 
also increased in cost between 1991 and 1992. Health as a 
proportion of total expenditure rose because of the increased 
costs of consultations, medicines and transport. Arguably, 
services were already only used when necessary, particularly by 
adults (children are not charged for consultations) and large 
reductions in expenditure could not therefore be made. However, 
people with chronic ailments such as high blood pressure, asthma, 
and diabetes complained bitterly about the increase in costs of
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treatment; one woman with high blood pressure said she could no 
longer afford to do anything about it and a diabetic (male) was 
not taking the required dosage of medicines in order to save 
money. A wider survey on the affordability of treatment for these 
chronic conditions, in March 1992, found that 31% of individuals 
could not afford the full course of medicines (Interministerial 
Committee on SDA Monitoring, 1992).
Although housing costs did not absorb a greater proportion of 
income, this is because lodgers' rent and main householders' 
rates have been aggregated as housing costs and we already know 
that rent was taking up a higher proportion of expenses for 
lodgers.
The proportion of expenditure devoted to remittances remained the 
same, but the number of households able to send money to family 
in rural areas declined. The proportion remained the same because 
households that could still manage to send money increased the 
amount they were sending in recognition of the hardship caused 
by the drought.
CONTRIBUTORS TO HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
Table 4.4 presents a detailed breakdown of household members 
contributing to the household budget.
105
Table 4.4: Changes in the sources of financial contributions to 
household expenses
1991
N=100
1992
N=100
Male head 43% 46%
Both spouses 26% 22%
Female head/spouse 5% 9%
Male head & sons 5% 5%
Male head & daughters 5% 6%
Female head and sons 2% 1%
Male head & offspring 3% 0%
Female head & offspring 3% 2%
Sons 2% 1%
Male head & relatives 1% 3%
Spouses & relatives 0% 1%
Spouses & son 1% 2%
Other combinations* 5% 2%
100% 100%
* In 1991: female head & ex-husband; male head & father;female 
head, son & relatives; ex-husband; female spouse & daughter. In 
1992 only the first two combinations applied.
Dependence on only the male head or the female head/spouse 
increased, and the number of households in which sons contributed 
to the budget dropped from seventeen to eleven and the number in 
which daughters contributed dropped from twelve to eight. This 
reflected a situation in which adult offspring had either lost 
their jobs (in the case of one son and one daughter), or had 
moved out to live independently (two cases), or earned so little 
that in the wake of increased costs of transport, food at work 
and so on, had ceased to make contributions. The number of 
households in which relatives contributed rose from three in 1991 
to five in 1992. Significantly, these were not new arrivals; but 
instead the change was a result of pressure applied on employed 
relatives to make regular contributions, a move away from the 
more traditional approach of the household head shouldering 
responsibility for relatives. Having said this, however, there 
is considerable pressure on household heads to support unemployed 
relatives, a point taken up later in this chapter. Finally, a 
boyfriend who contributed to household expenses in 1991 had 
withdrawn his support leaving the female head dependent on
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handouts and friends and desperately in search of paid work.
4.3 CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME 
FORMAL EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME
In 1991, 89% of household heads were formally employed. In 1992, 
this had fallen to 85%: three heads had lost their jobs (one 
woman and two men) , two men had left work for health-related 
reasons and one male head who was previously unemployed had found 
work. The numbers of second and third earners in the sample 
remained approximately the same. Table 4.5 shows the percentage 
of households with employed heads, second and third earners.
Table 4.5: Changes in members formally and self employed
% of households (N=100) 
1991 1992
Employed heads 
Second earners 
Third earners
89% 85% 
34% 35% 
9% 9%
Households had therefore not managed to increase the numbers of 
wage earners to protect levels of real income and consumption. 
In Harare, the general situation of high unemployment and the 
retrenchments under ESAP did not allow this strategy to be 
adopted. Instead, the dependency ratio, that is, the number of 
dependents per paid worker increased from 3.2 in 1991 to 3.8 in 
1992. The number of unemployed members actively seeking work 
rose from 39 people to 50. Six people also gave up looking, 
otherwise the increase would have been even higher.
These findings of increased unemployment in the study sample and 
a higher dependency ratio are contrary to studies in Latin 
America which have found an increase in the number of household 
members, particularly women, who enter the labour market in 
situations of economic crisis (Chant, 1991: Chapter 6, 1993;
Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988; Moser, 1989a; Rocha et al. 1987).
Gonzalez de la Rocha (1988), for example, in her study in Mexico,
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found, in direct contrast to this study, a decrease in household 
dependency rates from 3.09 members in 1982 to 2.59 in 1986 in her 
study in Mexico. The strategy of increasing the number of earners 
in the household obviously depends on labour market opportunities 
in the local context. Chant (forthcoming b) assessed changes in 
household survival strategies between 1986 and 1992 in three 
cities in Mexico. She found that radically reduced local 
employment opportunities, in both formal and informal sectors, 
in one of these cities (Puerto Vallarta) meant that no matter how 
much people wished to protect incomes it was very difficult in 
that particular context. This is also the case in Harare.
The branches and categories of employment had not changed 
significantly between 1991 and 1992. However, many workers 
expressed considerable anxiety about job security and commented 
on how much more difficult it was to organise for better wages 
and conditions since management always pointed out how they were 
lucky to have jobs at all, given the high rate of unemployment. 
Trade union membership had not increased and many workers 
expressed dissatisfaction at the way their union functioned 
and/or did not defend their interests although a few did see this 
as the only way to take action at the workplace.
Table 4.6 shows the changes in monthly income levels from formal 
and self employment, for heads of household, second and third 
earners. The average income of households from formal and self 
employment is also shown. The number of households which had no 
such income rose from nine households in 1991 to twelve in 1992. 
These households have been excluded from the calculations since 
the objective is to show absolute and real changes in wage/ 
income rates of those in paid work. Taking into account the rise 
in the cost of living (45%) between 1991 and 1992, real income 
declined enormously.
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Table 4.6: Changes in monthly income from formal and self
employment (in Z$)
Average
1991
US$1=Z$2.
income 
1992 
8 US$1=Z$4.9
%
rise
% real 
change
Household head 769 (88) 872 (84) 13%* - 22%
Second earner 681 (34) 681 (35) 0% - 31 %
Third earner 662 (9) 803 (9) 21% - 14%
Average income 739 815 10% - ltf%
(131) (128)
* These figures do not include one male household head who is a 
university lecturer, since his salary and the increase in income 
he had obtained through consultancy work skewed the results 
substantially. (Inclusion resulted in a % rise of 15%).
The sex composition of workers shows a small decline of men 
between 1991 and 1992 and a slight increase in women (see Table 
4.7). This probably reflects the fact that retrenchment in the 
industrial sector where men were employed had been harder hit 
than service sectors where most women worked, but the numbers 
(shown in brackets), particularly of women who are formally 
employed, are too small to derive definitive conclusions. In 
addition, the situation is a dynamic one and job losses in the 
service sectors are expected to accelerate.
Table 4.7: Changes in sex composition of formally and self
employed workers
1991 1992
men women men women
N=107 N=25 N=103 N=26
Household head 92% (82) 8% (7) 93% (79) 7% (6)
Second earner 62% (21) 38% (13) 57% (20) 43% (15)
Third earner 44% (4) 56% (5) 44% (4) 56% (5)
Total 81% 19% 80% 20%
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NON-WAGE SOURCES OF INCOME
In 1991, 80% of households had at least one other source of
income in addition to formal or self employment. In 1992, this 
had dropped to 70%, reflecting a decline in regular non-wage 
sources of income (106 in total for the sample in 1991 to 98 in 
1992) and an even more marked decrease in irregular sources, from 
40 in 1991 to only 19 in 1992. Table 4.8 shows the changes in the 
number and nature of non-wage sources of household income.
Table 4.8: Changes in regular and irregular non-wage sources of 
income
No. reg. 
1991
sources
1992
No. irreg. sources 
1991 1992
Lodgers' rent 44 44
Women's IGAs* 34 26 30 15
Transfers** 7 7 - -
Male offspring 7 4 3 1
Female offspring 
Co-resident
8 6 1 1
relatives 1 1 1 0
Non-res. relatives 1 3 0 1
Men's odd jobs 2 5 3 1
Ex-husband/boyfriend 2 2 2 0
Total no. of sources 106 98 40 19
* Income generating activities include sewing, knitting and
crocheting, selling agricultural produce in rural areas, petty 
commerce, selling small livestock and hairdressing.
** Transfers include pensions and compensation payments from 
previous state and private sector employment.
The number of offspring giving a monetary contribution towards 
household expenses declined from 29 (17 sons and 12 daughters) 
to 22 (14 sons and 8 daughters), but the change is offset by four 
adult offspring (two sons and two daughters) who no longer made 
a fixed small monetary contribution but instead pooled most of 
their wages, paying for various household expenses.
Lodgers' rent continued to be the most important regular non-wage 
source of income for main householders although women's income-
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generating activities was the most common source of income 
considering the sample as a whole (in both 1991 and 1992) . 
However, there was a massive decline in these activities in the 
year between the two surveys. This finding runs counter to 
several studies of responses to economic crisis which found that 
households increased their informal income-generating activities 
as a coping strategy. However, as with formal employment such a 
strategy depends upon the possibilities within the local context. 
In Harare, some sectors of informal production and services would 
seem to be saturated and this certainly applies to the areas in 
which women were most involved (knitting, sewing and crocheting) 
where they faced declining demand, increasing competition and 
rising cost of inputs. As Vandemoortele (1989:19) has argued, 
many branches of the informal sector in sub-Saharan African 
countries are saturated and cannot absorb more labour. In the 
case of the sale of agricultural produce, the drought had 
eliminated income from this source.
The implications for the household of this decline in women's 
income-generating activities are clearly negative as income is 
reduced. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, since women 
direct their income towards basic household needs with little 
personal spending, the effects on family health and nutrition are 
more pronounced than when men's income declines. The implications 
for women themselves and for gender relations are taken up in 
Chapter 5.
TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Table 4.9 shows how average monthly household income changed 
between 1991 and 1992.7 The absolute rise of 13% is higher than 
the 10% rise in income from formal and self employment, largely 
because of the rent rises which main householders have effected. 
However, real income taking into account the increase in the cost 
of living (45%) has declined by almost for the whole
sample. Indeed, since households expanded and the dependency 
ratio increased, the mean per capita income of the sample rose
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from Z$194 to Z$208, a rise of only 7%, and a real decline of 
The differentials in household income and per capita incomes 
also increased between 1991 and 1992.* Table 4.9 also shows a 
dramatic increase in the number of households living below the 
Poverty Datum Line calculated for low-income households in Harare 
(for July 1991 and July 1992), according to family size.9
Table 4.9: Changes in average, monthly household income (in Z$)
1991 1992 % rise % real 
N=99 N=99 change
Mean monthly income
% households 
under PDL
932 1054 13% - A2*% 
23% 43%
Once again, average figures conceal how different groups have 
been affected. Mean monthly income declined by 15.9% in real terms 
for the top 25% households while the bottom 25% had suffered a 
decline of 36 %. There was therefore not only a highly visible 
process of impoverishment taking place for the sample as a whole 
(in relation to rises in the cost of living) but the poorest 
suffered disproportionately. A First Merchant Bank quarterly 
guide to the economy pointed out that the gap between higher and 
lower income urban families had widened because of the escalating 
prices of basic commodities.10 In addition, a process of 
increased stratification has taken place in Kambuzuma, with 
income differentials exacerbated as a result of ESAP. Table 4.10 
summarises the real changes in income and expenditure according 
to income groups.
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Table 4.10: Summary changes in real income and expenditure
Total 
income 
% change
Regular 
expenses 
% change
Food 
expenses 
% change
Whole sample - 22% - 7.6% - 9.4%
Top 25% income group - 15.9% + 1.4% - 3.4%
Bottom 25% - 38% - 12.4% -15.4%
4.4 CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS AND DEBT
The percentage of households able to save money on a regular 
basis went down from 68% in 1991 to 50% in 1992. Although the 
average monthly amount saved rose from Z$117 to Z$189 
(representing a rise ofll.7% in real terms), 76% of households 
which did manage to save, saved well under the average figure in 
both years. The range in the sums saved also widened, the minimum 
being Z$5 and the maximum Z$1300 in 1991, and Z$10 and Z$1800 in 
1992. Table 4.11 shows the changes in who saves money and who 
decides what to spend savings on.
Table 4.11: Changes in who saves and who decides how to spend 
savings
Who saves Who decides
1991 1992 1991 1992
N=68 N=50 N=65 * N=50
Male head 
Female head/spouse 
Spouses jointly 
Spouses separately 
Other
46% (31) 
31% (21) 
18% (12) 
4% (3) 
1% (1)
42% (21) 
20% (10) 
30% (15) 
4% (2) 
4% (2)
17% (11) 
22% (14) 
60% (39) 
0% (0) 
1% (1)
14% (7) 
18% (9) 
64%(32) 
4% (2) 
0% (0)
100% 100% 100% 100%
The most marked change in ability to save within the household 
vas in relation to female heads and spouses. This would seem to 
directly reflect the drop in women's access to cash from income- 
generating activities. The percentage of men able to save also 
declined although both figures are slightly offset by three
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households in which the man and woman began to save jointly 
rather than separately. Joint decision-making about how to spend 
savings also increased, perhaps reflecting consensus on the 
greater need to direct savings towards items of basic consumption 
(current "emergencies"), particularly in the households where 
formal employment had been lost. Table 4.12 describes the 
reported changes in the use of savings, in 1991 and 1992.
Table 4.12: Changes in the use of savings
1991
N=68
1992
N=50
Emergencies 48.5% 48%
House buying/extension 
& household furniture 22.0% 24%
Education 7.4% 8%
Children's future 4.4% 6%
Health-related 4.4% 4%
Retirement 1.5% 4%
Lobolo (bride-price) 2.9% 2%
Other* 8.8% 4%
100% 100%
* includes clothes, kitchen utensils and shopping for Christmas 
and unexpected visitors.
Priorities would seem to be only slightly changed with fewer 
possibilities to spend money on replacing clothing and household 
items and for special occasions. However, whereas no households 
spent savings on ongoing consumption in 1991, in 1992 four 
households were using savings for food and school fees, thus 
depleting their resources for future needs. Both Chant (1993) and 
Gonzalez de la Rocha (1988) report similar findings from Mexico 
with poor families reallocating resources from long- to short­
term reproduction. Respondents expressed greater concern (in 
1992) about their children being unable to find jobs when they 
finished their schooling. They were aware that this implied 
taking financial responsibility for their children for longer 
periods and made it less likely that they could depend on their 
children to look after them in their old age. It is these longer- 
term consequences of the crisis which are impossible to quantify
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and which impose a current strain on relations within the 
household.
HOUSEHOLD DEBT
The number of households in which employed members borrowed 
regularly from work declined from 12 in 1991 to 10 in 1992 but 
the average amount borrowed rose from Z$73 to Z$77. These loans 
are usually docked off the following pay cheque and are therefore 
a source of temporary credit.
The percentage of households in debt rose from 8% in 1991 to 12% 
in 1992. Debt refers to borrowing money for ongoing consumption 
costs such as food, school fees and rent rather than loans from 
building societies or Hire Purchase arrangements for furniture 
and clothing. The mean amount owed by households in debt rose 
from Z$155 in 1991 to Z$229 in 1992, a rise of 48%. In 1991, 
loans were obtained from employers or friends. In 1992, three 
households had to borrow from various sources, including fellow 
church members.
4.5 CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION
Changes in household structure, size and composition in the study 
sample were extremely striking given the short period between the 
two surveys. They clearly indicate how strong an influence 
economic crisis has on this aspect of organisation among the 
poor.
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Table 4.13: Changes in household structure
1991
N=100
1992
N=100
Male headed nuclear 
Male headed extended 
Women headed nuclear 
Women headed extended 
Couple without children 
Siblings 
Other*
59% 48%
26% 36%
7% 7%
6% 6%
1% 0%
1% 1%
0% 2%
100% 100%
* One separated woman living alone and one widower. In 1991, the 
woman lived with her son but he went to live with her ex- 
husband's family because he was older and because she had found 
it difficult to cope. In the other case, the man's wife had died 
in the period within the surveys and he had sent their children 
to live with his mother.
The major change was the trend towards extension of previously 
nuclear male-headed households. Fourteen such households had 
taken in members of the extended family, both dependent children 
(nephews, nieces, grandchildren) and dependent unemployed adults 
(sisters, brothers, sons and sometimes their offspring). In only 
one case did an employed relative join the household, a 
respondent's niece who had obtained a-teaching post at Kambuzuma 
secondary school. The incorporation of non-earning members is 
undoubtedly a pressure on households, and is perceived as such 
by both men and women, although when this involved the taking-in 
of an unemployed female adult, the woman of the house at least 
feels that she is able to share her domestic workload. Chant 
(1991), in her study in Mexico, found that as women went out to 
work, a renegotiation of childcare and domestic work among 
different age groups of women occurred at the level of the 
household. Similarly, Moser (1989a) from her study in Ecuador 
reports that elder daughters took over this work as their mothers 
found paid work.
On the other hand, non-contributing relatives had left five male­
headed previously extended households, so there were changes in
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both directions. These five households had therefore become 
nuclear in structure.
Mean household size increased from 5.57 members in 1991 to 5.74 
members in 1992 (an overall increase of 17 members in the study 
sample).11 The average number of people living on a plot also 
increased from 9.96 to 10.29 people, corroborating Potts and 
Mutambirwa's (1991) assertion that high-density suburbs are 
becoming increasingly overcrowded. Table 4.14 shows the changes 
in household size between the two surveys.
Table 4.14: Changes in household size
1991 1992 
N=100 N=100
1- 5 members 
6-10 members 
over 10 members
55% 51% 
40% 46% 
5% 3%
100% 100%
The increase in households with 6-10 members is the result of 
extension whereas the decrease in the largest households is a 
because working offspring, in two cases, decided to move out with 
their spouses and children (to lodge elsewhere) in order not to 
have to support parents and other dependent members of the 
extended family. In contrast, Chant (1993) found in her study in 
Mexico, that over the 1982 to-1986 period, the retention of older 
children on marriage was an important factor accounting for the 
extension of households and in part, represehted a drive to keep 
income earners within the family.
The trend towards household extension in economic crisis has been 
documented in various studies in Latin America (Chant, 1991, 
Chapter 6, 1993; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988; Moser, 1989a).
However, whereas this is a positive move in that region since it 
involves greater resources, particularly income, for the 
household, in sub-Saharan Africa it would seem to have the 
opposite effect of diminishing resources and increasing the
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pressure on the core household. Various factors would seem to be 
responsible for these differences between the regions. The extent 
of wage-earning opportunities and the structure of the labour 
market is very different in Africa and Latin America, with 
greater opportunities in the latter region, even if jobs are low- 
paid and insecure. In addition, urbanisation is a relatively 
recent phenomenon in Africa, as compared to Latin America. Urban- 
rural linkages are therefore possibly stronger in Africa and 
combined with the legacy of the male migrant system and the 
dominance of extended family systems, obligations of wage-earners 
to provide for kin is still very strong.
A study completed in October 1992 by the University of Zimbabwe 
Sociology Department describes the crisis of expectations when 
poverty in rural areas forces people to move in with relatives 
in urban areas hoping to be looked after, only to find them 
unable to shoulder extra responsibilities because they are so 
hard-pressed themselves. The result is often bitter and strained 
familial relationships and the study concludes that the hardship 
caused by the drought and ESAP has done irreparable damage to 
kinship relations.12
4.6 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPACT OF ESAP
Income is clearly a key variable influencing how households are 
affected by ESAP. All but three households with particularly high 
incomes suffered a drop in their standard of living. It is worth 
describing these households since it provides an insight into the 
more effective coping responses of higher income groups. In one 
household with a university lecturer as male head, the 
opportunity to take on consultancies for international 
organisations had greatly increased household income. His wife 
was also in paid employment as a secretary at the university. 
This household moved out of Kambuzuma and was followed up in a 
rented house in a low-density suburb. Although the household had 
not taken a drop in their standard of living, plans to buy their 
own house had been affected by the high interest rates associated 
with ESAP. The second household was a sibling household where the
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eldest daughter was an economist for the Reserve Bank, and had 
received a substantial salary increase and an increase in 
"perks". She planned to marry shortly and ask her parents to re- 
assume responsibility for her two younger brothers. The male 
household head in the third household was a long-distance lorry 
driver who greatly increased his income by giving lifts to more 
people and charging higher rates, within Zimbabwe, across borders 
and in neighbouring countries.
At the other end of the income scale, the poorest households were 
worst affected and had been forced to make drastic changes in 
consumption, including cutting the number of meals consumed in 
a day, sometimes using up savings which had been kept aside for 
the future and/or getting into debt. The coping responses of 
these households are undoubtedly more constrained and less 
effective than those cited above.
Considering the changes in the number of households living under 
the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) as a key indicator, other variables 
such as tenure status (see Table 4.15), household structure and 
size (see Tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18) are also relevant.
Table 4.15: Changes in houseowners and lodgers below the PDL
Housing tenure 1991 1992 % rise
House owners 28% (17) 47% (28)
Lodgers 15% (6) 39% (15) Uo7.
Although lodgers were less likely to live below the PDL than main 
householders, in both years, probably due to younger average age, 
smaller household size and a lower dependency ratio of lodgers, 
the gap had diminished. This is likely to be a result of the 
enormous rises in the rent that lodgers had to pay for their 
accommodation.
The number of members was a key factor in determining whether a 
household fell below the PDL. Table 4.16 shows the changes in
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percentage of households living below the PDL in relation to 
household size.
Table 4.16: Households below the PDL according to household size
Household size 1991 1992 % rise
1-5 members 20% (11) 31% (16) 5**7.
6 or more members 27% (12) 55% (27) 10>o/*
Larger households were more likely to live below the PDL in both 
years but the rise in the proportion of large households living 
under the PDL was far greater than the rise in the proportion of 
small households. Larger households were therefore 
disproportionately impoverished by ESAP. The sentinel site study 
referred to above (Interministerial Committee on SDA Monitoring, 
1992) found that the proportion of households reporting food 
shortage rose with the size of the household, confirming the 
validity of this finding. As discussed above, this is a result 
of the high dependency ratio in these households.
Table 4.17: Households below the PDL according to nuclear/
extended household structures
1991 1992 % rise
Nuclear households 
Extended households
19% (13) 38% (22)
30% (10) . 50% (21) 6?%
In terms of changes between 1991 and 1992, household size was 
more important than whether its structure was nuclear or 
extended. In other words, although extended households were more 
likely to fall under the PDL than nuclear ones, in both years, 
the percentage rise was similar for both types of household 
structure (see Table 4.17).
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Table 4.18: Male and female-headed households below the PDL
1991 1992
Male-headed
Female-headed
20% (17) 44% (37) 
47% (6) 50% (6)
The much greater increase in the proportion of male headed 
households below the PDL closes, to a great extent, the gap 
between male and female-headed households, although the latter 
are still slightly more likely to live under the PDL. Chant 
(1993:342) from her study in Mexico reports that although women- 
headed households were poorer than male-headed units in 1982-3, 
by 1986 the balance had changed and the former households 
actually had greater earnings per capita than the latter. Chant 
attributes this finding to the freedom that these women have to 
move into areas of work prohibited to women with male partners, 
that is, to supply factors. In the present study, although the 
number of female headed households in the sample is too small to 
make generalisations, the reasons for the shift in the proportion 
of male- and female-headed households living below the PDL are 
somewhat different. First, there was a greater intake Of 
dependents in male-headed than female-headed units and second, 
the six women heading households living above the PDL had stable 
employment. In Harare, demand factors in employment would seem 
to be the critical constraint for women, corroborated by the fact 
that a number of women, particularly those heading households and 
elder daughters, had actively looked for employment without 
success during the one-year period of the study.
4.7 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The implementation of ESAP between mid-1991 and mid-1992 resulted 
in enormous changes for low-income households in Harare. Possibly 
the most striking and disturbing finding was the huge increase 
in the proportion of households living below the Poverty Datum 
Line and the exacerbation of income differentials. The UNICEF 
multi-country study carried out on the effects of SAPs concluded 
that in the majority of countries the proportion and number of
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people below a given PDL "had almost certainly increased" and 
that there was evidence of deterioration in relative income 
distribution (Cornia et_al, 1987:27). Beneria (1991) also argues 
on the basis of a variety of indicators that the redistribution 
of resources generated by the debt crisis and SAPs have 
intensified inequalities in Mexico. The present study confirms 
these findings.
The enormous rise in the cost of living resulted in many cuts in 
the consumption of food and basic commodities. The importance of 
disaggregation according to income levels also became clear: the 
poorest households which spend a greater proportion of income on 
food were worst affected by price rises. It is this group that 
was most dependent on state subsidies on food and in health and 
education services. However, almost all households suffered a 
drop in their living standards. Lodgers were particularly 
affected by rent increases which to a limited extent, served as 
a buffer for main householders.
During the year between surveys, a greater proportion of large 
households fell below the PDL as compared to smaller households 
and a greater proportion of male- as opposed to female^headed 
households. Household size increased mainly due to the arrival 
of dependent or unemployed extended family members. This was 
generally a source of increased stress with conflict between 
notions of traditional hospitality and financial hardship faced 
by the core household. Households were unable to incorporate more 
members into the labour market, since unemployment rates were 
already high and many sectors of industry and manufacturing 
initiated retrenchments as part of ESAP. A greater number of 
household heads were unemployed in 1992 than 1991; unemployment 
in the study sample increased as did the dependency ratio.
The number of households able to save declined and the number of 
households using savings for items of ongoing consumption 
increased. Meagre resources for future needs were being depleted 
in these households. A greater number of households were in debt
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to finance items such as food and education costs causing greater 
stress and anxiety.
The number of households with sources of income other than formal 
employment declined. This was largely a result of the decline in 
women's income-generating activities due to diminished demand, 
increased competition and the rise in the costs of inputs. The 
implications for women and the household as a whole will be fully 
discussed in the next chapter.
In general, households responded by making severe cuts in 
spending on clothing, school uniforms and transport and made 
changes in their diet, eating food of higher bulk and less 
protein. In the poorest households women and children (and in a 
few cases the men) cut down the number of meals consumed per day, 
walked to work if they were formally employed and generally made 
the greatest cuts in all areas of spending on basic goods and 
services. Responses have therefore been confined to what Gonz&lez 
de la Rocha (1991) has termed "negative strategies" (expenditure- 
restricting) as opposed to "positive strategies" which are 
oriented to the protection of living standards, particularly 
income-generating strategies.
In conclusion, there was a highly visible process of 
impoverishment in’ Kambuzuma, Harare between mid-1991 and mid- 
1992. This chapter has focused on the household as a unit and 
differentiated between households on the basis of income, 
structure and composition. However, as it is already clear from 
the findings presented (for example, on employment or 
consumption), gender is a critical issue for understanding 
adjustment at the household level. Chapter 5 further examines 
gender-differentiated responses to ESAP, their implications for 
women and their influence on gender relations within the 
household.
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. Although 120 households were interviewed in the first survey 
in 1991, it was only possible to trace 100 households twelve 
months later. The comparative data therefore applies to these 100 
households. Of the twenty households which were not followed up, 
members of fourteen households were in rural areas throughout the 
period of fieldwork or had moved to other urban areas without 
leaving an address. One of these moves was clearly a direct 
result of the economic situation: a female head had lost her job 
knitting for a small enterprise in the neighbourhood because of 
diminishing demand and had decided to return to her rural area 
of origin. In two households the respondents had died, one from 
illness and another in a car accident and the families had moved 
away. In one case the respondent had become part of another 
household. A greater number of lodger households (13) were not 
followed up than main householders (7) since the former group are 
more mobile.
2. The choice of terms used here can be illustrated by an 
example: "effect" would be used to describe the result of ESAP 
on the number of households living below the Poverty Datum Line 
while "response" would describe households eating meat and 
chicken less frequently, because there is some degree of 
conscious decision-making in terms of what to cut out. However, 
the use of the word "strategy" for the latter would not be used 
since it would seem to elevate this process of trying to cope to 
a status it does not merit, since limited options are available 
and most have negative implications for health and stress levels.
3. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) works out the cost of 
living on the basis of a "basket" of basic goods and services, 
each item with a particular weighting which differs for lower and 
higher income groups. The basket comprises foodstuffs, clothing 
and footwear, rent, fuel and light, household stores, transport, 
drink and tobacco, and an allowance for miscellaneous items (CSO,
1992) . Inflation has also been estimated at 45% for 1992 and this 
figure accepted by, for example, the World Bank representative 
in Zimbabwe (cited in Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992c). This 
percentage has therefore been used to work out real as opposed 
to absolute changes in income and expenditure, with the exception 
of food expenditure for which the CSO figure of 49% (between 
July 1991 and July 1992) has been utilised.
4. An interministerial committee was set up in collaboration with 
UNICEF to monitor the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) in 
February 1992. the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and 
Social Welfare coordinates the committee. Thirty sentinel sites 
were chosen to represent the major agro-economic and settlement 
zones of Zimbabwe. These included 11 sites in urban areas.
5. See The Herald. 23-6-92, "Hostel kids cannot afford school 
fees".
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6. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(21):11 for a discussion 
of this issue.
7. Total monthly income is the sum of formal employment income 
from pooling members plus other regular sources including 
contributions from adult offspring, relatives etc. The same basis 
for calculation was used in the last chapter describing the 
initial sample of 120. The highest income household (the 
university lecturer who moved out of Kambuzuma between surveys) 
has been excluded from calculations in this section since 
inclusion skewed results substantially.
8. In 1991, household incomes ranged from $60 per month to $3,300 
with a standard deviation (SD) of $660. In 1992, the range was 
from $40 to $4800 with an SD of $915. Per capita incomes in 1991 
ranged from $17 per month to $643 with an SD of $134. By 1992, 
the range widened from $20 to $849, with an SD of $145.
9. Poverty Datum Lines were calculated using the Consumer Price 
Index for lower-income urban families, produced by the Central 
Statistical Office for Zimbabwe, and updating figures for 1988 
in Loewenson et al. 1989. The PDLs in Z$ per month, corrected to 
the nearest dollar, according to household size for July 1991 and 
July 1992 are shown below.
‘hold size 1991 1992
2 309 448
3 338 490^
4 442 642
5 525 762
6 593 865
7 666 967
8 749 1088
10. See The Herald. 18-8-92 "Higher/lower income gap widens in 
urban areas".
11. The total number of resident offspring declined from 292 to 
290 and the number of dependent, non-resident offspring rose from 
45 to 55 children. This decrease in resident offspring is more 
than offset by the intake of extended family members.
12. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(23):5 "University Study 
Findings".
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CHAPTER FIVE
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES TO ESAP
"Men make our lives worse. They keep on spending money 
on beer. They have girlfriends and support other 
families. If men thought like us, it (life) would not 
be so hard."
Female respondent, Kambuzuma, 1992.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the different ways in which both women and 
men have responded to ESAP at the household level. The research 
findings show that women have had to be more flexible and make 
greater changes in their activities than men. The implications 
of these changes for women, gender relations and the household 
as a whole are assessed. It is argued that the household level 
impact of ESAP cannot be understood without a gender-specific 
analysis.
The chapter discusses areas which are. primarily the domain of 
women: domestic work and health care, the maintenance of urban- 
rural linkages, and informal income-generating activities. It 
also examines changes men and women have made in their leisure 
activities and participation in social organisations. The 
effects of ESAP on gender-based conflict at household level are 
then discussed and the final section draws out the implications 
of ESAP for gender roles and relations. Findings from semi­
structured interviews are more extensively used than in the last 
chapter.
5.2 CHANGES IN DOMESTIC WORK
Overall responsibility for domestic work has remained firmly in 
the hands of women over the period of this study. However, a 
greater number of female spouses shared this responsibility with 
female relatives in the second survey. This is linked to the 
trend towards extension of households and the incorporation of 
unemployed relatives. The percentage of female spouses with sole 
overall responsibility for domestic work was 63% in male headed
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nuclear households (N=49) compared to 31% in male headed extended 
households (N=3 6). Thus although extended households do not imply 
increased income, they are beneficial to women in that they allow 
the sharing of routine,, menial tasks. This point about the 
reduction of housework burdens . for individual housewives in 
extended households, is made by Chant (1984:23) in her study in 
Queretaro, Mexico. She also points out, however, that relatives 
usually share housework if they do not take a paid job (ibid:22) .
In 1991, a man assumed responsibility for housework in only one 
household whereas in 1992 men were responsible in five. However, 
this does not reflect an inversion in the gender division of 
labour in these households. In four cases (in 1992), it 
illustrates the situation that occurs when women are in the rural 
areas and do not have daughters in the home who can substitute 
for them. In one case, the woman respondent had died and her 
husband had sent their children to relatives. He was, at the 
time, living alone and responsible for his own domestic work. Men 
often do know how to cook, clean and wash clothes but will only 
carry out these tasks in the absence of a woman.
In the single household where a man took overall responsibility 
for domestic work in 199i, he was the respondent's brother. She 
was self-employed, buying and selling clothes, and her husband 
was employed as a casual labourer. They had one seven year old 
daughter at school. In 1992, both spouses were unemployed and the 
respondent's brother had left the household. Responsibility for 
domestic work was then totally assumed by the woman, although she 
had previously delegated this to a man and although her husband 
was also unemployed. There are no signs, therefore, of increased 
economic pressure resulting in any change in the gender division 
of labour in the domestic sphere. The care of young children, in 
particular, remains an exclusively female task.
Chant (forthcoming, b), assessing changes in reproductive labour 
in Mexico between 1982 and 1992, concludes that reallocation of 
tasks has been predominantly inter-generational with women
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passing housework and childcare onto daughters, co-resident 
mothers, nieces and so on. In Harare (over a period of one year), 
reallocation has not been primarily inter-generational. These 
tasks have been shared with or reallocated to co-resident sisters 
and sisters-in-law as well as daughters, nieces etc. However, as 
Chant (ibid) points out, housework and childcare remained 
staunchly female activities despite the fact that more women went 
out to work.
The changes in the average number of hours per week per household 
spent cooking, washing clothes, cleaning and shopping are shown 
in Table 5.1. The figures in brackets denote the number of 
households from which the average has been calculated.
Table 5.1: Changes in time spent on housework and shopping
Hours per week per household 
1991 1992
Cooking
Washing and ironing
Cleaning
Shopping
28.0 (100) 25.9 (100) 
7.8 (94) 7.1 (99)
8.6 (99) 9.9 (100)
3.6 (97). 4.3 (100)
All above activities 49.1 (92) 46.9 (99)
Overall, the time spent on domestic work has decreased, because 
the increases in time spent shopping and cleaning is more than 
offset by the decreases in time spent washing, ironing and 
cooking. The reasons for these changes are discussed below. For 
the majority of women in the study who are not formally employed, 
time constraints were not perceived as a major issue. This is in 
part, at least, because women are used to working hard and 
managing their time. As one respondent, involved in informal 
income generation said:
"Time is not a problem if you know how to organise 
yourself and your day."
Women involved in informal sector work demonstrate a striking 
ability to balance their productive and reproductive rcles. Women 
in formal employment tend to have domestic workers and do not 
therefore put in the long hours taken up by domestic work
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although they do face time constraints given that they remain 
responsible for household management.
COOKING AND FOOD CONSUMPTION
Despite the fact that the total number of people in the sample 
of 100 households went up from 557 to 574 (a net rise of 17 
persons), the total number of hours spent cooking went down. This 
reflects the fact that many women from the poorest households cut 
out the midday meal completely in order to cut food costs, 
particularly, but not only those who had to manage on fixed and 
insufficient housekeeping money from their husbands. In one 
household, the woman cut out the midday meal despite the fact 
that she was pregnant. Men did not respond in the same way, 
although more men did take food from home rather than buying it 
at work where it is more expensive when unsubsidized by the 
employer. This response actually involves more work for women 
since they prepare the packed lunch.
Evidence from Chile and Ecuador also suggests changes in the 
intra-household distribution of food, when income falls, with 
women and young girls suffering disproportionately (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1989:65). Tibaijuka (1988:39) found that 58% of 
women in her sample in Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania, had been forced 
to reduce the number of meals from three to two per day and 
Muntemba (1989:121) reports that a greater number of women than 
men cut out meals during a period of price rises in Zambia. As 
Raikes (1989:454) summarises in her review of women's health in 
East Africa, "Men eat first and best".
The decrease in cooking hours may also reflect the decrease in 
the number of households where the respondent cooked on her own. 
In 1991, 51 respondents said they were solely responsible for 
food preparation, whereas by 1992 this number had fallen to 45. 
In the majority of cases, the task had been passed on to female 
relatives but in some, cooking was done together. In these cases, 
food preparation took less time and was carried out in a more 
social environment.
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As noted in Chapter 4, increased self-production of food is not 
a viable option for households living in high-density suburbs in 
Harare, due to the unavailability of land. Women who were main 
householders were already utilising available garden space in the 
plot, usually for green vegetables and a little maize. Lodger 
women usually have no access whatsoever to land. A few women had 
planted maize in vacant council plots but it had been slashed by 
the City Council, just before it was ready for harvesting. 
Interestingly, this issue was taken up by the party, ZANU.PF 
because local councillors had received complaints from their 
constituents and were worried that they would not be re-elected 
if this policy was pursued.1 It was agreed by the city council 
that the by-laws should be reviewed but nothing had been done by 
June 1993 and in any case, the damage (for 1992) had already been 
done.
WASHING AND IRONING
The time taken up by washing and ironing also decreased. Many 
women responded to the higher costs of washing powder and to a 
lesser extent water, by washing clothes less frequently. This 
finding is similar to that of Chant's study in Mexico (1993) 
where people tried to conserve expenditure on water in this way. 
Once again, there was a shift from the female spouse taking sole 
responsibility for washing towards sharing with female.relatives 
and daughters- There was also a marked increase in the number of. 
domestic workers who were given sole responsibility for washing 
(four households in 1991 and nine in 1992) . This occurred in 
households where the woman was formally employed and faced 
greater time pressures in obtaining transport to work and 
shopping around for cheaper foodstuffs and basic commodities.
SHOPPING
The increase in time spent shopping is related to rising prices. 
Most households spent more time shopping around for bargains and 
many could no longer afford to do a bulk shop once a month but 
instead bought smaller quantities more frequently, which often 
works out to be more expensive. Similar findings are reported
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from studies in Latin America (Beneria, 1991; Moser, 1989a).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, shopping is one household task in 
which significant numbers of men are involved. In 1991, men were 
involved in shopping in 34% of households and by 1992, this had 
risen.to 36%. However, men did not take the entire responsibility 
for shopping except when women were away in rural areas. In 
contrast, the female head or spouse was entirely responsible for 
shopping in 3 0 households, and in a further 12, children or the 
domestic worker also shopped but usually with strict instructions 
about what to buy and where.
It is the overall responsibility for household consumption which 
creates particular stress for women. In response to a direct 
question about whether women or men were worse affected by the 
increased cost of living, almost all women thought that they 
were. The main reason given was that women were more concerned 
with household consumption and welfare. As one respondent put it, 
"I am the one who sees every day what thechildren 
need. I am the one who has to feed the whole family on 
a fixed amount of money and I have to think what to 
do."
Another respondent said:
"My husband gets angry when there are only vegetables 
and no meat (to go with sadza, the maize meal staple) .
The trouble is that he does not know the prices of 
things."
In households where men were involved in shopping, there was 
undoubtedly a greater appreciation of the increasing difficulties 
in providing for the basic food needs of the household. The quote 
by a male respondent at the beginning of Chapter 4 provides a 
lucid illustration of this. However, as Bruce (1989:985) points 
out, women in Africa are almost universally viewed as ultimately 
responsible for fulfilling children's food needs.
In sum, women have responded to the price increases of food and 
basic commodities by changing the household diet, particularly
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their own, spending more time shopping around and washing clothes 
less often. There was an overall decrease in the time spent on 
housework. Time is not a critical constraint for the majority of 
women (who are not formally employed) but rather resources to 
meet household needs. Increased sharing of housework seems to be 
not so much a deliberate choice but rather a by-product of the 
arrival of relatives needing support, although it does ease the 
labour burden for women.
HEALTH CARE
Women were exclusively responsible for providing health care 
within the household. (In just one case did an older male sibling 
look after a younger brother who was ill in the previous four 
weeks.) Women are not only responsible for meeting health 
supporting needs for food, hygiene and nurturing, but they are 
also responsible for "initiating health actions in an illness 
episode" (Raikes, 1989:454) and then providing care in the home 
(see also Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1991:124). As has been pointed 
out by various researchers, this is viewed as an extension of 
women's role in reproduction (eg. Browner, 1989; Moser, 1989b).
In response to a question about who cared for the individual who 
was ill in the four weeks before the survey, all 14 responses of 
"self-care" referred to women respondents being ill and looking 
after themselves. The illnesses they suffered from were no 
different to those of other members of the household, which did 
warrant care by someone other than the patient. Thus, these women 
saw themselves through bouts of malaria, fever and high blood 
pressure with little support from others.
One employed respondent (a textile industry worker) explained how 
ESAP and the threat of retrenchments had made it more difficult 
to take time off work if she or her children were ill. As she 
explained:
"There is fear in the air especially since the case of
Cone Textiles (where massive retrenchment had taken
place) . We are very worried, especially low level
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employees like myself. There is talk that they
(management) might introduce a new rule. If you are
late three times in a month or don't go to work for
any reason, you can be sacked."
A male respondent (driver for a daily newspaper) who suffered 
from asthma also said that he forced himself to go to work, even 
when he suffered a severe attack, because he was worried about 
losing his job. The threat of being laid off affects both men and 
women, and has similar implications for stress-related ill- 
health. However, the problem is compounded for women because they 
are responsible for their children's health care as well, and 
also have to nurse their husbands and male relatives.
The number of people who were ill over the four week period 
preceding each survey and the number of consultations they 
obtained were approximately the same in 1991 and 1992. However, 
the average cost of consultations and drugs rose from Z$40 to 
Z$55. As discussed in Chapter 4, this has resulted in individuals 
with chronic diseases not receiving adequate treatment and it is 
the women who then carry the extra burden of care in the home, 
(see also Browner, 1989; Evans, 1989 and Raikes, 1989 for similar 
observations for illness in general.) In 1991, 44% of respondents 
said they had problems with utilising health services but this 
had risen to 64% by 1992. The cost of services was cited as a 
problem by only nine respondents in 1991 whereas in 1992, 19
respondents cited cost as the major problem. Under ESAP, the 
burden of health care in the home has increased. This represents 
a direct shift in responsibility from the state to women (Kanji, 
1991; Moser, 1989b).
Although the increase in cost recovery in the public health 
sector was linked to the objective of improving the quality of 
care, only 7% of respondents thought this had improved between 
1991 and 1992, while 59% thought the quality was the same and 34% 
thought the services had deteriorated.
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Maternity fees were raised in January 1992. The deposit for the 
fees at the major hospital in Harare rose from Z$140 to Z$500, 
to cover delivery charges, ward fees, anaesthetic and so on. 
Respondents reactions to this rise of 257% ranged from angry 
indignation to depressed resignation; as one husband said,
"I earn $300 a month, how can my wife go to the 
Maternity for $500?"
Women were being detained in Harare hospital long after they had 
given birth because they had not raised the money to pay the 
fees. For example, the press reported in March 1992 that ten 
women had spent seven to ten days longer than necessary in 
hospital and had to sleep on the floor in order to release beds 
for other women.2
An earlier increase in ante-natal and maternity fees in Harare 
had already depressed use of these services (Loewenson et_al, 
1991). Women most at risk of having complicated births and who 
most require good ante-natal care are those who are overworked 
and undernourished. These are obviously women from poorer 
households and are precisely those who cannot afford these higher 
charges. Maternal morbidity and mortality is therefore likely to 
increase for poor women (Kanji et al. 1991) . Although data on the 
utilisation of various levels and types of service are not yet 
available, the number of patients receiving treatment at Harare 
Central Hospital over a two month period after the rise in fees 
was 2 5% lower than in the same period in the previous year 
(MacGarry, 1993:21).
In sum, there is little doubt that women are particularly 
affected by the rises in health care costs, both as users of 
services, for themselves and their children and as providers of 
care within the household.
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5.3 CHANGES IN LEISURE ACTIVITIES
As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of leisure was much more 
alien to women than men. Few women spend money on leisure and 
social activities and most mentioned the essentially productive 
activities of knitting and crocheting as their main source of 
relaxation. In contrast, men clearly differentiated their leisure 
time and tended to spend money on social activities, particularly 
drinking and sport. There are clearly defined and different 
social standards in relation to the type of activities which are 
acceptable and respectable for men and women. It is acceptable 
for women to talk to other women, to visit relatives, to go out 
with the family and to attend religious functions and groups. It 
is not acceptable for women to go to town on their own or with 
friends, to drink or go to soccer matches without men.
Table 5.2 shows the changes (between 1991 and 1992) in the number 
and types of activities cited in response to a question about 
leisure and social activity. Men's activities were those cited 
by women of the household and were only confirmed with the men 
in a few cases.
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Table 5.2: Changes in women and men's leisure activities
Women
1991
(N=98)
1992
Men
1991
(N=97)
1992
attending church 30 26 15 22
visiting* 15 18 8 10
sports 9 6 33 26
radio & TV 8 8 13 8
reading 7 11 12 13
films 5 3 11 5
burial society 2 3 4 5
knitting/crochet 63 51 0 0
gardening** 2 2 0 0
social groups 0 2 0 0
drinking 1 0 30 28
betting 0 0 4 2
repairs*** 0 0 4 4
142 130 134 123
* visiting relatives and friends 
** growing food
*** repairing cars, TVs and radios
As far as women are concerned, the number who cited knitting 
and/or crocheting declined because some women could not afford 
the increased cost of materials. In 1991, one-third of women (33) 
referred to this as their only leisure activity. In 1992, this 
number had declined to 20 and eight women whose sole leisure 
activity had been knitting reported engaging in no leisure or 
social activities at all. Only two men did not have leisure 
activities in 1991 but this number rose to six in 1992.
Fewer men and women went to soccer matches and the cinema in 
1992, both relatively costly forms of leisure. However, only a 
small minority of women had previously engaged in these 
activities, as family outings which they felt contributed to the 
quality of their lives and to social relations within the 
household. A far greater number of men went to matches and films 
in both years.
A greater number of women reported reading (often the bible) for 
leisure in 1992. A few more women said they visited friends and
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relatives. No women had cited participation in groups as a social 
activity in 1991 whereas two women did so in 1992, but there was 
no substantial increase in extra-familial collective activities.
Although many women did report that their husbands had cut down 
on drinking, only two men had actually stopped drinking 
altogether. 'The only woman who had reported drinking (with 
friends) in 1991 had given this up. Interestingly, church 
attendance had increased for men and decreased for women. In the 
case of the (four) women, time pressures had reduced their 
attendance whereas for men, church-going may have been a form of 
relaxation and social activity to replace cost-incurring leisure 
pursuits.
Overall, there was a decline in the number of leisure activities 
reported for both men and women. Gonzalez de la Rocha (1988:220) 
also notes that as a result of economic pressure in Mexico, the 
poor are more tired and worn and have less time to relax. Men 
have reduced their expense-incurring leisure activities although 
drinking and sport remain very popular. Even fewer women spend 
money on leisure and many have had to give up knitting and 
crocheting which they enjoyed and which had produced useful items 
or income for the household. Inequalities in leisure time and 
costs between men and women remain, even if they have not been 
substantially exacerbated by ESAP.
5.4 CHANGES IN URBAN-RURAL LINKAGES
As discussed in Chapter 2, women's seasonal migration to rural 
areas has long been essential to the survival of low-income urban 
households-(see also Chant & Radcliffe, 1992; Potts & Mutambirwa, 
1990). As Potts and Mutambirwa (1990:697) summarise for Zimbabwe,
" ..urban residence requires the earning of an urban wage 
and with high unemployment and a lack of adequate pension 
and welfare payments, migrants act entirely rationally... by 
keeping their land (if they have any) which gives them some 
security against unemployment or failure of their urban 
enterprise and , more importantly, old age or disability."
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However, a combination of ESAP and the drought has had a severe 
impact on these urban-rural linkages. In 1991, one or more 
members had spent at least two months of the previous year away 
from Harare in 42% of households. In 1992, this had dropped to 
3 3% of households. A survey carried out in 1988 (Potts and 
Mutambirwa, 1990) found that only 48% of households remained 
permanently in town. The percentages in this study were 58% in 
1991 and 67% in 1992 indicating a decline in linkages with rural 
areas over the past few years. Table 5.3 shows changes from 1991 
to 1992 for the whole sample and according to whether families 
were main householders or lodgers. As expected, a greater 
proportion of lodger households had members spending time in 
rural areas in both years.
Table 5.3: Changes in percentage of households with member/s who 
spent 2 months and more in rural areas in the preceding year
Number of households 
1991 1992
Main householders (N=60) 
Lodgers (N=40)
Whole sample (N=100)
35% 27% 
55% 42%
42% 33%
Two major factors were responsible for the decline in urban-rural 
links: firstly, the drought which meant that there was no
substantial harvest and secondly, the rise in transport costs and 
the need to cut expenditure which led to a decrease in journeys 
between town and countryside by various members of the household. 
The number of household members in the sample who regularly spent 
time in the rural areas went down from 93 people in 1991 to 57 
in 1992.
In addition, respondents reported a reduction in short visits. 
Spouses' trips to see each other, usually the man to visit his 
wife and family at the rural home and the woman (often with 
children) to visit her husband in town, were reduced. Visits by 
various members of the urban household to elderly parents and 
extended family in rural areas also decreased. A few households
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had been forced to entirely cut out visits, for example one 
couple who came from Mozambique (just over the Zimbabwean border) 
could no longer afford to visit their elderly parents and 
relatives. Beneria (1991:175) also reports that just over half 
the households in her sample in Mexico City had, as a result of 
the economic crisis, decreased or eliminated trips to visit 
friends and relatives as well as their attendance at family 
parties and religious holidays.
Table 5.4 illustrates the decline in the number of (female) 
respondents who spent time in rural areas in the preceding year 
and the changes in the length of time spent there.
Table 5.4: Changes in time women spent in rural areas
Time in rural area Number of women 
1991 1992
1-3 months 
4-6 months 
7-9 months 
More than 9 months
10 7 
15 16 
7 3 
2 5
Women accustomed to earning income or at least producing food in 
rural areas faced.greater dependence on their menfolk. As one 
respondent said,
"As it is now, we are all dependent on his income. 
Depending on one person makes the situation very 
difficult. If the rain comes, I too can earn money 
again."
Some women also resented having to pay for food they had 
previously produced:
"If it rains, we can stop buying this expensive food 
from shops. We will be able to grow most of what we 
need."
On the other hand, a few women in a group discussion said it was 
better that they spent more time in town because this would 
reduce (not, they insisted, eliminate) the number of girlfriends
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their husbands had, the risk of contracting AIDS and the drain 
on resources. Others felt that the reason to stay in town was 
that the opportunities for income generation were greater in 
Harare than in the countryside.
The decline in women's links with rural areas has both short and 
long term implications. In the short term, it results in reduced 
resources (food and cash income) for urban women and the 
household in general. It also causes greater anxiety about rural 
kin suffering the effects of drought and, as discussed in the 
last chapter, reduced remittances from urban family. Increased 
separation between family members is another consequence. For 
example, for women and children who spend most of their time in 
rural areas, it implies fewer visits and longer separations from 
their husband/father in town, except in the few cases where women 
move their base to town. For women who spend most of their time 
in town but have older children schooling in rural areas there 
is also increased separation. In the longer term, if the decline 
in linkages continues, this could lead to a deterioration in 
relationships between family members and a rise in personal and 
social problems. On the other hand, the decline could increase 
men and women's consciousness of themselves as urban residents 
and even promote the formation of civic groups in town.
Given their complexity, it would be premature to draw many 
conclusions about urban-rural linkages. However, as a consequence 
of the drought and ESAP, there are fewer possibilities for women 
to take advantage of opportunities available in rural areas to 
maximise present and longer-term security for the household. This 
has negative implications for gender equality in terms of a 
decline in women's productivity and income and increased 
dependence on men's earnings, as discussed in the next section.
5.5 CHANGES IN INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES
Women's income generating activities were the most common source 
of regular and irregular non-wage income for households. Table
5.5 shows the decline in the number of these activities between
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the two surveys.
Table 5.5: Changes in women's income generating activities
1991
Regular
1992
Irregular
1991 1992
Sewing/knitting/crochet 
Sale of agricultural
19 15 20 13
produce 9 5 5 1
Petty commerce 2 4 3 1
Hairdressing 1 1 1 —
Sale of small livestock 3 1 1
Total no. of activities 34 26 30 15
The most marked change is the decline in sewing, knitting and 
crocheting. As discussed in the last chapter, this is a 
consequence of declining demand, increased competition and the 
rising cost of materials. Brydon (1993) reports very similar 
findings from Ghana. In Harare, the fall in demand is a major 
factor, corroborated by a higher-income respondent who explained 
that in her effort to cut expenses, she only buys one woollen and 
not three for the cold season. The finding is also confirmed by 
national statistics of the clothing industry referred to in the 
last chapter.
A respondent who made bedspreads for sale explained her 
situation:
"I used to sew five bedspreads a week and know that I 
could sell them. Now it is different. I can't find 
customers. Many people cannot afford to buy clothes, 
let alone bedspreads. For me, money for the material 
is also a problem. I only make bedspreads when I know 
I have a customer.
It is different for men. At least they know they will 
receive a fixed amount at the end of the month."
141
Some respondents could also no longer afford the initial outlay 
for wool to knit and were reduced to offering their labour to 
customers who could provide the wool, which was much less 
lucrative. Finally, getting customers to pay up was also becoming 
more of a problem. They asked to pay in instalments and some even 
defaulted on these payments.
Agricultural produce is usually sold to marketing boards in rural 
areas, after women have worked to harvest the crop. As discussed 
in the last section, this source of income was badly affected by 
the drought. The sale of livestock, usually chickens, also 
declined as a result of increases in the cost of chicken feed and 
reduced demand for chicken in the settlement, this being one of 
the first food items to be cut to save money. Finally, although 
one hairdresser reported an increase in clients because higher 
income women could no longer afford to use more expensive 
hairdressers in town, another complained that she had to give up 
because the women she served no longer had the money to have 
their hair plaited.
The only activity which showed an increase was small-scale buying 
and selling. This category includes firstly, buying food items 
such as vegetables and fruit, popcorn and drinks from large 
central markets or wholesalers and reselling within the 
settlement. Secondly, it includes taking crocheted or knitted 
items to South Africa and selling for cash or trading for clothes 
which are then resold in Harare. The first activity has low 
returns on long hours while the second can be more lucrative. 
However, all the women said that it was becoming more difficult 
to make a profit and that it necessitated longer hours and harder 
work. As one respondent who travelled to South Africa said,
"I have to work much harder and be much more 
aggressive to make the same profit that I made last 
year".
Tibaijuka (1989) reports similar findings from Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania where women involved in informal sector work were having 
to work longer hours to be able to make a profit.
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The changes in average monthly income from regular and irregular 
activities are shown in Table 5.6. The figure in brackets refers 
to the number of activities from which the average is calculated. 
The change in real terms takes into account the rise in the cost 
of living (45%) between July 1991 and July 1992.
Table 5.6: Changes in average monthly income from women's regular 
and irregular activities
1991
(Z$)
1992
(Z$)
% change % change 
real terms
Regular
activities 196 (34) 172 (25) - 20% - 4 5  %
Irregular
activities 35 (33) 42 (15) + 12% - 25 %
Although the women who have managed to continue to make a profit 
with their activities work harder and longer hours, their 
earnings have actually declined by 45 % in real terms for their 
regular activities and by 13 % for their irregular activities.
A few men also had part-time work or did odd jobs which generated 
income. In 1991, two men in the sample had a regular source of 
non-wage income: one was the lecturer referred to in the last 
chapter who did consultancy work and the second was the long­
distance lorry driver who charged for lifts. In 1992, two more 
men did: one was an electrician employed in industry and doing 
odd jobs at weekends and the other was a city council employee 
who owned a car, worked on the other side of Harare and began 
charging for lifts.
Whereas the number of men with regular income-generating 
activities increased, the number with irregular activities 
declined from three in 1991 to one in 1992. A mechanic who fixed 
cars at weekends no longer did so and a man who took photographs 
at weddings could no longer find customers.
In contrast to women, the two men with non-wage income earned 
Z$250 and Z$2000 per month respectively in 1991 while the average
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monthly earnings of the four men in 1992 was Z$1542. This clearly 
shows that the assets and skills which men have gives them a 
remarkably greater earning capacity than women. In addition, some 
of the areas in which they are involved, such as informal 
transport services, do have room for expansion given the rise in 
bus fares, whereas the areas women are involved in do not.
In summary, women were much more dependent than men on non-wage 
income and suffered a more severe decline in these activities and 
their earnings than men. As discussed in Chapter 1, studies have 
shown that this has negative implications for household health 
and nutrition, even more so than declines in men's income.
The decline in women's income and economic power also has 
implications for equality between men and women. As Chant 
(1984:28) puts it (based on a study in Queretaro, Mexico), "The 
man's supremacy in the family is largely based on economic power, 
and when women have a measure of economic independence, they tend 
to play a greater part in decision-making". The measure of 
economic independence is an important factor. In households in 
Harare where both spouses were formally or self employed (with 
higher incomes than more informal activities), a noticeably 
higher degree of negotiation was reported about what kinds of 
changes both had to make to cope with the increased cost of 
living and these women generally showed greater self-confidence 
and self-esteem.
In contrast, in households where women had diminishing or no 
independent income, they struggled to meet basic household needs 
from fixed and increasingly inadequate sums of housekeeping money 
from their husbands. Dwyer and Bruce (1988:8) argue that women's 
income provides them with psychological and practical leverage 
in their relations with men. However, these women had used their 
relatively low incomes not so much to increase their power in 
gender relations but rather to diminish conflict, by asking their 
husbands for money less often. The decline of already low incomes 
from informal sector earnings resulted in less control, lower
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self-esteem and an increase in conflict (this last point is 
discussed more fully later in this chapter).
It was formally employed women who were inclined to use their 
income as leverage. Again, quoting Chant (1993:348), "Going out 
to work (my emphasis) was regarded in some respects as a triumph 
in terms of gaining personal independence and reducing reliance 
on men, as well as contributing to a greater sense of purpose, 
power and status within the household, and enabling greater 
influence and control over household expenditure". The 
relationship between women's income and the renegotiation of 
gender relations is by no means a simple and direct one; the 
formally employed women in the present study tended to also have 
less contact with their rural origins, more years of formal 
education and/or more experience of public life through their 
workplaces.
Dwyer and Bruce (1988:8) argue that fundamental change for women 
is based on collective action which in turn is linked to extra- 
familial experiences. These can be production or consumption 
related, the latter having been shown by various studies to be 
an important but much ignored area of struggle for women in many 
parts of the world (Daines & Seddon, 1991; Moser, 1989c). In 
general, organising collectively has greater potential to 
initiate change at the social or public level. It is therefore 
important to examine whether ESAP has affected men and women's 
involvement in social organisations.
5.6 PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS
As discussed in Chapter 3, churches are an extremely important 
part of life for women and to a lesser extent, men. Eighty-five 
percent of women were members of a church as compared to 55% of 
men. In both 1991 and 1992, religious groups (women's groups and 
mothers' unions) were the most popular form of social 
organisation for women. For men, it was burial societies followed 
by church groups. Women did not feel that the church helped them 
or their households to cope with the effects of ESAP in any
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material way. If anything, some complained that the church 
expected them to help destitute families with contributions of 
food, clothing' and money and that they no longer felt able to 
help. As one respondent explained:
"They tell us we must help people who are suffering 
more than us; old people and widows, people at home 
(rural areas) who are affected by the drought. But how 
can I help when I do not have enough to feed my 
children myself?"
In this respect, ESAP would seem to have undermined community 
solidarity and increased individualistic behaviour in the 
struggle to make ends meet.
Two respondents did report getting support from other church 
members but not from the church as an organisation. On the 
contrary, one respondent (a member of the Catholic church) said 
that the congregation had been asked to help with the priest's 
"salary" and resented this fact because he had a car and "lived 
well".
Forty-three percent of women belonged to at least one 
organisation in 1991 and this percentage rose to 48% in 1992. 
Fewer men belonged to social organisations due to their lesser 
involvement in religious groups. Thirty-one percent of men 
belonged to at least one organisation in 1991 and this rose to 
37% in 1992. Table 5.7 presents a detailed breakdown of men and 
women's membership of social organisations in 1991 and 1992.
146
Table 5.7: Changes in women and men's membership of social
organisations
Women
1991
N=99
1992
N=98
Men
1991
N=86
1992
N=86
Religious 25 28 7 8
Burial society 18 19 18 18
Social/sport 3 3 1 2
Political 4 4 0 1
Trade union 1 3 5 6
Professional group 2 2 2 2
Cooperative 2 1 0 0
55 60 33 37
During the period of the study, there was a small increase in 
participation in social organisations for both women and men. 
Only one employed respondent had stopped going to a church 
women's group because she no longer had time. However, there was 
little change in the nature of these organisations.
Certainly, ESAP has not (yet) given rise to local organisations 
concerned with consumption issues which have emerged in some 
parts of Latin America as a response to economic crisis (Daines 
& Seddon, 1991). This is at least partly because items of 
collective consumption (water, energy, health care and so on) are 
still provided by the state, even if they are more expensive. 
However, it is arguably also linked to the general 
underdevelopment of civic organisations in Africa, which in turn 
relates to the. image of paternalism promoted by (relatively 
recent) post-independent states, although this is currently 
changing. For example, many respondents clearly expressed their 
disillusionment with the ZANU.PF government and some with party 
politics in general, in a way which would not have occurred 
shortly after independence. Finally, it would seem that linkages 
with rural areas and the recent (compared to Latin America) 
process of urbanisation results in a weak urban identity which 
also acts as a brake to the formation of urban civic groups. A 
substantial proportion of urban residents (particularly lodgers) 
still see their longer term prospects linked to the situation in
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rural areas. The implications of this lack of organised and 
collective response to ESAP on the part of the poor is discussed 
in Chapter 6.
The major locus of response to ESAP has therefore occurred at the 
household level. The next section returns to this level to 
examine the effects of ESAP on gender-based conflict and the 
implications for women. In other words, it further discusses how 
ESAP has influenced intra-household relations and the 
implications for gender issues.
5.7 GENDER-BASED CONFLICT AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
One of the major sources of conflict between men and women 
relates to their different priorities for the use of income; 
specifically to men's private spending on drink and girlfriends. 
Most wives did not mind their husbands keeping back money for 
private use and tended to accept the idea that men have a right 
to personal spending which they do not have themselves, although 
this does not extend to supporting "girlfriends". The conflict 
related much more to the amount of money available for collective 
needs. Since various measures within ESAP have reduced real 
incomes this conflict has been exacerbated.
Chant (forthcoming, b) and Moser (1989a) in their respective 
research in Mexico and Ecuador both observed that the only 
households where the incidence of domestic violence does not seem 
to have escalated with economic crisis are those in which women 
earn money on a regular basis and are respected by their menfolk. 
In Harare too, employed women tended to report lower levels of 
conflict in the household.
This is not to say that overt gender conflict had increased in 
all households where women did not have a regular source of 
independent income. Many women attempted to avoid conflict by 
resigning themselves to men's behaviour and voiced few 
expectations of better or fairer treatment. To give one example, 
one male wage earner, a builder, had been injured at work in 1990
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and had been laid off with a lump sum in compensation. He had 
taken to drinking heavily and the money ran out at the end of 
1991. Since then, the family of nine members (there were seven 
children) have been dependent on the wife who runs the house on 
rent from lodgers, home-grown food and her diminishing income 
from knitting. When asked about how she felt about her husband's 
use of the compensation money (she had never been told the 
amount), she shrugged and explained that this was in the nature 
of men and that nothing could be done about it. She voiced an 
acceptance of a different and more individualistic code of 
conduct for men which was echoed by many respondents.
However, not all women with little independent income were so 
accepting. Some felt that men were not fulfilling their
obligations as husbands to provide economic support for
themselves and their children, and had lost respect for them. One 
respondent stated bitterly:
"Men do not want to change. They don't want to adjust.
My husband.. .the children can be so hungry but he will 
still go and have his beer."
The question then arises as to what impedes women who admit to 
being angry from leaving their husbands. Some researchers, such 
as Beneria (1991) on the basis of her work in Mexico, have stated 
that exasperation on the part of. women with • the increased 
asymmetry in male-female household inputs during the crisis can 
lead to women breaking away and going it alone. Most women in the 
present study were very conscious of a lack of practical 
alternatives in terms of survival and this was particularly true 
for older, less well educated women who knew it would be
extremely difficult to find employment.
In many ways, urban women who are unemployed feel more
disadvantaged than their rural counterparts. They feel 
economically dependent on their husbands and lack some of the 
social support mechanisms provided by rural communal life (a 
report produced by UNICEF in 1985 makes similar observations).
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This is not to say that women who are based in rural areas but 
spend part of the year, in Harare with their husbands have more 
harmonious relationships and have not been so affected by ESAP. 
One respondent explained her situation:
"Things are much harder now. When I am at home (rural 
area), I cannot afford cooking oil and sometimes I 
can't even buy sugar. My daughter was sent back from 
school because my husband did not send the money to 
pay the levy. I had to ask again and again.
When I go back (after a period in town), he has to give me 
money. I am always upset when it is time to go back because 
I know we will fight about how much I need."
When asked if she would prefer to live in town on a permanent 
basis, she replied,
"Maybe. But we would have more fights if I stayed 
here."
As Beneria and Roldan (1987:162) observe, men within capitalist 
patriarchal societies have at their disposal many mechanisms of 
social control; economic, coercive and ideological. In Zimbabwe 
lobolo (bride-price) strengthens men's position, in that women 
have been "paid for" and owe their labour to their husbands. The 
issue is therefore not only one of economic survival without men, 
but includes ideological aspects which women (and men) 
internalise. This includes undervaluing unpaid domestic work, 
childcare and socialisation, and nurturing and affection which 
promotes emotional well-being in the family. It also includes 
accepting inequalities and double standards in sexual behaviour, 
morality and leisure. As discussed in Chapter 1, access to 
resources and the level of oppression of women in the specific 
cultural context are important factors, and in Harare, both 
combine to militate against women breaking away from difficult 
relations with men.
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Although women's control of fertility was not a focus of this 
research, some women did make reference to restricting the number 
of children they had or intended to have because of financial 
constraints. Interestingly, these women were formally employed 
and not amongst the poorest in the sample, corroborating research 
that has found a positive association between women's control of 
income and a greater say in fertility decisions (Blumberg, 
1991:109).
In women headed households, access to income and resources tended 
to be lower, and the effects of ESAP severe, but for employed 
women, there was no conflict about directing income to basic 
household needs. Older women, usually widows and main 
householders, had the least resources and opportunities and were 
heavily dependent on adult offspring. Much therefore depended on 
their relationship, especially with sons, who tended to have more 
resources than daughters to support the family. When sons did not 
meet their obligations, conflict had been exacerbated by ESAP, 
and where daughters were not in a position to help, the effect 
on the household was particularly severe.
Blumberg (1991:115) cites several studies which show that the 
consequences to women's power at the household level are faster 
and more direct when women's relative control of income drops 
than when it rises. In other words, women with independent 
incomes have a long, slow struggle to increase their power in 
relation to men whereas a loss in income implies a rapid 
decrease. This seems to be the case in Harare, where women have 
suffered a huge decline in the income they control and a rapid 
consequent loss of what Folbre (1988b) terms "bargaining power" 
with men, over a range of issues affecting themselves and their 
households.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Women, because of their primary responsibility for household 
consumption and management, bear the brunt of the increased 
difficulties in meeting the day-to-day needs of their households.
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Effective responses to the situation have been extremely limited 
since they do not include access to greater resources. Women have 
thus had to modify their lives to a greater extent than men. 
Their responses have been mainly individual taking greater cuts 
in their own consumption, spending more time shopping for 
bargains, working longer and harder hours in the informal sector 
for poorer returns and engaging in even fewer leisure activities. 
For the majority of women, not in formal employment, tensions 
have increased with wage-earning husbands who continue to engage 
in private spending rather than household needs, even if this 
tension does not result in overt conflict. The implications of 
these changes for women and for their households are almost 
entirely negative.
The research has shown the need to disaggregate the household to 
understand the real impact of Structural Adjustment Policies. 
Household members have some shared interests, needs and resources 
but there are many elements of conflict. As we saw in the last 
chapter, the position of the household within the social 
structure is extremely important in determining the overall 
impact of ESAP. However, if we are interested in a deeper and 
more accurate understanding of economic and social reality and/or 
if we are interested in the elimination of exploitation, then 
both income/class and gender-related issues must be taken into 
account.
Nevertheless, it is important to note the limitations of gender 
equality for working class women. Although the sharing of income 
and resources in most working class households is undoubtedly 
skewed towards men, it is still conditioned by low incomes. In 
the poorer households, getting a more equal share may alleviate 
the problems of meeting basic consumption needs of the family, 
but it is insufficient for a reasonable standard of living, as 
perceived by the respondents of the study. Gender equality is 
therefore insufficient; equality with men who themselves suffer 
unemployment, low wages and poor working conditions is hardly an 
adequate goal. Women in Benerla and Roldan's (1987) study
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articulated this, explaining that equality would mean work 
situations which were alienating and exploitative, as for men of 
their class, while depriving them of some rewarding aspects of 
motherhood and household management. Similarly, most women in 
Willis's (1993:70) study in Oaxaca, Mexico said that, given the 
choice, they would not work, since the jobs available, mainly as 
domestic help, were tiring, demoralising and degrading.
Opportunities for gaining access to economic and social power 
would seem to be diminishing for all low paid workers, with low 
income women particularly affected. Not only are the women 
subordinated to men, with fewer resources, education and skills, 
but they are also the least socially organised and able to make 
their voices heard. Cooperative strategies are not evident. If 
anything, the sphere of struggle has become further 
individualised and privatised. Willis (1993:79) also comments on 
the lack of cohesion and community spirit in Oaxaca, Mexico, 
although she could not assess if this was a response to economic 
crisis or if it had previously been that way. It can be argued 
that the entire "market-place" orientation of ESAP fosters a more 
individualistic than collective approach to the solution of 
economic and social- problems. Chant (1993:345) argues that the 
poor's need to join forces in times of increased hardship is to 
some extent a motivating factor in explaining the rise in 
household extension in Mexico which is in turn linked to the 
increase in women's participation in the labour force. While this 
may be the case in some areas of Latin America, at the present 
time in Harare, various factors ranging from the restricted 
labour market, the nature and policies of the post-independent 
government, the relatively recent process of urbanization to more 
culturally-based issues all seem to militate against active 
solidarity and collective responses among the poor. The situation 
is not, however, static and this issue is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6 which examines possible future implications 
of ESAP for low-income households.
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In the context of the present study, the use of the term 
"survival strategies" , which implies active, conscious and 
possibly longer-term planning, has the risk of romanticising or 
at least elevating the process of trying to cope with financial 
hardship, with all the accompanying stress and anxiety, to a 
status that it does not warrant. The term "household survival 
strategies" has the additional problem of assuming a degree of 
consensus and harmony of objectives which may not exist (Schmink, 
1984:95). Household strategies may therefore be an uneasy 
aggregate of individual strategies.
Women's contribution to the economy, with both paid and unpaid 
work, has to date been underestimated, if not ignored, but there 
may now be a risk of overestimating the extent to which women can 
compensate for low wages, rising prices and diminishing 
employment opportunities. Coping responses cannot be a substitute 
for more equitable macro-economic policies (see Cornia, 
1987:104). As Moser (1989a:159) puts it, on the basis of her 
research in Ecuador, "Not all women can cope under crisis and it 
is vital that the romantic myth of their infinite capacity to do 
so be debunked." Most respondents were very clear about their 
lack of resources to deal with the level of the crisis and the 
need for more responsible government and more adequate state 
intervention to deal with the basic problems of the majority of 
the population. As one respondent commented:
"I think the government should stop ESAP. People who 
already have money are not suffering. We are. The 
trouble is they make these programmes without knowing 
our problems and how we live. The government says 
people should be self-reliant. But how do we do this?"
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. See The Herald. 15-2-92 "Party discourages City Council from 
slashing maize".
2. See The Herald. 8-03-92, "Women detained for lacking hospital 
fees".
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CHAPTER SIX
ASSESSING ESAP; CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to assess ESAP, examining the 
relationship between the changes at household level, described 
in the last two chapters, and Structural Adjustment policies, and 
drawing out future implications for the urban poor, and women in 
particular.
It is difficult to "prove" a direct relationship between ESAP and 
the negative effects found in the study for a number of reasons. 
First, proponents of Structural Adjustment have argued that the 
situation would be worse if such programmes had not been 
implemented. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions on 
this essentially counter-factual argument. While the World Bank 
has attempted to show that adjusting countries have performed 
better in economic terms than non-adjusters (World Bank, 1988b), 
their methodology and results has been challenged by economists, 
for example, Woodward, (1992b:96).* Secondly, social research 
does not take place in laboratory conditions but in the real 
world, where various factors influence the economic and social 
situation. World recession, national political influences and in 
the case of Zimbabwe, the severe drought of 1991-92 have all had 
an important bearing on people's living conditions. In addition, 
the AIDS epidemic has also affected social support mechanisms and 
the resources of poor communities, as well as placing an extra 
burden on the health sector. Having noted these other influences, 
however, it would seem essential to point out that economic and 
social policies should be formulated to take into account such 
influences, which are usually known and/or predictable. This is 
precisely one of the criticisms of IMF and World Bank sponsored 
Structural Adjustment: it takes little or no account of the
different contexts in which policies are to be implemented.
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Although it is methodologically difficult to isolate the results 
of each policy measure, the timing of the research during the 
process of adjustment does show strong linkages between changes 
at household level and specific policy measures, particularly 
those such as the lifting of food subsidies and the introduction 
of cost recovery in social services.
The major stated objectives of ESAP are to promote economic 
growth and reduce poverty (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991a:1). The 
first section of this chapter summarises the macro-economic 
results of ESAP during the research period, discussing current 
trends and their implications for growth and employment. As with 
any policy option, there are groups which gain and those which 
lose. The likely outcomes for the urban poor are assessed 
focusing on the medium-term rather than the short-term period 
covered by the study, since it is now more widely accepted that 
poverty and unemployment may increase in the short-term.2 This 
leads on to the discussion as to whether poverty alleviation 
programmes (Social Dimensions of Adjustment - SDA) are effective 
and gender-sensitive. Finally, the responses of various social 
groups are discussed and possible long-term implications of 
Structural Adjustment, for low-income households and for women 
in particular.
6.2 IS ESAP WORKING? MACRO-LEVEL TRENDS AND DEBATES
On the basis of data available for 1991, Chapter 2 argued that 
ESAP was not successful even using purely economic criteria. 
During 1992, GDP is estimated by the World Bank to have fallen 
by 11% and agricultural output by 4 0%3 and inflation was 
estimated at 48.8% (EIU, 1993:3). Predicted inflation rates for 
1993 vary with the Economist Intelligence Unit stating that an 
optimistic forecast could be 30% (EIU, 1993:5).
The Bank attributes the problems to the drought and to the non­
implementation of certain elements of the Structural Adjustment 
package, namely the rapid reduction of government expenditure by 
retrenchment in the civil service and further reductions in
157
subsidies to, and the privatisation of, parastatals. The 
government, which employs 25% of formal sector employees, claimed 
in November 1992 that 7,000 civil servants had been retrenched 
(of a planned total of 25,000 by 1995).4 Critics allege that the 
figure is far less than that and some claim that the number has 
actually increased by 10,000 (EIU, 1992:14) since retrenched 
workers have been re-employed usually at higher grades. The 
abolition of the unpopular Ministry of Political Affairs in 1992 
turned out to be somewhat of a farce since, as the Economic 
Intelligence Unit puts it, it was reincarnated as the new 
Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and 
Cooperatives (ibid:6). The planned reduction of the civil service 
seems unlikely to happen by 1995, given the vested interest of 
the government in retaining support of this group for the 
proposed 1995 general election.
On the question of parastatals, subsidies are being cut, trading 
and performance targets set up and laws to govern their 
operations are to be amended to force them to operate along 
commercial lines (EIU, 1993:13).The Confederation of Zimbabwe 
Industries is demanding the immediate privatisation of seven of 
the 44 parastatals and eventual privatisation of the rest (ibid). 
Opponents of Structural Adjustment argue against blanket 
privatisation and point out that the State in countries in 
South-East Asia (Newly Industrialising Countries - NICS, which 
have been successful in terms of economic growth) have used 
protectionism and supported particular industries.
Leaving aside for the moment the role of the State in the 
economy, one of Zimbabwe's largest merchant banks points to the 
unfavourable economic climate for investment and production 
created by the policy of high interest rates, the liquidity 
crisis and depressed consumer demand.5 Since only increased 
production and investment can provide employment (one aim of ESAP 
being to streamline service provision), it is worth discussing 
this aspect further. An estimated 2 0,000 workers (figures range 
between 13,000 from the government to 25,000 from ZCTU) were
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retrenched in both public and private sectors in 1992 and several 
companies, particularly in the clothing and textile sectors, were 
liquidated. Unfortunately, no disaggregated data exists on the 
numbers of men and women who have lost their jobs. Many companies 
made losses and the Merchant Bank predicts that 1993 will be 
tougher than 1992. Even officials within government are pointing 
to the destruction of the productive sector; for example, the 
industry minister spoke of the high interest rates as "monetary 
terrorism" as companies are squeezed out of business. (EIU, 
1992:13). This refers particularly to non-exporting companies 
(EIU, 1993:13).
Stoneman (1990) argues that liberalisation of trade and foreign 
currency regimes, privatisation and general reduction of the 
state's economic role impact directly on industrialisation, the 
single most important process for long-term development. He 
points out that unlike other sub-Saharan countries which went to 
the IMF and World Bank for loans, Zimbabwe had a more diversified 
economy, functioning markets, a thriving private sector, and 
exchange rates which were maintained at realistic rates. He 
alleges that the World Bank pays lip service to 
industrialisation, while supporting macro-economic policies which 
make it difficult if not impossible. Ghai (1991:5) makes the same 
criticism and Kadenge et al (1991:32), too, argue that if local 
industry is not given the time or conditions to re-equip itself 
for external competition, while import tariffs are lifted on 
products that are locally produced, a process of de­
industrialisation will occur. Although it is too early to make 
definitive statements, there do seem to be indications that this 
is happening in some sectors. For example, the local production 
of some medical drugs and of car tyres was undermined because 
import tariffs on these products were lifted before tariffs on 
the raw materials required to produce these locally (MacGarry, 
1993:24). This raises the additional problem of the sequencing 
of measures under ESAP.
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What is also relevant is that, in any case, the international 
finance institutions advocate export-led industrialisation. Thus, 
manufactured goods have to be competitive on the world market, 
where multi-national corporations hold all the advantages in 
terms of capital and mobility. Sibanda's (1989:156) view is that 
foreign currency allocation systems determined wholly by market 
forces implied that only industries linked with foreign, monopoly 
capital will survive and prosper. In addition, the export of 
Zimbabwean ferrochrome (mining is a major source of export 
earnings) has been undermined by the entry of Russian ferrochrome 
on the world market (Robinson, 1993). One of the main growth 
areas in exports is that of horticultural products, particularly 
the sale of cut flowers (EIU, 1992:19, 1993:20), but it remains 
to be seen whether this area will provide substantial and 
reliable enough earnings to make a difference to the overall 
economy. The tobacco harvest was likely to set a new record in 
1992, despite the drought, but quality was affected and average 
prices on the world market were one-third lower than in 1991 
(EIU, 1993:19).
The Finance Minister himself has forecast that exports would fall 
in 1993, but expects a rapid expansion in 1994 (EIU, 1992:7). 
Debt servicing as a percentage of exports was 27.2% in 1991 
(World Bank, 1993). The leading independent financial newspaper 
states that it reached 30% in 1992 and predicts that it will fall 
to 27.5% in 1993 due to post-drought recovery of agricultural 
exports.6 In the meantime, total debt reached US$ 3.4 billion in 
1991, 57% of GNP (ibid) . Some economists estimate that debt
reached US$ 4 billion in 1992, 80.6% of GNP, largely as a result 
of short-term borrowing to finance the trade liberalisation 
programme.7 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993:32) states that 
trade statistics show no early signs of beneficial results from 
Structural Adjustment; exports have been contracting and both 
markets and sources of supply are narrowing rather than 
diversifying. Zimbabwe appears to be becoming more dependent on 
traditional primary commodity exports to old markets. This 
supports Stoneman's argument of deindustrialization.
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In March 1993, the government announced an imminent restructuring 
of investment regulations to attract foreign investors. The long 
discussed Export Processing Zones (EPZs) would come to life under 
these proposals. However, these would mainly benefit foreign 
capital and working conditions are notoriously poor where these 
zones have been created in other parts of the world (see for 
example Standing, 1991a). As Standing (1991a, 1991b) points out, 
the IMF and World Bank do not believe in Labour Regulation 
(minimum wages, unionisation and so on) , and as a result of 
"deregulation" forms of labour security around the world have 
been eroded and conditions of work have deteriorated. As 
described in Chapter 2, working conditions have already
deteriorated due to the amendments that have been made to the 
1985 Labour Relations Act in Zimbabwe. In other parts of the 
world, women have constituted to majority of workers in EPZs but 
in Zimbabwe, high levels of male unemployment combined with
gender ideologies which discriminate against women in the
workplace suggest that this may not be the case.
Stoneman (1990) argues that in Zimbabwe, in particular, there is 
greater potential for faster growth if it followed the
redistribution of wealth and income. He does not deny the
inefficiency of the civil service, government corruption and the 
need for reform, but argues that measures such as land reform and 
labour intensive industrialisation would lead to more efficient 
and more equitable economic growth. Neither of these issues are 
central and explicit concerns of current economic policy making.8
As Stoneman (1990) concludes, growth may be generated by capital 
inflows, and for a time sufficient funds may flow to maintain 
growth in some showpiece countries, but that this is not
sustainable. As argued in Chapter 1, this would seem to be the 
case in Ghana, which is cited as a successful adjuster by the 
World Bank. There is certainly a vested interest on the part of 
the international financial institutions in seeing Zimbabwe 
successfully implement their brand of Structural Adjustment, 
since these policies have failed in so many countries in Africa.
161
As the editor of the leading independent newspaper, the Financial 
Gazette, commented, "Zimbabwe's failure will in many ways signal 
the failure of the structural adjustment and trade liberalisation 
programmes as designed by the World Bank and IMF", a situation 
they would want to avoid. He goes on to say that donors who have 
already made huge financial commitments would be prepared to put 
in a lot more and "spoil the government all the way" in order to 
protect their investments and ensure that Zimbabwe services its 
debt.9
There is no doubt that excessive state intervention in situations 
where competitors are stifled has been counter-productive in many 
African countries, where, as Moyo (1991:16) points out "state 
enterprises have become havens for the party bureaucracy and 
other parasitic elements with the consequent lack of resources 
to the nation." However, as he goes on to argue, it is a question 
of defining the appropriate role for governments in developing 
economies, since both market and government failure have 
occurred. His conclusion, similar to Stoneman's, is that there 
are a number of options based on an analysis of the results of 
potential reforms in a particular country, and. not a single 
economic blueprint. Robinson (1993) also argues that there is a 
need for land reform, improvement in wages and working 
conditions, a reduction in inflation and well thought out social 
policies if economic growth is to take place.
In the final analysis, there are two very opposing views of how 
economic growth might occur. The path which is being somewhat 
equivocally pursued by the Zimbabwean government10 of 
liberalisation, privatisation and integration into the world 
economy is seen by international financial institutions to be the 
only way to use resources efficiently and to .grow. The other 
view, articulated amongst others by the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa (UN ECA) sees land reform, food self-sufficiency and 
state intervention in the economic and social sectors as playing 
more important roles in growth and development (Onimode 1990; UN 
ECA, 1989) . A clear example of the difference in strategy, with
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regard to food self-sufficiency, was the treatment of Zimbabwe's 
one million ton grain surplus in 1991. Under pressure from the 
World Bank, the government sold off the surplus in order to save 
money on storage. It then had to import grain because of the 
drought at three times the price gained from its earlier surplus 
sales.11
The UN ECA also argues that action at an international level on 
debt, commodity prices and fairer terms of trade are essential 
if the decline in sub-Saharan growth and development is to be 
halted and reversed. This international aspect is, not 
surprisingly, heavily neglected by proponents of Structural 
Adjustment since, as argued in Chapter 1, SAPs maintain unequal 
international relations in the interests of the industrialised 
West. Interestingly, however, a recent criticism of World Bank 
style Structural Adjustment comes from the Japanese Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, 1991), a major lending partner 
for SAPs. They criticise the Bank's approach for over-stressing 
market mechanisms, promoting privatisation without taking into 
account important aspects other than economic efficiency, not 
introducing adequate measures to promote investment, liberalising 
imports too quickly and not protecting domestic industry to allow 
a viable export sector to develop. The World Bank itself is 
currently reviewing its strategy, if not its objectives, in 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa where there are indications of a 
recognition that SAPs have failed to produce a single example of 
self-sustaining growth.12 One of the problems with such hints of 
policy revision is the time lag before changes in policy 
implementation in the Third World, during which time these 
countries will have suffered possibly irremediable consequences.
The debate concerning policies to promote growth has been treated 
at some length since firstly, economic growth is generally 
accepted to be a necessary, although not sufficient condition to 
promote the well-being of the majority, and secondly, it is a 
central objective of ESAP. In Zimbabwe, the research indicates 
that ESAP is increasing poverty and unemployment and there is
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little evidence to suggest that the policies will reverse these 
trends in the next few years. Before turning to the area of 
social policy and poverty alleviation programmes, policies 
towards the informal sector are discussed, since this sector is 
said to be important in providing employment and income during 
the period of Structural Adjustment, particularly for the urban 
poor.
ESAP AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
It is difficult to enumerate the number of people involved in 
this sector or as the current terminology refers to it, in 
"micro-enterprises". A study sponsored by the United States 
Agency for International Development in 1991 put the figure at 
1.6 million as compared to 1.1 million people employed in the 
formal sector.13 Much has been said by the government about the 
development of small-scale business as a primary source of job 
creation in the wake of economic stagnation, but little has 
actually been done to support this sector. The Small Enterprise 
Development Corporation (SEDCO) established in 1985 has achieved 
limited success due to financial constraints and bureaucratic 
controls.14 Serious obstacles continue and indeed, are stifling 
the sector by denying access to finance, imposing high interest 
and taxation levels, restricting access to land and basic 
utilities and enforcing zoning regulations. Although the 
government claims it is committed to overcoming these constraints 
within the five year programme, there is little progress after 
more than two years. In February 1993, the government finally 
released Z$ 100 million (US$ 1.7 million) for small to medium 
scale business to banks and to the Indigenous Business 
Development Centre (IBDC). The IBDC has criticised the method of 
allocation since 25% goes to existing businesses to reduce the 
debt burden for those who already owed money, and the rest to 
institutions which have strict lending rules that effectively 
rule out small applicants (EIU, 1993:14). The Confederation of 
Zimbabwe Industries is to set up a small industries development 
unit (ibid) but its success in removing the obstacles described 
above remains to be seen.
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Even if support for small businesses does become more than 
rhetoric, promotional measures are likely to be seized by better- 
off individuals or groups who will choose the most productive and 
dynamic activities with strong linkages with other activities or 
sectors (Moyo, 1991:12). This will result in increased 
differentiation within the informal sector. There are clear 
gender implications here. The study cited above that two-thirds 
of the 800,000 micro-enterprises were owned by women.15 However, 
as the present research confirms, women tend to be involved in 
the most vulnerable, precarious and lowest-paying activities, 
where it is possible to operate with little capital. Women are 
less likely to be in a position to take advantage of 
opportunities, which could further widen income differentials 
between men and women, unless women are specifically targeted.
In the policies and plans regarding this sector it is difficult 
to find even a modicum of gender-sensitivity. In the most recent 
document (October 1991) on the Social Dimensions of Adjustment, 
there is no mention of how gender inequalities will be addressed 
although it is stated that (amongst other groups) "married women 
who are secondary breadwinners may be the first to be retrenched" 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1991b:6). The only mention of designing 
projects to meet the particular needs of women is in relation to 
food-for-work projects in rural areas.
Having said that, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
which has carried out an enormous amount of work in this field, 
argues that specifically targeted programmes focusing exclusively 
on the informal sector alone will not succeed. As a report of the 
Director General (ILO, 1991:19) puts it,
"It is the whole of the economy, as well as the 
institutional, policy and regulatory framework within 
which it operates, and not only the informal sector 
itself, that needs to be the object of attention. It 
is the whole strategy for development which may need 
to be reconsidered and reoriented, since it has 
resulted in a number of biases which favour urban
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development and capital-intensive enterprises".
The likelihood, otherwise, is the saturation of the informal 
sector, as the research in many sub-Saharan countries shows (see 
Vandemoortele, 1991, discussed in Chapter 1).
Labour-intensive enterprises and employment issues do not seem 
to be considered central to ESAP. Firstly, an increase in 
employment is not an explicit criterion of the success of 
Structural Adjustment programmes. Criteria for success are 
limited to monetary and fiscal indicators such as growth of GDP, 
the budget deficit, growth of exports and so on (Moyo, 1991:16). 
Secondly, employment would seem to have been relegated, along 
with health, education and social welfare to the Social 
Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA), an adjunct of the main programme. 
Both points illustrate how development policies have shifted from 
being people-centred to economic-growth centred, to the detriment 
of low-income groups.
ESAP and its effects on employment prospects has particularly 
negative implications for women. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5, formal and informal employment opportunities and informal 
earnings have all diminished for women. Gender discrimination in 
employment, women's disadvantaged position in terms of education, 
skills and access to capital signify that they cannot compete 
with men in an environment where affirmative action for women is 
totally lacking and policies are, on the whole, completely 
gender-blind.
6.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME
The government has recognised that ESAP has negative implications 
for the poor; however, these are seen as short to medium term 
consequences since the "full, salutary impact of ESAP is only 
likely to be realised in the medium to long term" (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1991b: 1) . Ironically, the World Bank is said to have 
been more concerned than the government, at least at the 
initiation of ESAP, about the negative effects of ESAP on the 
poor. The World Bank put pressure on the government to draw up
166
the SDA document which came out in October 1991, ten months after 
the main programme was publicised (Davies, 1993; Robinson, 1993) .
"Transitional" negative consequences of ESAP are to be alleviated 
by the SDA programme. Its first component consists of social 
welfare programmes: targeted supplementary feeding and food
subsidies, fee exemption for health care and education for 
vulnerable groups. The second component consists of training and 
employment programmes. The employment and training component of 
the programme is stated to include small-scale income-earning 
ventures, employment-creating programmes and the provision of 
training for those retrenched from their jobs as a result of ESAP 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1991b:4).
One year into ESAP, the SDA was still a paper exercise yet to be 
implemented although the government had allocated Z$ 20 million 
from its 1991 budget to the Social Development Fund (SDF) and had 
procured a further Z$ 35 million from the African Development 
Bank (ADB) for training and employment opportunities.16 In 1992, 
the European Community (EC) pledged a further Z$ 180 million 17 
and various donors have since pledged further funding. The EC 
funds, however, are directed solely at retrenchment packages for 
civil servants, including retraining and reassignment. These 
packages are in stark contrast with conditions for retrenchment 
in the productive sector where workers have been laid off with 
a week's wages. Much of the Social Fund will be directed to the 
"new poor", in particular, government employees rather than more 
disadvantaged groups, such as the unemployed and landless. In 
addition, as the Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Finance 
pointed out in May 1993, 80% of total SDA expenditure was devoted 
to short-term compensatory and welfare schemes rather than 
employment and training programmes, although the latter would 
more "productively cushion vulnerable groups".18
As the research shows, the urban poor experienced great hardship 
in 1991 and 1992 but the institutions to implement the SDA 
programme were only in place and approved by the Public Service
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Commission in January 1993.19 The administrative issues which 
have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the SDA therefore 
include its late introduction, no information to the public on 
mechanisms of implementation, bureaucratic procedures and the 
fact the already overloaded Social Welfare Department was given 
the primary responsibility for its implementation (see Gayi, 1991 
and Brydon, 1993 for similar criticisms of PAMSCAD in Ghana, 
discussed in Chapter 1). The two following sections examine more 
closely the functioning of targeted welfare programmes which were 
the main focus of the SDA during the period of this study.
EXEMPTION FROM SCHOOL FEES AND HEALTH CARE CHARGES
Although school fees were introduced in January 1992, few 
families managed to claim exemption from the Social Welfare 
Department, for a number of reasons. The Ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare responsible for the 
implementation of the SDA, stated that the main reason was that 
welfare workers had not been adequately informed and had 
processed applications as part of the established public 
assistance programme which stipulated good performance as a 
criterion for help.20 However, there was a general lack of 
planning and organisation of how the system was going to 
function. Parents were not informed that they could claim, 
headmasters, in Kambuzuma at least, knew nothing about how the 
system would work and the Welfare Department set a deadline which 
parents were not informed of.21 As pointed out in Chapter 4, 
none of the thirteen households eligible for exemption in the 
study sample managed to claim in 1992, for lack of information 
and cooperation at the local level.
Aside from bureaucratic problems, there is the issue of finance 
to fund the number of children who are eligible for exemption. 
The programme supported approximately 8000 children in 1992 22 
but this number is extremely low in relation to the level of 
need. In February 1993, the number assisted had risen to 13,000 
children but, as the government publicised the exemption system, 
the Welfare Department was being overwhelmed by applications.23
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This deluge of requests occurred despite the fact that the 
decision to raise fees from the 1992 levels was abandoned when 
the President appealed to the education authorities on the 
grounds of economic hardship resulting from ESAP and the 
drought.24 The President's appeal was a response to the strength 
of popular protest against this measure. Nevertheless, 
examination fees were raised despite protests from parents and 
school fees will rise again next year. Moreover, as shown by this 
research, schooling costs include levies, school uniforms and 
transport costs, all of which have risen.
Fees for various categories of health care have been 
substantially raised during 1991 and 1992 (see Chapter 2), while 
the exemption threshold was a mere Z$ 150 (monthly income). The 
threshold for exemption was finally raised to Z$400 in February 
1993,25 but this is still very low in relation to the Poverty 
Datum Line (the PDL for a family of five was Z$762 per month in 
July 1992). The detrimental effects of this policy on utilisation 
of services and the health of the urban poor have been discussed 
in Chapter 5, but it is worth noting here that even the Minister 
of Health is aware of the implications. As he put it, "There is 
no doubt in my mind that we are having a negative effect on the 
health of the population by insisting that people who can't, 
should pay" (Horizon. 1992:21).
The government has declared that an overriding objective of the 
SDA programme is to "fine tune the interventions to make sure 
only disadvantaged groups are targeted" (Government of Zimbabwe, 
1991b: 1). Given the finance available and the fact that the 
majority of Zimbabweans live under the Poverty Datum Line, it is 
difficult to see how targeting can be effective. In the present 
study, not a single family living below the PDL had gained in any 
way from the programme.
Access to health and education services has moved from being a 
basic social right to a kind of charity; with a bureaucratic 
system having to be negotiated to convince officials of inability
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to pay and entitlement to exemption. These residual, highly 
targeted interventions do not even aim to improve living 
conditions but rather to meet emergency needs of the very 
poorest, witnessed by the extremely low threshold levels for 
exemption. As Loewenson (1991a:9) puts it, the SDA reinforces a 
two-tier system: the first of service provision according to 
ability to pay (or effective demand) and a second tier, according 
to need, from the Social Fund. The use of national resources 
according to national need is no longer a concern. It would 
certainly seem that post-independence, redistributive social 
policies have been abandoned, resulting in a widening of income 
and social inequalities.
FOOD ALLOWANCES
As food subsidies have been lifted, and even before the sale of 
imported maize which began in September 1992, the price of the 
main staple maize meal had rocketed. In recognition of the 
hardship faced by poor urban families who would not benefit from 
drought relief provision, the government introduced a targeted 
food allowance in August 1992.26 This was a cash allowance based 
on the difference between the old and new price of (the cheaper 
and less refined) roller meal, for families who earned less than 
Z$200 a month, an even lower threshold than for health and school 
fees exemption. (The highest level of allowance was Z$4 per 
family member.) The documents required to claim the allowance 
were a cause for even greater concern. It is worth listing them 
to illustrate how unrealistic and ineffective the programme 
design is. Beneficiaries were expected to produce: birth
certificates, proof of marital status, evidence of employment and 
earnings or unemployment, proof of citizenship, proof of 
residency in an urban area, proof of school attendance in an 
urban area for children. In the first few months of the 
programme, few people were able to claim,27 and although current 
figures are not available, it is unlikely that those in need will 
be effectively targeted.
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IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN SOCIAL POLICY
The research findings indicate how the impact of measures such 
as the lifting of food subsidies and cost recovery in social 
services go beyond the present period of hardship. Families' 
savings for the future are being depleted, with negative 
implications for old age, sickness, investment in education and 
other aspects of social development. The poor are bearing the 
brunt of the so-called "social costs of adjustment" since the 
elite who gain from the economic policies also gain from these 
social policies. The longer term consequences of this 
disinvestment and neglect of the majority of the population's 
health and education can only be negative, in both economic and 
social terms.
This study confirms the disproportionate effect on women of 
policies which cut food subsidies and raise fees for social 
services. The reasons for this lie in women's responsibility to 
feed the household, provide health care, childcare and so on 
which have been amply discussed in earlier chapters. The effects 
of these policies are not limited to women now, but extend to 
future generations, with girls suffering more than boys when 
parents with scarce resources are faced with choices about which 
children to prioritise.
Policy-makers have not taken into account gender-specific roles 
and there is little awareness of the way in which social costs 
are shifting from the state to low-income women. In Zimbabwe, 
government policy making has never been particularly gender- 
aware, and although awareness may be growing in some circles of 
the donor community (UN, NGOs and even some bi-lateral government 
donors), there is no evidence of this being incorporated into 
national level policies.
SAPs seek to reduce "distortions" that have prevented efficient 
operation of markets but as Palmer (1992) argues, gender-based 
distortions relating to the unpaid work women do as well as their 
unequal participation in the labour market, are not taken into
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account. She argues that without a gendered analysis of 
efficiency, policy-makers will remain entangled in a highly 
inefficient market. Certainly, the lack of concern about 
distributional effects of policy measures implemented within 
ESAP28, discussed in Chapter 1, results in disadvantaged groups, 
low-income households and women, in particular, becoming further 
marginalised as more powerful groups in society protect 
themselves.
6.4 FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
The dominance of economists, and the absence of social 
development professionals, in the formulation of Structural 
Adjustment programmes is one factor which results in much of the 
debate centring around economic issues and more particularly, 
statism versus privatisation. As Mamdani (1989) argues, however, 
this choice is between government corruption and private 
speculation, neither of which serves the interests of the poor. 
The critical issue, in his view, is therefore, one of political 
and economic democratisation, a different basis for making 
decisions. In examining the longer term prospects for low-income 
households, this would seem to be one of the central issues. The 
next section will therefore examine the issue of democratisation 
in relation to ESAP.
ESAP AND DEMOCRACY
The World Bank and an increasing number of donor agencies in the 
West are tying their aid to what has been termed "good 
governance" with democracy and accountability in the exercise 
of political power. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the very 
implementation of SAPs have been reliant on authoritarianism and 
repression on the part of governments. It can be argued that 
government accountability is reduced by Structural Adjustment. 
The state has less control over economic and social policies 
since these are defined by international financial institutions 
and donor countries. There is less of a role in their 
implementation and fewer resources.29 Governments are then 
accused of non-implementation of policies because they are
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concerned about popular opposition and political stability in the 
country, albeit because it threatens their maintenance of power. 
This does beg the question of what are the legitimate concerns 
of a sovereign government. In any case, it would seem that the 
notion of "democracy" as used by the World Bank and others runs 
the risk of being predominantly confined to the notion of multi­
party ism and parliamentary institutions alone, rather than the 
extension of active participation in decision-making to 
disadvantaged groups, including women (see Ashworth, 1992 for a 
similar view). Based on research on governance, democracy and 
economic policy in sub-Saharan Africa, Healey and Robinson (1992) 
question the assumption that multi-partyism equals more 
democratic processes and in turn, more accountability. They also 
question the assumption that formal democracies are more 
successful at fostering economic growth or reducing 
inequalities.30 On the other hand, the emphasis on democratic 
rights as an international issue could provide space for 
autonomous civic organisations and may result in greater pressure 
from below for increasing governments' accountability.
In the post-independence period, the Zimbabwean government 
initially decentralised decision-making to local government but 
then brought it under strong party and central state control, 
actively discouraging action by groups outside party and state 
structures (Loewenson, 1991:10). As such, the government and the 
ruling party are seen as the only agents of socio-economic 
transformation, promoting an image of protectionism and 
paternalism towards "the people". Skalnes (1993:404-5), for 
example, discusses how political authoritarianism in Africa has 
given rise to patrimonial and personalistic forms of rule that 
undermine rational policies needed for long-term development. A 
major issue here is the underdevelopment of civic organisations. 
As Davies (1991:10) points out: "We have 'underdeveloped'
structures and institutions, not solely in the economic sphere, 
but also in the political. The centrality of the state is not 
simply something that has been imposed on society in a 
voluntarist way. It reflects the weakness of alternative
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institutions." In the present study, most respondents felt it was 
the government's responsibility to take account of their 
problems, to provide employment and food and basic goods at 
controlled prices. A very small minority of respondents 
identified collective organisation as an avenue to pressure for 
this responsibility to be met. Trade unions were mentioned in 
terms of their role in negotiating for higher wages, although 
respondents were critical of their capacity to carry this out and 
of the self-interest of union officials. A few respondents 
referred to coming together with others, for example, one 
respondent said women should come together, collect information 
on price rises and present it to their local elected councillor; 
another said pensioners should get together to negotiate for 
higher allowances.
ESAP was formulated with minimal consultation and debate, even 
within government and party structures (see Moyo, 1992:326), to 
say nothing of labour organisations, professional bodies, women's 
groups and other grass roots organisation (weak as they might 
be) . In the early months of implementation, Members of Parliament 
were frequently reported in the press as complaining that they 
were not adequately informed of the programme and were unable to 
respond to their constituents' questions. Labour organisations, 
such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) with a 
membership of 400,000, were not consulted.
A survey carried out in early 1991 to assess public awareness of 
the content of ESAP concluded that the majority of the population 
was not aware of the content of ESAP. This was particularly so 
with peasants and mining communities (10% awareness), but even 
among rural business persons and low-income urban households only 
just over half those interviewed were cognisant of the content 
of ESAP (Kadenge et_al, 1991:30). Brydon (1993) reports similar 
findings regarding the content of SAPs (known as the Economic 
Recovery Programme) in Ghana. It was only towards the end of 
1991, with the very rapid escalation in the cost of living and 
questions from all sections of society, that seminars began to
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be organised at different levels and in various ministries and 
the ruling party. Since then, the press has played an 
increasingly important role in examining the programme, 
questioning its effects and the role of the government and 
donors. Nevertheless, it was only in 1992, when major policies 
had already been implemented and loans procured, that wider 
debate and discussion developed.
RESISTANCE TO ESAP FROM ORGANISED GROUPS
While ESAP is already well underway, the timing and intensity of 
the measures and their eventual outcome will probably depend on 
the organisational strength (or weakness) of the opposition from 
various groupings, and the level of government repression.
In Tironi and Lagos's (1991) analysis of the "Social Actors and 
Structural Adjustment", they identify one of the principal actors 
as the trade union movement, arguing that it is a major source 
of resistance because living conditions of workers are threatened 
by SAPs as is the power of the unions. There is no doubt that 
ZCTU, the umbrella trade union organisation, was one .of the first 
organisations to pressure for debate and dialogue. Its 1991 May 
Day theme of "Liberalisation or Liberation" was widely publicised 
and won much popular support.
The government has responded to ZCTU's demands for dialogue by 
inviting them to participate in the implementation of the SDA 
programme and to sit on committees to look at which areas of law 
should be deregulated under ESAP, that is, on how, and not 
whether, to implement World Bank-style ESAP (Loewenson, 1991:11). 
There is no doubt that ZCTU has been extremely vocal in its 
criticism of ESAP and has organised protest marches against the 
rises in the cost of living and changes to the Labour Relations 
Act. The Secretary General has also been given considerable press 
coverage in explaining how the sharing of benefits and burdens 
is unfair under ESAP. However, there is also little doubt that 
the unions have been weakened by retrenchments and changes in 
labour legislation (see ZCTU, 1993 for a summary) and that
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individual unions are barely coping with the problems of their 
own workers, leaving little scope for building support of other 
underprivileged groups. Daines and Seddon (1991:20) emphasise the 
importance of the degree to which trade unions are capable of 
building a popular rather than a proletarian character, in 
providing a challenge to the ruling elite. The ability of unions 
in Zimbabwe to do this is ultimately an empirical question which 
time will answer, but the obstacles are enormous. The experience 
of unions in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa is not 
positive. For example, Bungura and Beckman (1991) provide a 
detailed account of how organised workers in Nigeria attempted 
to defend employment and wages, and mobilise and channel 
opposition of other social groups. Despite their efforts however, 
they were unable to reverse the direction of Structural 
Adjustment Policies.
Tironi and Lagos (1991) also identify employees of the state and 
public enterprises as possible sources of resistance to measures 
which reduce their numbers and result in a decline in their 
economic and social status. This is a group that the government 
is obviously concerned about, but as discussed earlier in this 
chapter the government is adopting a "softly softly" approach and 
is attempting to cushion the effects with (albeit only 
relatively) generous retrenchment packages.
Although there is widespread disillusionment with ZANU.PF, very 
apparent even in this micro-level study, a strong viable 
alternative party has not yet emerged. The five, small, right- 
wing opposition parties seem unable to unite. Ironically, Ian 
Smith, the former Prime Minister of pre-independent Zimbabwe was 
asked to chair meetings intended to unify them in 1992 but the 
attempt failed with disagreement between the leaders on a whole 
range of issues.31 Moyo (1992:328) argues that these opposition 
parties are all too frequently characterised by nepotism, 
tribalism, regionalism and incompetence. A relatively new 
initiative, the Forum for Democratic Reform Trust (FDRT), formed 
in May 1992, brings together a range of respected figures from
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the law, the churches and business, includes some prominent white 
liberals, and is in the process of launching a new party (EIU, 
1993, 1:9). While the Forum has, to date, won wider respect than 
other opposition parties (see Moyo, 1992:329), it has been 
criticised by the ZCTU for being more concerned with clean 
government, constitutionalism and the protection of private 
property, than with problems of hunger, shelter, unemployment and 
other concerns of the poor.32
Aside from political parties, some groups and movements have 
emerged or grown stronger since the initiation of ESAP. The 
students' movement has demonstrated for increased grants to cope 
with the rise in the cost of living but has also protested 
against the government's human rights record.33 These 
demonstrations have been repressed by the use of riot police. An 
organisation for the protection of human rights has been formed 
(ZIM Rights) but again, has been accused along with the Press by 
the Minister for National Security for "sowing the seeds of 
despondency and conflict". Strong statements have been issued 
about how the government will "take immediate and firm action to 
stamp out any civil disorder that may be attempted in this 
country".34 Indeed, the government is alleged to have employed 
force, scare tactics and propaganda in its attempt to quell 
opposition (EIU, 1993:4). Just one example is the case of two 
officials from an opposition group of former ZAPU members, who 
were struck and killed by a car in March 1991. The Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) is thought to be responsible.35
Members of Parliament who have dared to challenge government 
policy have also been warned (by the President and the Speaker) 
of "taking democracy too far".34 Similarly, the independent press 
has been attacked by the ruling party for criticising government 
policy, giving too much space to the views of opposition parties, 
alleging corruption of senior government officials and 
criticising the government's human rights record. The cabinet has 
actually discussed plans to curb press freedom and editors and 
journalists have been harassed and intimidated (EIU, 1993:7).37
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The government's main response to criticism and opposition from 
trade unions, students, back-bench MPs and the press has been 
repression, rather than co-optation or compromise, which Tironi 
and Lagos (1991:41) suggest as alternatives for overcoming the 
opposition of various social actors.38 At the same time, the 
government continues to appeal for loyalty due to the party which 
won independence, now over twelve years ago. Government 
corruption would seem to be spreading and worsening, with a spate 
of charges at high levels in 1992 (EIU, 1993:8), and there is no 
evidence of any rethinking of economic or social policies (EIU, 
1993:6).
In examining the nature of organised responses to ESAP, two 
contradictory trends are apparent. On the one hand, there is 
state repression of opposition to the negative effects of ESAP 
on the lives of the majority of the population, and an attempt 
to weaken, if not destroy the means that less powerful sections 
of society have to respond collectively to their problems. As 
Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantra (1991:7) argue, in their analysis of 
the relationship between the state, SAPs and social groups, 
economic crisis and SAPs have led to a blurring of class 
distinctions and a weakening of established social organisations 
and institutions, together with a decline in state power. They 
conclude that, as a result, the social and political situation 
has become fluid and uncertain, with at best ambiguous prospects 
for stability and democracy. On the other hand, there is the 
potential for the growth of civic organisations in defence of 
basic rights, which is supported, on an ideological level at 
least, by international pressure for democracy and 
accountability. There does seem to be a divergence between 
economic forces, which increasingly constrain low-income groups, 
and these political currents for democracy, so that future trends 
are difficult to predict.
The next section examines the nature of responses to ESAP from 
less organised sections of society, before some concluding 
comments are made on future implications for low-income
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households.
LESS ORGANISED RESPONSES TO ESAP
As Daines and Seddon (1991:9) point out, studies on the every day 
forms of response to the increases in the cost of living with 
SAPs have been characterised as primarily defensive, aimed at 
meeting basic needs and with little potential for changing 
policies. The current research shares this characterisation, 
since it has been argued that responses are mainly individual and 
family based, directed at coping with rather than resistance to 
current policies. In addition, they seem to be decreasing 
consumption and increasing labour for urban, low-income 
households and women in particular. There was little awareness 
of the wider causes of the present situation and the struggle was 
seen in terms of meeting every day needs.
Daines and Seddon (1991:8) put forward the argument that every 
day forms of struggle carry the potential for changing 
circumstances and that they can erupt into open forms of 
conventionally recognised politics. The evidence to support this 
view is drawn from Latin America and Asia, where they argue that 
neighbourhood groups, while not a new form of organisation, have 
increased in strength and coordination, sometimes linking up to 
form or join more organised movements, such as the women's 
movement. While the potential undoubtedly exists, in Harare at 
least, ESAP seems to have lessened the room for manoeuvre for 
disadvantaged groups and there are no clear indications that 
every day struggles around issues of consumption are developing 
in collective or cooperative forms. An important reason for this 
may be that wider group solidarity and the level of mass 
political consciousness is higher in urban areas in Latin America 
than Africa, for historical, political and socio-cultural reasons 
discussed in the last chapter.
Tironi and Lagos (1991:42) argue that the disorder created by 
SAPS gives rise to fragmentation and further stratification, so 
that individuals oscillate between apathy and rebellion, since
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they cannot perceive strong common interests around which to 
establish collective action. On the issue of rebellion, popular 
unrest in the 1980s, which has been a primarily urban phenomenon 
in the Third World, has been marked by street protests and 
demonstrations (the so-called food or bread riots described in 
Chapter 1). According to Tironi and Lagos (1991:48), these 
outbreaks of violence by marginal groups, do not bring about 
change and are followed by resignation and conformist behaviour. 
In this situation, individuals retreat into primary groups based 
on links of an affective nature, thereby increasing their 
isolation and social segmentation.
The research findings do point in this direction since the urban 
poor, particularly those without formal employment, do not seem 
to identify strong common interests and even their identity as 
urban citizens is weak, due to linkages with family and land in 
rural areas of origin. Skalnes (1993:423) also comments on the 
incompleteness of the process of proletarianisation of workers 
in Zimbabwe due to these rural links. While these links may 
weaken as a result of ESAP (as discussed in Chapter 5) they are 
currently still extremely strong for the majority. In a sense, 
modern life in the city, with employment, housing, basic consumer 
goods and services has become increasingly inaccessible while 
traditional patterns have also been broken. In this situation, 
the main response at present seems to be disaffection with the 
social order and increased individualism. However, in Zimbabwe 
a greater culture of resistance has certainly existed in the 
recent past during the national liberation struggle and it could 
be rekindled or strengthened with the pressures felt under ESAP. 
Moyo (1992:328-9), in his analysis of state politics and social 
domination in Zimbabwe, voices this view, arguing that the 
growing concern of various sections of society with the effects 
of ESAP could coalesce into an issue-oriented mass movement. The 
next few years will be critical in indicating the kind of future 
social change we can expect to see in Zimbabwe.
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Lagos and Tironi (1991:45) analyse the long-term implications of 
current trends, arguing that, in time, from fragmentation and 
disintegration, there emerges segmentation and pluralism. From 
common interests and centralised collective actions by leading 
social actors, the tendency is towards individual action, 
organisation around primary or local groups and decentralised 
social action, focused on particular issues. However, as Chant 
(forthcoming, b) points out, the specific implications for women 
are not discussed and the same limitation applies to Moyo's 
analysis.
In the present study, the vast majority of women were and are 
more isolated than men and have the least resources. There could 
therefore be even more obstacles for the identification of common 
interests and tangible goals, leading to forms of collective 
organisation and action.39 Much may depend on the ability of more 
organised and politicised groups to incorporate greater numbers 
of women. The social groupings discussed in the above section 
have not, to date, shown much gender-sensitivity in their 
activities, so that it is difficult to be optimistic about their 
ability to do this.
Elson (1991c:192), in discussing how to overcome male bias in 
development, says:
"The first step ...is enabling women to develop a 
better sense of their own worth and their own 
contribution to the family and to the wider society. 
Following this, women need to be able to develop a 
sense of their own identity, an identity which is not 
submerged in their roles as wives, mothers and 
daughters. On this basis, they can develop a voice of 
their own, both individually ..and collectively... and 
begin to act with other women to weaken the forces 
constraining them."
The problem is that ESAP and the resultant increased burden of 
meeting household needs has contributed to further submerging
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women in their roles as wives, mothers and daughters, so that the 
"space" for developing a sense of their own identity is reduced. 
Rocha et al/s (1987:17-18) analysis of evidence from Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico leads them to state the "the resolution of 
the basic problem of consumption has become the central concern 
around which women's activities turn". This statement seems to 
mirror what is now happening to most women in Harare.
The effects of SAPs on employment opportunities and the informal 
sector, cutbacks in social sector expenditure, the introduction 
and/or raising of user charges and devaluation with decontrol of 
prices all seem to increase and reinforce women's disadvantages 
and further exploit their labour. In many ways, SAPs impose 
limits on women's struggles and undermine their power and ability 
to renegotiate gender relations within the household. As Grown 
and Sen (1987) argue, it is easier to increase the capabilities 
and entitlements of women in the Third World if these are 
increasing for the societies they live in. This brings us to the 
importance of the international dimension, since changes in the 
relationship between the industrialised countries and the West 
in terms of trade, protectionism in the West and debt relief are 
essential for improvement in the economic sphere. In other words, 
there are structural limits to what can be changed for women and 
gender relations without an alternative form of development. At 
the same time as the international dimension increases in 
importance, information about this in an accessible form and 
indeed, control over these aspects would seem to be decreasing 
for the poor. This is not to portray poor people and women in 
particular as passive victims, since surviving is an active 
struggle, and since SAPs may at least be opening up rather than 
restricting political space, but rather to emphasize the 
structural nature of the constraints they face in changing
relations of power and control of resources.
6.5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It has been argued in this chapter that, even within the criteria
set by the programme, ESAP had not, by the end of 1992, been
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successful. There are indications that a process of de- 
industrialisation is taking place and there is certainly 
increased dependence on foreign loans and capital. The (economic) 
criteria set for measuring the success of the programme do not 
incorporate indicators which reflect the well-being of the 
majority of the population, and the urban poor and women in 
particular. Even if the programme does eventually promote some 
economic growth, the almost total neglect of the distributional 
impact of the policies indicates that benefits will continue to 
be accrued by national and international elites. Post­
independence redistributive social policies have been abandoned, 
causing a further widening of inequalities, with particularly 
negative implications for women. The poverty alleviation 
programme (SDA) is both ineffective and gender-blind and there 
is no indication of a change in perspective on the part of policy 
makers.
The effects of these policies combined with state repression of 
any opposition has weakened the organisations by which less 
powerful sections of society can respond collectively in defence
of their basic rights and needs. Although new forms of
organisation may emerge in i the future, the current situation
seems to fragment and individualise responses to the crisis.
The differential and disproportionate effects of SAPs on low 
income groups are now at least acknowledged by government and 
international financial institutions, even if their policy 
responses are extremely inadequate and there is still an 
insistence on the notion of "trickle down" of benefits in the 
longer term. Gender disaggregation and recognition of the way in 
which women are particularly disadvantaged by SAPs is not only 
poorly acknowledged by policy makers, but there is little in the 
way of action. As long as this gender blindness prevails, the 
deleterious effects on women, and because of their engendered 
roles, on the health, nutrition and welfare of low-income 
households, will continue.
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Notes to Chapter 6
1. Woodward's analysis suggests that while external performance 
was generally better in adjusting than non-adjusting countries, 
only the exporters of manufactured goods performed better overall 
than non-adjusting countries; and other country groups performed 
substantially worse than non-adjusting countries in all cases 
except where they undertook less macro-economic adjustment (as 
measured by exchange rate devaluation and reduction of the budget 
deficit) than non-adjusting countries. Since exporters of 
manufactured goods represent a relatively small proportion of 
developing countries, Woodward questions the appropriateness of 
the present approach of Structural Adjustment as a general 
development strategy, particularly for unindustrialised, 
commodity-dependent and low-income countries.
2. This is not to belittle the scale of the deterioration in 
living standards found in the current research, which should be 
of great concern to policy makers.
3. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, (11)25:3 "Package for ESAP".
4. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 1992, (11)24:2 , untitled.
5. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1993, (12)5:3 "Companies face 
liquidation" which reports the merchant bank view and provides 
their figures on closures and retrenchments.
6. See Financial Gazette. 20-5-93 "Debt service ratio to drop to 
27.5%" for these estimates.
7. See Daily Gazette. 13-01-93, "National Debt could increase: 
economists say", for these estimates. Figures from the World Bank 
are not yet available for 1992.
8. The Land Acquisition bill passed in April 1992 shifts 
government policy so that land acquired by government (an 
envisaged five million acres) will go only to "experienced and 
master farmers", which effectively excludes the landless. The
110,000 families on the waiting list are required to reapply, 
(see Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(10):6 "Dramatic shift in
government resettlement policy will not give land to needy"). 
There was no representation of peasant farmers in the debate on 
the bill and the government has aligned itself to large, 
commercial farming organisations which are hostile to peasant 
interests (see Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(7):9 "Land
Acquisition").
9. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, (11)26:3 "Zimbabwe's failure 
haunts World Bank, IMF".
10. See Skalnes (1993:416-18) for a discussion of the differing 
viewpoints concerning ESAP within the government and the pressure 
from well organised, white-dominated interests in the productive 
sector leading to the adoption of the programme.
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11. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, (11) 18:4 "Drought relief 
aims to keep Structural Adjustment on track" and Zimbabwe Press 
Mirror. 1992, (11)12:2, untitled piece, for a discussion of this 
issue.
12. See Africa Confidential. 1993, 34 (12) "Opening up the World 
Bank" for a discussion of a "confidential draft" by the Bank's 
Policy Research Department initially entitled "Why Structural 
Adjustment has not succeeded in sub-Saharan Africa" and 
diplomatically renamed "Adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa - 
Progress, Payoffs and Challenges". The report is due to be 
published in September 1993.
13. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1993 (12) 5:6 "Little businesses".
14. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1993, (12)3:3 "Indigenous Sector".
15. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 11 (3):7 "Enterprises".
16. See The Herald. 4-03-92, "Social Dimensions Fund stands at 
$50m.
17. See The Financial Gazette. 16-07-92 "EC pledges $180m to 
boost Social Fund".
18. See The Herald. 24-5-93 "Welfare bill puts burden on Social 
Dimensions scheme".
19. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. (11)26:2, untitled article.
20. See The Herald. 28-10-92, "Call to help parents with fee 
problems".
21. See The Herald. 23-02-92, "Directives on School Fees".
22. See The Herald. 16-06-92, "State pays school fees for at 
least 8000 pupils." However, at least 2000 of these were not new 
applications but children supported under a previous scholarship 
scheme for needy families but related to good school performance 
(see The Herald. 13-02-92, "Pledge to pay school fees for 4000 
pupils").
23. See The Herald. 5-02-93, "13000 children helped to pay school 
fees".
24. See The Herald. 12-12-92, "Ministry cancels fee increases for 
next year".
25. See The Herald. 19-01-93, "Clinics to give free treatment to 
people earning $400 a month".
26. See The Herald. 21-08-92, "Ministry releases details of food 
money claims".
27. See The Herald. 19-10-92, "Government food aid scheme proves 
too cumbersome".
185
28. Stewart (1992) who discusses the distributional impact of 
various macro-economic policies implemented within SAPs, is also 
critical of the lack of concern for their distributional impact, 
on low income groups and women.
29. Ghai (1991) provides a fuller discussion of the decline in 
the power and reach of the state within current macro-economic 
policy frameworks.
30. Healey and Robinson's research indicates that political 
stability and incentives for domestic savings are correlated with 
economic growth. ESAP in Zimbabwe currently militates against 
both.
31. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11 (19):6 "Opposition in
shambles".
32. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror.1992. 11(16):9, untitled article, 
for an interview with the President of the ZCTU on this issue.
33. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1991, 10(21):3 "Students clash
with police" and 1992, 11(11):1 "Students take demo into city".
34. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(22):1 "Press beating".
35. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1991, 10(22):2 "Who drove?".
36. See Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(19):4 "Structural 
Adjustment: the Political Dimension".
37. See also Zimbabwe Press Mirror. 1992, 11(8):8 "Press 
freedom".
38. The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993, 1:4) voices the view 
that the independent press and human rights groups will be 
sufficiently protected by international pressure, although they 
will continue to be attacked in various ways. This would be a 
tangible, positive effect of current international trends calling 
for more democracy and accountability in government.
39. There are a few exceptions to this isolation and lack of 
action. One example is the protest of 700 people, mainly women, 
in Mutare town, against the decision of the council to charge a 
Z$50 levy for every backyard shack in poor suburbs. Riot police 
were called in to defuse this demonstration.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
This thesis was written with the principal objective of examining 
the gender-specific effects of ESAP on low-income urban 
households. The research has demonstrated that the effects, to 
date, have been negative and that women, due to gender-based 
inequalities and gender-ascribed roles, have been even worse 
affected than men. The first two chapters of this thesis examined 
the broad conceptual and contextual setting for the research and 
outlined the Structural Adjustment programme. The third chapter 
moved to the micro-level, providing a "base-line” socio-economic 
profile of the study population in Kambuzuma while the fourth and 
fifth chapters assessed the changes among and within households 
following economic and social policy changes implemented under 
ESAP. The sixth chapter returned to the macro-level, assessing 
ESAP and attempting to link the findings from this micro-level 
study with national policies, drawing out possible future 
implications for low-income households and women in particular. 
The aim of this final chapter is to draw attention to the most 
critical findings and to place them in the context of the 
original objectives and rationale for the study and current 
debates in the field. In addition, the chapter briefly examines 
the policy implications of the study findings and discusses 
possible questions and approaches as to future research in this 
field.
7.1 CRITICAL FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH
Research into gender, poverty and SAPs has increased over the 
last few years. Since the present study began, further analysis 
has been carried out on the way gender functions as a critical 
variable in determining the effects of ESAP at the grassroots 
level and this is now a major, if not principal focus, of various 
recent publications (see for example, Afshar & Dennis (eds.), 
1992; Elson(ed.), 1991; Gonzalez de la Rocha & Escobar Latapi 
(eds.), 1991). However, there is still a paucity of gender-
187
disaggregated household level studies in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
study contributes to an understanding of gender and processes of 
change following macro-level policy changes. It substantiates the 
hypothesis that low-income women are worse affected than men by 
current, market-led economic and social policies and illustrates 
the inadequacy of neo-classical approaches which treat the 
household as an undifferentiated unit. The research shows how a 
combination of measures adopted as part of ESAP have decreased 
women's income (to a greater extent than men's) and increased 
their labour, thereby diminishing their power within the 
household and, in many cases, increasing gender-based conflict 
over the deployment of scarce resources. While female-headed 
households do not face the same constraints on how to utilize 
resources, they are over-represented among the poorest households 
and older women are often dependent on their families, 
particularly sons, for their subsistence.
The study also provides empirical substantiation for the now more 
widely accepted view that SAPs exacerbate poverty, although there 
is still debate as to the time span over which this poverty is 
likely to occur. Since the study was carried out over the first 
two years of ESAP, it is not possible to draw definite 
conclusions on this point directly from the findings. However, 
on the basis of an assessment of ESAP in Zimbabwe at a macro- 
economic level (and the experience of other countries in the 
region), it has been argued that these effects are not likely to 
be transitional. In any case, the nature of the current effects 
of ESAP have longer term implications. Household savings for 
future investment in housing, education, health care have been 
depleted by the rises in the cost of living and have 
repercussions on the future well-being of low-income households. 
Similarly, relationships between extended family members and 
between men and women have been strained with longer term 
consequences. This study has attempted to assess changes in a 
holistic manner and to integrate various levels of analysis. In 
so doing, a more integrated picture of people's lives emerges and 
the notion of merely transitional hardship for the poor becomes
188
more difficult to sustain. In any case, the huge increase in the 
number of households living below the Poverty Datum Line over a 
relatively short period and the exacerbation of income 
inequalities, irrespective of their duration, should be a matter 
of great concern to policy makers.
The research also provides some contrasting findings to those of 
many Latin American studies which found an increase in the 
participation of women in the labour force during crisis and 
Structural Adjustment. In Harare, this has not been the case: 
unemployment rates were already high and many sectors of industry 
and manufacturing initiated retrenchments as part of ESAP. The 
specific context is therefore very important, particularly the 
structure and size of the labour market, the level of gender 
discrimination in employment (based on the social and cultural 
construction of gender) and women's levels of education and 
skills.
Although the informal sector is attributed great importance in 
providing income during the period of adjustment, women in Harare 
(as in most countries) are involved in very vulnerable and low- 
paying activities. The fall in demand combined with increased 
competition and the rising cost of inputs, particularly in making 
clothes, has meant that women's income from this sector has 
declined as a result of ESAP. Since profits in female-dominated 
sectors have been more severely affected than male-dominated 
areas of work, gender inequalities within the informal sector 
have been exacerbated. Plans to support this sector do not take 
into account women's disadvantaged position in terms of skills 
and access to capital, let alone the way in which women's time 
for such activities is constrained by their household 
responsibilities.
The trend towards extension of previously male-headed nuclear 
households found in the study has not implied a greater number 
of income earners, as it has in many Latin American studies. 
Instead, households have incorporated unemployed relatives,
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including those fleeing the effects of the drought in rural 
areas, so that dependency ratios increased over the period of the 
study and housing has become more overcrowded. Household 
extension in Latin America has resulted in the alleviation of 
financial hardship and greater cooperation between members of the 
household whereas in Harare, the opposite has often occurred with 
relationships becoming strained by increased financial stress.
The changes in policy and budget cuts in the social sectors have 
decreased the access of low-income groups to social services. 
They also increase gender inequalities by substituting financial 
resources with women's time, particularly in health care. If 
hard-pressed parents choose to educate boys rather than girls, 
future generations of women will also be prejudiced. The SDA 
programme to alleviate "transitional” costs of adjustment for 
vulnerable groups has, to date, been very weak in both its 
conceptualisation and implementation. It has concentrated on 
highly targeted welfare interventions, has done virtually nothing 
to promote the productive capacity of the poor and has been 
totally gender-blind in its implementation, which in any case has 
been fraught with administrative and bureaucratic problems. This 
study indicates that there is an urgent need for comprehensive 
evaluations of such programmes and a need to review current 
social policies which rob the state of an effective role in 
service provision.
While the nature and extent of gender inequalities emerge clearly 
in this study, men also suffer unemployment, poor wages and 
working conditions. Gender equality is therefore an insufficient 
goal and without changing class-based inequalities, it would be 
difficult to substantially improve the lives of the poor.
Coping responses to the huge increases in the cost of living 
under ESAP were found to be mainly negative in that they involved 
cuts in consumption, an increase in women's labour and a decline 
in leisure activities, as opposed to positive responses which 
include creating greater access to resources. The poorest
190
households, most dependent on state subsidies on food and in 
health and education, were worst affected by the rises in the 
cost of living and forced to make the heaviest cuts in the 
consumption of food and basic commodities, with negative 
implications for their health and welfare. Women have had to 
modify their lives to a greater extent than men but their 
responses have been largely ineffective in compensating for the 
effects of low wages, rising prices and fewer income generating 
opportunities. In Harare, women's responsibility for household 
consumption and reproduction together with the lack of 
opportunities for employment and income generation mean that they 
bear the brunt of increased difficulties in meeting the day-to- 
day basic needs of the household. This has resulted in most women 
becoming further submerged in their roles as wives, mothers and 
daughters, so that the possibilities for increased "public” roles 
and greater self-confidence are diminished. This situation 
appears to be somewhat different to that of Latin America where 
women have increasingly moved into the labour market in the 
course of economic restructuring.
In Harare, responses to the crisis have been individual and 
family rather than community based, concentrating on coping with 
the effects of policies rather than resisting or attempting to 
change them. It has been argued in the present thesis that the 
nature and policies of the post-independence government, the 
relatively recent process of urbanization, and cultural issues, 
all militate against greater collective responses to the crisis. 
In addition, existing social organisations such as trade unions 
have been weakened by changes in legislation under ESAP, and have 
also remained male-dominated and gender-insensitive.
Although many of the changes in economic policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa are similar to those in Latin America, some research does 
point to greater solidarity and collective response among the 
poor in the latter, at least in the form of women organising 
around issues of collective consumption. While it is difficult 
to adequately identify the reasons for the differences between
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the two regions on the basis of existing research, and there are 
undoubtedly great variations within the regions, several factors 
would seem to be important. In Latin America, greater levels of 
urbanization and more established urban populations perhaps 
encourage a greater sense of identity as urban residents, and 
have conceivably also given rise to longer-standing and more 
elaborate social networks that have provided a basis for 
collective action. In contrast, the relatively recent process of 
urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa and the very strong links with 
rural areas and peasant societies seem to militate against a 
clear urban identity. The identification of common interests 
within urban settlements is therefore arguably more difficult. 
The greater provision of social services by many relatively 
recent post-independence African governments could also have 
discouraged women's organisation around issues of collective 
consumption.
In Harare, although cooperative strategies and social 
organisations may emerge in the future, the current situation 
seems to fragment and individualise responses to hardship under 
ESAP. The main beneficiaries of ESAP seem to be national and 
international elites, with the state actively repressing 
organisations which represent the views and aspirations of less 
powerful sections of society. However, the current economic 
crisis and the moves towards greater democracy have begun to 
encourage the formation of civic groups, some of which have begun 
to demand basic human rights and greater accountability from 
government. The process is, however, complex and sometimes 
contradictory so that future trends are difficult to predict, 
particularly in relation to the improvement of women's position 
in society.
7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Any serious consideration of gender issues immediately leads to 
a critique of the traditional emphasis on economic growth as the 
objective of development and demands inclusion of the area of 
reproduction and social development as essential components. The
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problem is that tackling this issue requires a fundamental 
reconceptualisation of development, with a redistribution of 
resources at national and international levels. Alternative 
policies to SAPs have been formulated but comprehensive change 
in the reallocation of resources would not seem to be on the 
agenda of decision-makers at the present time. Similarly, work 
has been done on how these alternatives can be made more gender- 
sensitive by allocating resources to women (for example in small- 
scale production and services) and reallocating resources within 
sectors. However, despite the enormous amount of advocacy work 
which has been done to raise issues of gender and Structural 
Adjustment (see Ashworth, 1992 for a summary) , one of the key 
questions, raised by Elson (1991:187) is still the extent to 
which those with economic and political power are prepared to 
channel resources directly to poor women, rather than assume that 
resources will "trickle down" from men to women (and children). 
In summary, policy implications and alternatives exist but the 
political will to implement change in favour of low-income groups 
and women is weak.
Another major area of concern is the amount of data which is 
being gathered without adequate gender disaggregation. As Elson 
(1991:198) points out, even recent major data gathering 
initiatives to monitor the effects of SAPs by the World Bank and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will not 
investigate gender assymetries within the household. Similarly, 
the indicators which are currently used to measure the success 
of ESAP are focused on macro-economic performance with little 
attention to social variables and the position of women. Once 
again, it is a question of where the interests of decision-makers 
lie. Certainly, monitoring the position of low-income groups and 
women would seem essential if, as the rhetoric would still have 
it, the well-being of the majority of the population is the 
primary focus of development.
193
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The present research has resulted in the identification and 
exploration of a number of problems related to ESAP. Although it 
would not be difficult to identify further interesting areas for 
research, in the light of the discussion above, perhaps more 
fundamental questions need to be raised related to the 
objectives, methods and utilisation of research in this field. 
Despite an increase in an understanding and analysis of the 
problems faced by poor people in the Third World on the part of 
social researchers, positive changes in policy which might 
benefit low-income groups, let alone women, have been less 
evident. Academic social research, in particular, tends too often 
towards acquiring knowledge for its own sake rather than for an 
improvement in the lives of disadvantaged groups. A brief 
description of how this research was carried out illustrates that 
it might be possible to use studies more effectively, without 
losing the rigour appropriate to research carried out by 
academics.
The study was carried out with the National Union of the Clothing 
Industry. It was made clear from the start that the findings 
would be used for this thesis but a commitment was made to use 
the project to develop the research capabilities of the union, 
to facilitate the discussion of findings with union members and 
to use relevant information in negotiations with employers. In 
other words, the knowledge gained from the research process and 
outcomes was to be used, as far as possible, to empower affected 
groups and individuals and to raise gender-related issues within 
the union.
The development of research skills led to the formulation of 
another project, related to ESAP, the clothing industry and the 
role of the union. The results of the present research have been 
utilised by a number of national and local organisations in 
Zimbabwe, and have been made available, in appropriate and 
accessible form, to the government, donor agencies, civic 
organisations and to the respondents of the study. In addition,
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the research was widely publicised using the media: radio,
newspapers and current affairs magazines, particularly the 
independent press which has played an important role in promoting 
debate about ESAP and its effects. This approach therefore 
allowed for the collection of objective information and views as 
well as collective discussion and review of findings and their 
implications. In summary, the very process of research can make 
a contribution to the development of democratic debate, processes 
and structures.
One particular area, which was not adequately investigated in 
this study, was the role and nature of social groups and 
organisations in which women participate. This relates to a more 
general need to assess the nature and extent of successful 
collective responses to ESAP as opposed to more defensive, 
individual responses found in this (and other) studies. As Elson 
(1991:193) points out, women need organisations which seek to 
empower them as well as enabling them to cope. An investigation 
of collective as well as individual responses could help in 
promoting positive strategies for change, particularly if the 
research methodology includes a collective framework for 
discussing findings, involving the very groups under 
investigation. Again, the very process of research could be used 
to enhance women's organisational capacity.
Given the international nature of the current crisis, comparative 
research between different regions of the developing world could 
also lead to a greater understanding of different responses to 
economic change. If appropriate methodologies were employed, such 
research would also provide organisations which represent low- 
income groups with the opportunity to obtain information and 
learn from the experience of other countries.
It is difficult to be optimistic about major improvements in the 
economic situation in Zimbabwe, and even if they occur, about the 
extent to which they will benefit low-income households in 
general, let alone the women within them. However, the space
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which political trends for democracy is opening up in Zimbabwe, 
as in other parts of the region, does provide fresh avenues for 
struggle and change. If research can be used to strengthen 
organisational capacity at the grassroots level, to give a voice 
to those who are least heard and to lobby for more equitable and 
gender-aware development policies, then this is probably the best 
contribution we, as researchers, can make to improve the lives 
of low-income women and their households.
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APPENDIX ONES RESEARCH METHODS
SELECTION OF SETTLEMENT
The research was located in Kambuzuma, a high-density suburb in 
Harare. It was decided to carry out the study in one settlement 
for two reasons. Firstly, there are no large differences in 
income levels between high-density suburbs, but rather within 
settlements (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1985). Since income 
differentials within low-income groups were of interest, one 
settlement was sufficient to provide this. Secondly, working in 
a single settlement facilitated an appraisal of community-level 
networks and groups which would have been more difficult in more 
than one area.
Kambuzuma was selected for the study because it is a well- 
established and stable settlement which does not have any 
peculiar characteristics, such as high in-migration (as do 
settlements located close to the main bus and railway stations) 
or special projects taking place (eg one settlement has a World 
Bank funded 'sites-and services' project).Kambuzuma is therefore 
a more typical suburb, reflecting the general situation in most 
high-density suburbs. It also has both the most common forms of 
housing tenure: lodging and owner-occupancy. It should be noted, 
however, that two suburbs in Harare, Mbare and Epworth, have a 
higher proportion of very low income households; Mbare, due to 
high levels of in-migration and Epworth because it is the only 
squatter settlement, although it is slowly being upgraded. The 
findings of this study do not therefore reflect the experience 
of the poorest settlements in Harare.
SAMPLING PROCEDURE
The study is based on a sample of 100 households. The sample size 
was based on practical considerations of time and cost 
(particularly since several visits had to be made to each 
household to obtain the range and depth of information required) 
while being large enough to permit the manipulation of data. A 
household has been defined as a group of people living and eating
197
together, and who at least partially pool resources (income and 
unpaid work) to meet the physical needs of the group as a unit 
(see Chapter 3). Lodgers therefore constituted a separate 
household although they lived in the same house or on the same 
plot. Single lodgers were excluded from the sample for the 
reasons given in Chapter 3.
One hundred and twenty households, to allow for 'loss' in the 
follow-up study, were randomly selected using a map of the 
settlement with enumerated plots, obtained from the local 
district council. Kambuzuma had a population of approximately
40,000 people with 2,600 plots, divided into 6 sections. 
According to discussions with the District Officer prior to 
sampling, there are no differences in income levels or housing 
tenure between sections. Nevertheless, households from all the 
sections were included in the sample, with approximately 10 plots 
per section selected from each section (every 25th plot), giving 
a total of 60 plots. This more than produced the required number 
of households since most plots had at least two households, 
usually a main householder and a lodger family. It was only 
possible to follow up 100 households in 1932 (see Chapter 4, 
note 1).
INTERVIEWS
Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in 
order to obtain a more holistic picture of people's lives. A 
questionnaire was used to collect information on household 
structure and composition, employment and paid work, household 
expenditure, domestic work and time-use and involvement in social 
organisations, all major areas where changes were likely to occur 
as a result of economic stress. This questionnaire was piloted 
on 13 households and modified^ The same questionnaire format was 
used to collect information after 12 months. (See Appendix Two)
Semi-structured interviews (40 households) were used to analyse 
coping strategies since these better elucidate why certain 
decisions and priorities are made, in terms of the subjects'
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perceptions and perspectives on their problems and options.
The majority of interviews were carried out in Shona and a 
minority in English. It was necessary to work with fluent Shona 
speakers who were given several training sessions on the 
objectives and methods of the research and interviewing 
techniques (including role play), prior to commencing the study. 
An interview guide was also formulated for their use (see 
Appendix Two). Over the two year period, six research assistants 
were involved (four females and two males), including trade union 
organisers, a researcher from the City Council Research 
Department and social work students. The training and experience 
was much appreciated by the individuals and organisations 
involved and was instrumental in the formulation of action- 
oriented research related to ESAP, specific industries and the 
unions. It was very useful working with these research assistants 
since they had all grown up in high density suburbs and were able 
to provide invaluable insights into lifestyles and problems in 
such settlements.
THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
In all households (except three), the respondent in the first 
instance was the woman who was primarily responsible for 
household management and domestic work. It was felt that it was 
essential to get her point of view in such a study and in any 
case, she was more likely to have the different types of 
information required on all members of the household. This was 
usually found to be true, although, in a number of cases, a 
shorter interview was held with the man/ men in the household to 
obtain or confirm information that the women were unsure about, 
particularly about men's income. Most of the households were 
visited at least twice to fill in the questionnaire, since it was 
too long to be completed at one sitting.
The questionnaire was divided into six sections, described below. 
The guidelines for the questionnaire survey in Appendix Two 
provide a more detailed view of the content of each section and
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areas of difficulty and ambiguity which had to be addressed,
particularly in the sections on income and expenditure.
A. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS covering 
information on household structure (see Chapter 3 for 
typology) and composition, profile of each member of the 
household in terms of age, education, occupation and so on, 
tenancy status and housing characteristics, information on 
seasonal migration to the countryside.
B. TIME ALLOCATION/ DOMESTIC WORK. Questions related to the 
responsibility for and time taken up by cooking, shopping, 
cleaning, washing and ironing. Responsibility for childcare 
as well as leisure and social activities of the respondent 
and spouse (when relevant), were also covered in this 
section.
C. EMPLOYMENT/ PAID WORK. This covered formal and informal 
sector work, regular and irregular other sources of income, 
including items such as rent, contributions from offspring, 
state transfers etc. Informal sector earnings often depend 
on the time of year in question, so that carrying out the 
follow-up study about the same time of year allowed for a 
more reliable comparison.
D. USE OF HEALTH SERVICES. Questions related to the 
utilisation of curative services during the four weeks 
previous to the study and of maternal health services 
during the previous twelve months. Constraints to 
utilisation were also a focus of this section.
E. HOUSEHOLD BUDGET/ EXPENSES. The items of interest were 
food, rent, rates, transport, water, electricity and other 
fuel, remittances to family in rural areas, education 
expenses and clothing. The frequency of consumption of 
staples and meat were differentiated in order to detect 
changes in diet. Information on who contributed to the
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household budget was also collected, as well as on savings 
and debt.
F. INVOLVEMENT IN ORGANISATIONS/ GROUPS: questions related to 
the frequency and type of activities, if any, of head and 
spouse in social, religious, political and professional 
organisations.
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
In January 1992, six months after the 'base-line' household 
survey, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 21 
households to examine if and what kind of changes had taken 
place. The sub-sample was drawn from various categories (not 
exclusive): lower and higher income households, (within the
income range established by the questionnaire study); male- and 
female-headed, households with women who spent the greater part 
of the year in the country side, main householders and lodgers.
A list of prompting questions were used to elicit how and why 
certain decisions and priorities were made within the household 
regarding employment and paid work, consumption of food and basic 
goods, domestic work, use of services, social and leisure time> 
links with rural kin. The initial question asked was what the 
respondent felt had been the main effect of ESAP on the household 
and the final question was what she/he felt could/should be done 
about the problems identified.
These interviews showed a number of changes taking place a short 
period after the beginning of ESAP. They also served as a pilot 
for the second batch of semi-structured interviews (July/Aug 
1992) , in confirming criteria for selection of the sub-sample and 
in defining important areas of change due to ESAP.
The respondents were, in the main, the women who had been 
interviewed in the questionnaire survey. However, in some 
instances, a husband was present and both were interviewed 
together which proved to be quite useful since it allowed direct
201
observation of ways of relating between men and women.
In July/August 1992, a further 29 semi-structured interviews were 
carried out. Ten of these were with households which had been 
interviewed in January 1992 and nineteen were with newly-selected 
households, making the total number in the sub-sample forty 
households. These interviews were extremely useful in elucidating 
gender-differentiated responses within the household and gender- 
based conflict regarding the use of scarce resources.
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Two focus group discussions were held in January 1992 on the 
theme of coping with the increased cost of living. The first 
brought together women who worked primarily in and from home and 
the second women who spent over three months a year in rural 
areas engaged in agricultural work. A third discussion with women 
who were formally employed was planned, but partly because they 
had the greatest time constraints, a suitable time was difficult 
to agree on and only two women turned up on a second attempt.
These group discussions, which were very animated, were extremely 
useful in identifying differences in points of view among the 
women as well as a range of coping responses.
INFORMATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESAP
Aside from the main government documents on the planned 
programme, it was necessary to collect information from the 
media, particularly the government and independent press, on the 
actual implementation of specific measures, since these often did 
not conform to the initial plan. In addition, these sources 
proved very important in describing reactions and responses of 
various sections of society to ESAP, as well as the changing 
economic situation in the country.
DATA ANALYSIS
The questionnaire data was analysed using the basic statistic 
facilities of the software package EPI-INFO, mainly percentages
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and cross-tabulations. The qualitative data from semi-structured 
interviews was synthesised, by variations in income, household 
structure and so on, to examine common trends in responses to 
financial hardship.
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APPENDIX TWO
QUESTIONNAIRE; PHASE 2*
* Used in 1992 but identical to questionnaire used in 1991 except 
for a few additional notes in this version.
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER: ______________________
NAME OF RESPONDENT;______ ____________________________________
ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:
EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS
SEX OF RESPONDENT:
MAIN HOUSEHOLDER/LODGER:
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE:
DATE OF INTERVIEW:
TIME OF INTERVIEW:
NAME OF INTERVIEWER:
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SECTION A: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND HOUSING CHARACTISTICS
A. 1 How many people, including yourself, live in 
household/family at present (that is, cook and 
together)? ____________
A.2 How many other people live on this plot? __________
your
eat
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A.3 Can you tell me about changes in the household since last 
year. (REGISTER ONLY CHANGES DURING THE INTERVIEW, FILL IN THE 
TABLE LATER FROM LAST QUESTIONNAIRE)
Name Sex Relation 
to resp.
Year
of
birth
Level of
Education
(completed)
Present
Occupation
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A.4 Respondent's marital status:
A.5 Do you have any other children who do not live with you? 
Yes_____ No________
If yes, please tell me more about them: (REGISTER
CHANGES, FILL IN TABLE AFTER INTERVIEW)
Name Age Sex Independent/
dependent
Occupation
A.6 Do all members of the present household live in Harare all 
the year round? Yes_____No_______
If not, please tell me more about this.
Name Where person 
goes
No. of mths 
per year
Reason
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A.7 What is your tenancy status?
Homeowner ___________
Lodging _____________
Renting whole house ___________
Other (specify) ___________________________
A.8 If main householder, whose name is the house in?
Male head ___________
Female head ____________
Joint ________
Other (specify) _________________
A. 9 How many rooms do you use (including
A.10 What is your main source of water?
piped water in the house ____________
piped water outside the house ___________
other (specify) __________________________
A.11 Do you have electricity in the house?
Yes ____ N o _______
What form of lighting do you use?________
A.12 What type of fuel do you use for cooking?
electricity ________
paraffin stove _______
other(specify) ____________
kitchen)?
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SECTION B: TIME ALLOCATION/ DOMESTIC WORK
B.l Who is the main person responsible for housework in this 
household? __________________________________________
B.2 On an average day, how often do you cook a meal?
once a day __________
twice a day _________
three times a day __________
other (specify) __________
Who does this work (include helpers)? ________________
How many hours a day does it take to prepare food, cook and 
clear up afterwards? ___________
B.3 What shopping do you do?
daily ____________
once a week _____________
monthly _______________
other (specify) ______________
Who does the shopping?
time taken ________
time taken _________
time taken___________
time taken __________
(include helpers)
B.4 Generally, what cleaning do you do in the house?
daily __________________  time taken
twice a week ________________ time taken
once a week ________________  time taken
other (specify) _______________ time taken
Who does the cleaning? (include helpers) _______
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B.5 How many times a week do you wash clothes?
daily _______
twice a week _________
once a week _________
other (specify) ________
About how long does it take to do each wash, including the 
ironing? _______________
Who does this work (include helpers)? ________________
B.6 Who looks after the young children in the day?
Do you have any children who attend a creche? 
Yes ________ No_________
B .7 Does your husband spend time with the children? 
Yes ______No_______
If yes, what does he do with them? ____________
B. 8 At what time do you usually get up in the morning?
At what time do you usually go to bed at night?
B. 9 At what time does your husband get up in the morning?
At what time does he go to bed at night?
B.10 What do you do for your own enjoyment?
B.ll What are your husband's social activities?
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SECTION C: EMPLOYMENT/ PAID WORK
C.l Please tell me more about the work of members of your
family.
Name Name
Name of employer 
and job description
How many other 
people work there? 
0, <5, 6-10, >10
Is work permanent 
or casual/temporary
How many days a 
week is the work?
How many working 
hours per day?
Take home pay last 
month
Work location
How does he/she get 
to work?
How long is the 
iournev to and from 
work, in total.
Transport costs per 
day?
Is he/she a member 
of a union?
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C.l continued:
Name Name
Name of employer 
and
Job description
How many people 
work there ( 0, <5, 
6-10, >10)
Is the work 
permanent or casual
How many days a 
week is the work
How many working 
hours per day?
Take home pay last 
month
Work location
How doeshe/she get 
to work
How long is the 
iournev to and from 
work in total?
Transport cost per 
day.
Is he/she a member 
of a union?
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C. 2 Are any members of the household unemployed and actively 
seeking employment at the moment? Yes ______ No_______
If yes:
Name No. of months seeking work
C.3 Does any member of the household have any other sources of 
income (such as second jobs, rent, money received from 
family, sale of produce)?
Yes No
If yes, can you tell me about the regular sources:
Name Source Income(yearly 
monthly ...)
Monthly
amount
1
DEDUCT COSTS OF INPUTS: WORK OUT PROFITS MADE
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Can you tell me about the irregular sources:
Name Source When
received
sum
received
Average
inc/mth
DEDUCT COST OF INPUTS; WORK OUT PROFIT MADE.
C.4 Do you grow any food items, such as maize or vegetables? 
(not kumusha but at house in town or kumumba)
Yes _______  No_________
If yes, what do you grow?_____________________________
Who works the plot? _________________
Is the produce for sale__________
for consumption _________
both ________
C.5 Do you rear any animals? Yes _____ No _____
If yes, which animals? ___________________________
Who looks after them? _______________________
Are the animals and/or their products:
for sale ________
for consumption _______
Both
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SECTION D: USE OF HEALTH SERVICES
D.l Have you or any other member of your household been ill or
injured in the last four weeks? Yes ______
No • (go to QD.3)
D.2 If yes, can you tell me more about this:
Name: Name:
Who was ill/injured 
(state if child or adult)
what type of illness / injury 
(eg fever, cold, diaorrheia)
how many days unable to 
what s/he normally does
did you see anyone about it? yes/no
who did you see? eg doctor, nurse..
where? eg clinic, private clinic
did you see anyone else about it? 
who?
where?
How many visits in 
the past 4 weeks/
How much was paid for 
transport in the 4 weeks?
How much was paid for visits/ medicines 
in the last 4 weeks?
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Who went with the ill/injured 
person?
Who cared for the sick person 
at home?
Did the person recover?
D . 3 Do you face any problems in using the public health 
services in Harare?
Never used _______
Yes/ sometimes _____
No _____
If yes, can you tell me what sort of problems?
Compared to last year, are the services:
the same ______
better _______
worse _______
D.4 Have you used the ante-natal clinic during the last year?
Yes, regularly _________
Yes, irregularly ________
No ________
If yes, were there any problems in attending the clinic?
If no, what was the main reason for not attending?
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D.5 Have you used the Family Planning clinic in the last year? 
Yes _______  No ________
If yes, what did you feel was the main problem in 
attending the clinic? _________________________________
If no, what was the main reason for not attending?
D .6 Do you and your husband belong to a Medical Aid Society?
Yes, husband ________  Yes, wife _________
No, husband _________  No, wife _________
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SECTION E: HOUSEHOLD BUDGET/ EXPENSES
E.l Can you tell me how much you spend on the following 
items?
Item Amount Monthly
cost
Who provi­
des money
Food and groceries 
at home
Rent
Rates
Education expenses: 
fees, transport, 
milk etc
Water
Electricity
Other fuel
Food at work
Transport to work
Money sent to 
family
Other regular 
expenses (specify) 
eg domestic help
Clothing
School uniforms
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E.2 Of the money you spend on food, how much do you spend on:
maize per month? _______________________________________
bread per month ________________________________________
E. 3 How often do you eat meat? ______________________
How much does this cost per month?________________
E.4 How often do you eat chicken? ____________________
How much does this cost per month? __________________
E.5 Do you and your spouse manage to save any money each 
month?
Yes ______ No_______ (go to E.7)
If yes, who saves and how much?
Name of saver (specify 
if joint savings)
Amount per month
•
E.6 What are these savings used for?
Who decides what to spend savings on?
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E . 7 Since the cost of living is so high, are you or your 
spouse in debt now?
Yes _______  No_______
If yes, can you tell me more about this.
Who took loan? Source of loan Current debt
E.8 Do you have accounts to pay off at any shop at present? 
Yes No
If yes, can you tell me more about this:
Name of account 
holder
Name of shop Monthly amount
E.9 Do you borrow regularly from work or elsewhere?
Yes ______ No________
Amount (monthly) ________________
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SECTION F: INVOLVEMENT IN ORGANISATIONS/ GROUPS
F.l Are you a member of the church? Yes _____ No
Is your husband a member a church? Yes _____ No
F.2 Do you and your spouse belong to organisations such as 
church groups. burial societies, women's groups, ZANU 
groups, trade unions etc.? Can you tell me about this.
Name of member Type of group/ 
organisation
Frequency of 
vour activity
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APPENDIX TWO (CONT)
GUIDELINES FOR QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY - 1992
General Notes
1. The objective, of this follow-up study is to detect the CHANGES 
in the economic and social situation of the household since the 
first questionnaire was filled in. YOU MUST THEREFORE READ THE 
FILLED-IN QUESTIONNAIRE CAREFULLY BEFORE YOU ARRIVE AT THE 
RESPONDENT'S DOOR.
You must refer to the filled in questionnaire as you are filling 
in the new one.
2. ASK ALL THE QUESTIONS. Don't assume you know the answers from 
last year's questionnaire. On the other hand, for many questions, 
you can reduce the interview time by asking specifically for 
changes since last year, noting these down, verifying the data 
you have in the last questionnaire and filling in the data which 
is the same as last year after the interview.
(see QA.3 for an example)
3. Don't forget to show respect for your respondents. Try and 
build a good relationship with them (in most cases you already 
have this) - listening well is very important. Remind the 
respondents about the objectives of the research and tell them 
this interview will be shorter since the main objective is to 
register changes since last year. This is important because, as 
you know, the questionnaire is very long!
4. Ask short, clear questions. Don't put words in the 
respondent's mouth - for example, don't answer the question if 
she is having difficulty with it but rephrase or explain the 
question.
5. If during the course of the interview, it becomes clear that 
information was wrongly recorded last year, NOTE THIS CLEARLY at 
the bottom of the relevant page of the new questionnaire so that
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we can amend last year's record. Otherwise, we will have a false 
idea of changes which have taken place.
6. Note the general domestic context that surrounds you while 
carrying out the interview. After the interview, please record 
any comments which you think will add to the general picture of 
how the household functions and in particular, any changes you 
note since last year. This can be done on the back of the 
questionnaire or at the bottom of the page. Don't worry about 
writing on the questionnaire provided you do not obsure any 
responses.
Notes to help you complete the questionnaire properly 
IMPORTANT! ALWAYS USE A RED OR BLUE BIRO
COVER PAGE
Fill in the bottom section of the page after you have left the 
interview. We do not want to keep the respondents waiting while 
this section is completed.
PAGE 2
A.1 Explain to the respondent the definition of "household” - 
i.e. those who cook, sleep and eat together.
PAGE 3
A.3 Household composition You can ask if there are changes in 
household composition, if anyone has moved in or out since 
last year. Register the information on anyone who has moved 
in. Note who has moved out below the table. Then verify 
that the data on education and occupation on last 
questionnaire is correct and update if necessary on new 
questionnaire. The whole table can be filled in after the 
interview.
Level of education means years of completed schooling & 
completedcourses, but also make a note of any current 
course that anymember of the household is involved in.
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Remember that "occupation" should be noted as defined bv 
the respondent.Don/t automatically write 'housewife' before 
the women herself has had a chance to come up with her own 
description.
If the domestic worker lives, eats and sleeps with the
family, then her details should be included.
PAGE 4
A.5 This question refers to offspring (children) who are living 
away from home. Independent means adults with their own 
income and possibly theirown families. Dependent means 
offspring who are being supported by this household. In the 
Occupation column, make a note
of whether children are at school, adults are employed or 
housewives etc.
You can register changes during the interview, verify and
update data and fill in the whole table after the
interview.
PAGE 7
B.7 Please get the specific details of what the husband
actually does with the children.
B.10 You need to think very carefully about how to express this
question in Shona.
PAGE 8
C.l Name of Employer & Job Description: state a) the person's
job - i.e. driver, plastics moulder, machinist, ET driver 
etc. and b) the name of the employing company.
Pay - please make sure that you note the take home pay.
Journey to & from work - make sure that you get the total 
travelling time to and from work.
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Union membership: please make every effort to get this
information, even if it means going back another time.
PAGES 10 and 11
C. 2 Note that we only want information on those who are
actively seeking employment.
C.3 When a source of income is regular - e.g. monthly or twice
a year then include it in this table. Otherwise include it 
in irregular sources of income.
With irregular sources of income, please find out on how 
many occasions the household has had this income in the 
last year (since the last questionnaire). Then work out a 
monthly average.
If you are given a total figure, for a regular or irregular 
source, write it below the table and work the cost of
inputs with the respondent, then calculate the actual 
profit made per month. Put this final figure in the table 
under 'monthly amount'.Note: you should also include in
this section, money received from offspring or relatives, 
either resident or non-resident, as well as pensions,
compensation payments etc.
PAGE 12
D. 2 What type of illness; write the main symptoms of the
illness and make a note if it is chronic - i.e the person 
has had it over a long period (eg. high blood pressure, TB, 
diabetes etc)
How many days: Find out if the illness was such that the 
person could not work, go to school, or play as usual and 
for how many days.
Did you see anyone else: the objective of this question is 
to check whether a referral was made, or if a traditional 
healer was seen..
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How many visits: this means the number of visits to a
clinic/hospital or any health practitioner.
How much for transport: remember to write in the total
amount for the 4 week period.
How much for visits/medicines: same as for transport. Also 
note the instances where medical aid paid the full amount.
PAGE 13
D.2 Who went with ill person; please write "nobody" if the 
person was unaccompanied.
Who cared for sick person: please write "not relevant" if 
person did not need care. And write "self" if the person 
looked after her/himself.
Did the person recover: write "still sick" if person has 
not recovered.
D.3 If the person does not use public health services in 
Harare, then tick "never used" and give the reason why (eg. 
only used ku musha).
PAGE 15
E.l Food & groceries; you may need to help the respondent to 
work this out, by going through exactly what items are 
bought on a daily, weekly and/or monthly basis. Write these 
figures down in the column marked 'amount...' (or under the 
table if you need more room) and then calculate the monthly 
sum and write this in the column 'monthly cost'.
Education expenses: this includes expenses for school,
university, technical/secretarial college etc. It also 
includes creche expenses. Write down the specific amounts 
first, and then calculate the total.
When you are given the amount per term, work out the
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monthly figure in the same way as for the last 
questionnaire for that family.
Water: If water is included with electricity or in rent, 
then please state this clearly.
Electricity: same as above. Also state if there is no
electricty in the house.
Other fuel: specify exactly which alternative fuel is being 
used.
Food at work: this section is only for those who actually 
contribute to various household expenses on a regular basis 
- usually the head and/or spouse, (sometimes the female or 
male head and son). Note the amount spent per day, multiply 
by number of days worked per week. Then multiply by 4.2 to 
get the monthly amount.
Transport to work: this only concerns those who make
regular contributions to household budget (same as for food 
at work).
Work out figure as for 'food at work' above.
Money sent to family: this covers money sent ku musha as 
well as money given to family living elsewhere in urban 
area. If money is for theirown children who are living away 
to go to school, then please state clearly under education 
expenses that the amount has been included in this section.
Clothing: make sure that you do not include clothing
expenditure twice - once in this section and then, again, 
in 'accounts'.
'Accounts' for other items (specify) should be noted under 
Other Regular Expenses.
Other regular expenses: this includes all other regular
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expenses such as domestic worker's wages, burial society, 
accounts, insurance etc.
Who provides money: the intention here is to establish who 
contributes to particular parts of the household budget. 
Also: please state here if offspring contribute anything, 
and if they do, then specify whether it is in the form of 
money or actual groceries.
PAGE 16
E.2 Bread expense per month: If bread is bought daily, multiply 
daily amount by 30. If bread is bought a few times per 
week, work out the amount spent per week and then multiply 
by 4.2 to get the monthly amount.
E.5 Savings: we are interested in savings of those who
contribute to the running of the household, usually the 
head and spouse. But if other members consitute this 'core 
household' e.g. head and son, then note their savings too.
PAGE 17
E.7 Debt: this includes details about borrowing from employers, 
friends, relatives. Note: accounts should not be included 
here but in E.8
E.9 Borrow regularly: this includes borrowing every month from 
employers or every 3 months (for example) for school fees 
etc.
PAGE 18
F. 2 Describe clearly the type of organization - i.e. church
group, sports, professional body etc.
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